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#''Semantic'' epiphenomenalism, where beliefs has a causative link to behaviour but not by virtue of their ''semantic'' content. Under this theory, a belief would be some form of long-term neuronal event<ref>''op. cit'' pp 6-7. He cites [[Robert Cummins]] suggesting that this is the "received view"</ref>. However on this view P(R/N&E) would be low because the semantic content of beliefs would be invisible to natural selection, and it is semantic content that determines truth-value.
#Beliefs are causally efficacious with respect to behaviour, but ''maladaptive'', in which case he suggests P(R/N&E) would be low because R would be adversely selected for.
#Beliefs are causally efficacious with respect to behaviour, and adaptive. Since behaviour is caused by both belief and desire and desire can lead to false belief, there are many ways in which beliefs could be false but adaptive and natural selection would have no reason for selecting true but non-adaptive beliefs over false but adaptive beliefs (Note : While this seems to indicate that Plantinga is stating that evolution is selecting for or against beliefs, this is just sloppy use of language on his part). Thus he suggests that P(R/N&E) in this case is also low.<ref> ''op. cit. pp8-9</ref> Plantinga points out that innumerable belief-desire pairs could account for a given behaviour; for example, that of a prehistoric man fleeing a tiger:
<blockquote>Perhaps Paul very much ''likes'' the idea of being eaten, but when he sees a tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect, because he thinks it unlikely the tiger he sees will eat him. This will get his body parts in the right place so far as survival is concerned, without involving much by way of true belief... Or perhaps he thinks the tiger is a large, friendly, cuddly pussycat and wants to pet it; but he also believes that the best way to pet it is to run away from it... Clearly there are any number of belief-cum-desire systems that equally fit a given bit of behaviour.<ref>Plantinga, ''Warrant and Proper Function'', pp. 225-226 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195078640.001.0001></ref></blockquote>
Thus, Plantinga argues, the probability that our minds are reliable under a conjunction of [[metaphysical naturalism|philosophical naturalism]] and [[evolution]] is low or inscrutable, and therefore asserting that naturalistic evolution is true also asserts that one has a low or unknown probability of being right. This, Plantinga argues, epistemically [[defeater|defeats]] the belief that naturalistic evolution is true and that ascribing truth to naturalism and evolution is internally dubious or inconsistent.
Plantinga contrasts the purely naturalistic-evolutionary view with the alternative [[theism|theistic]] view that, while accepting the scientific description of evolutionary processes, also allows for the presence of a God who is capable of creating a universe, the physical properties of which produce reliable human cognitive faculties, even though the direct physical cause thereof is undirected (see, for example, the philosophical position known as ''[[theistic evolution]]'').
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