Content deleted Content added
fixed |
No edit summary |
||
Line 1:
{{Short description|Theory in the philosophy of science}}
The '''unity of science''' is a thesis in [[philosophy of science]] that says that all the [[sciences]] form a unified whole. The variants of the thesis can be classified as [[ontological]] (giving a unified account of the structure of reality) and/or as [[epistemic]]/pragmatic (giving a unified account of how the activities and products of science work).{{sfn|Tahko|2021|p=4}} There are also philosophers who emphasize the disunity of science, which does not necessarily imply that there could be no unity in some sense but does emphasize [[Pluralism (philosophy)|pluralism]] in the ontology and/or practice of science.{{sfn|Tahko|2021|p=4}}
Early versions of the unity of science thesis can be found in [[ancient Greek philosophers]] such as [[Aristotle]],{{sfn|Cat|2017}}{{sfn|Wilson|2000}} and in the later history of [[Western philosophy]].{{sfn|Cat|2017}} For example, in the first half of the 20th century the thesis was associated with the unity of science movement led by [[Otto Neurath]],{{sfn|Symons|Pombo|Torres|2011}} and in the second half of the century the thesis was advocated by [[Ludwig von Bertalanffy]] in "General System Theory: A New Approach to Unity of Science" (1951){{sfn|Bertalanffy|1951}} and by [[Paul Oppenheim]] and [[Hilary Putnam]] in "Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis" (1958).{{sfn|Oppenheim|Putnam|1958}} It has been opposed by [[Jerry Fodor]] in "Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)" (1974),{{sfn|Fodor|1974}} by [[Paul Feyerabend]] in ''Against Method'' (1975) and later works,{{sfn|Feyerabend|1993}}{{sfn|Feyerabend|2011}} and by [[John Dupré]] in "The Disunity of Science" (1983){{sfn|Dupré|1983}} and ''The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science'' (1993).{{sfn|Dupré|1993}}
| |||