Unity of science: Difference between revisions

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Early versions of the unity of science thesis can be found in [[ancient Greek philosophers]] such as [[Aristotle]],{{sfn|Cat|2017}}{{sfn|Wilson|2000}} and in the later history of [[Western philosophy]].{{sfn|Cat|2017}} For example, in the first half of the 20th century the thesis was associated with the unity of science movement led by [[Otto Neurath]],{{sfn|Symons|Pombo|Torres|2011}} and in the second half of the century the thesis was advocated by [[Ludwig von Bertalanffy]] in "General System Theory: A New Approach to Unity of Science" (1951){{sfn|Symons|Pombo|Torres|2011}}{{sfn|Bertalanffy|1951}} and by [[Paul Oppenheim]] and [[Hilary Putnam]] in "Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis" (1958).{{sfn|Cat|2017}}{{sfn|Oppenheim|Putnam|1958}} It has been opposed by, for example, [[Jerry Fodor]] in "Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)" (1974),{{sfn|Cat|2017}}{{sfn|Fodor|1974}} by [[Paul Feyerabend]] in ''Against Method'' (1975) and later works,{{sfn|Cat|2017}}<ref>{{harvnb|Feyerabend|1993}}; {{harvnb|Feyerabend|2011}}.</ref> by [[John Dupré]] in "The Disunity of Science" (1983) and ''The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science'' (1993),{{sfn|Cat|2017}}<ref>{{harvnb|Dupré|1983}}; {{harvnb|Dupré|1993}}.</ref> by [[Nancy Cartwright (philosopher)|Nancy Cartwright]] in ''The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science'' (1999) and other works,{{sfn|Cat|2017}}{{sfn|Cartwright|1999}} and by [[Evelyn Fox Keller]] in ''Making Sense of Life: Explaining Biological Development with Models, Metaphors, and Machines'' (2002) and other works.<ref>{{harvnb|Ludwig|Ruphy|2021}}; {{harvnb|Keller|2002}}.</ref>

[[Jean Piaget]] suggested, in his 1918 book ''Recherche''{{sfn|Piaget|1918}} and later works, that the unity of science can be considered in terms of a circle of the sciences, where logic is the foundation for mathematics, which is the foundation for mechanics and physics, and physics is the foundation for chemistry, which is the foundation for biology, which is the foundation for sociology, the moral sciences, psychology, and the theory of knowledge, and the theory of knowledge forms a basis for logic, completing the circle,{{sfn|Braun|Baribeau|1984}} without implying that any science could be [[ReductionismGreedy reductionism|reduced]] to any other.{{sfn|Kitchener|1981}} More recently, multilevel [[complex system]]s are considered to be [[transdisciplinary]]<ref name=trans/> objects of study.{{sfn|Cat|2017}}{{sfn|Bunge|2003|pp=4, 250}} Such systems can be modeled as having [[emergent properties]] at different [[levels of organization]], which do not neatly correspond to separate disciplines such physics or biology,{{sfn|Cat|2017}} and which cannot be adequately modeled using a philosophy of extreme [[reductionism]] ("everything comes from the bottom", which does not fully account for emergent properties) or extreme [[holism]] ("everything comes from the top", which does not fully account for systems' components and interactions).{{sfn|Bunge|2003|p=40}}{{sfn|O'Connor|2020}}

==Criticism==

{{See also|Theory of everything#Arguments against}}

The allure of a unified scientific framework, built upon the bedrock of [[reductionism]], falters when confronted with the intractable [[Complexity|complexities]] of [[Nonlinear system|non-linear systems]]. While the reductionist ideal promises to dissect reality into its fundamental components, revealing the underlying unity of logic, math, physics, chemistry, and biology, it stumbles against the phenomenon of [[emergence]]. Here, properties arise from intricate interactions, defying simple decomposition and rendering the "whole" demonstrably more than the sum of its parts. This exposes a critical deficiency: reductionism, while powerful, cannot fully account for the emergent behaviors that define much of the natural world. Equally insufficient is [[Holism|wholism]], which, while acknowledging the significance of the whole, provides no concrete mechanisms for understanding its genesis. Consequently, the pursuit of a singular "theory of everything" risks oversimplification, demanding instead a more nuanced approach that acknowledges the inherent limitations of both reductionism and wholism, and embraces the insights offered by complexity science to navigate the intricate tapestry of reality.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Kesić |first1=Srdjan |date=27 June 2015 |title=Systems biology, emergence and antireductionism |url=https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4992115/ |website=Saudi Journal of Biological Sciences |language=en |doi=10.1016/j.sjbs.2015.06.015}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=O’Connor |first1=Timothy |title=Emergent Properties |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2021}}</ref>

==See also==

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* {{cite SEP |last=Ludwig |first=David |last2=Ruphy |first2=Stéphanie |date=2021 |url-id=scientific-pluralism |title=Scientific pluralism |edition=Fall 2024}}

* {{cite book |last=Nicolescu |first=Basarab |author-link=Basarab Nicolescu |date=2002 |title=Manifesto of transdisciplinarity |___location=Albany |publisher=[[State University of New York Press]] |isbn=0791452611 |oclc=46872261 |url=https://archive.org/details/manifestooftrans0000nico |url-access=registration}}

* {{cite SEP |last=O'Connor |first=Timothy |date=2020 |url-id=properties-emergent |title=Emergent properties |edition=Winter 2021}}

* {{cite book |last1=Oppenheim |first1=Paul |author-link1=Paul Oppenheim |last2=Putnam |first2=Hilary |author-link2=Hilary Putnam |date=1958 |chapter=Unity of science as a working hypothesis |editor-last=Feigl |editor-first=Herbert |editor-link=Herbert Feigl |title=Concepts, theories and the mind–body problem |series=Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science |volume=2 |___location=Minneapolis |publisher=[[University of Minnesota Press]] |pages=3–36 |hdl=11299/184622 |isbn=9780816601585 |oclc=2669746 |chapter-url=https://conservancy.umn.edu/handle/11299/184622}} Reprinted in {{harvnb|Boyd|Gasper|Trout|1991}}.

* {{Cite book |last=Piaget |first=Jean |author-link=Jean Piaget |date=1918 |title=Recherche |___location=Lausanne |publisher=Édition La Concorde |page=59 |oclc=2565864 |access-date=9 February 2017 |url=http://www.fondationjeanpiaget.ch/fjp/site/textes/VE/JP_18_Recherche.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160629025055/http://www.fondationjeanpiaget.ch/fjp/site/textes/VE/JP_18_Recherche.pdf |archive-date=2016-06-29 |url-status=live |language=fr}}