Content deleted Content added
m using wiki references |
m removed one of a several repeated statements |
||
Line 2:
[[Mihir Bellare|M. Bellare]], [[Phillip Rogaway|P. Rogaway]]. ''Optimal Asymmetric Encryption -- How to encrypt with RSA''. Extended abstract in Advances in Cryptology - [[Eurocrypt]] '94 Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol. 950, A. De Santis ed, [[Springer-Verlag]], 1995. [http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/papers/oae.pdf full version (pdf)]</ref>
The OAEP algorithm is a form of [[feistel network]] which uses a pair of [[random oracle]]s G and H to process the plaintext prior to [[asymmetric encryption]]. When combined with any secure [[trapdoor one-way function|trapdoor one-way permutation]] <math>f</math>, this processing is proved in the [[random oracle model]] to result in a combined scheme which is [[semantic security|semantically secure]] under [[chosen plaintext attack]] (IND-CPA). When implemented with certain trapdoor permutations (e.g., RSA), OAEP is also proved secure against [[chosen ciphertext attack]].
OAEP satisfies the following two goals:
Line 13:
An improved scheme (called OAEP+) that works with any trapdoor one-way permutation was offered by [[Victor Shoup]] to solve this problem.<ref>
Victor Shoup. ''OAEP Reconsidered''. IBM Zurich Research Lab, Saumerstr. 4, 8803 Ruschlikon, Switzerland. September 18, 2001. [http://www.shoup.net/papers/oaep.pdf full version (pdf)]</ref>
More recent work has shown that in the standard model (that is, when hash functions are not modelled as random oracles), that it is impossible to prove the IND-CCA2 security of RSA-OAEP under the assumed hardness of the [[RSA problem]].
P. Paillier and J. Villar, ''Trading One-Wayness against Chosen-Ciphertext Security in Factoring-Based Encryption'', Advances in Cryptology -- [[Asiacrypt]] 2006.</ref><ref>
D. Brown, [http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/223 ''Unprovable Security of RSA-OAEP in the Standard Model''], IACR ePrint 2006/233. </ref>
| |||