Like [[anti-plurality voting]], Coombs' rule is extremely vulnerable to strategic voting. As a result, it is more often consideredused as an example of a [[Pathological (mathematics)|pathological]] voting rule than it is a serious ruleproposal.<ref name=":0" /> The equilibrium position for Coombs' method is extremely sensitive to [[Exhausted ballot|incomplete ballots]], [[Tactical manipulation of runoff voting#Compromise|compromising]], [[Tactical manipulation of runoff voting#Push over|push-over]], and [[strategic nomination|teaming]],andbecause the vast majority of voters' effects on the election come from how they fill out the bottom of their ballots.<ref name=":0">[http://www.accuratedemocracy.com/l_data.htm "Data on Manipulability"]</ref> As a result, voters have a strong incentive to rate the strongest candidates last to defeat them in earlier rounds.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Smith |first=Warren D. |date=12 July 2006 |title=Descriptions of single-winner voting systems |url=http://www.9mail.de/m-schulze/votedesc.pdf |journal=Voting Systems}}</ref>
This results in a [[Keynesian beauty contest|Keynesian beauty pageant]] that is extremely sensitive to minor variations in the perceived strengths of candidates.
