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'''Interpretivism''' is a school of thought in contemporary [[jurisprudence]] and the [[philosophy of law]]. In the [[English language|English]] speaking world, interpretivism is usually identified with [[Ronald Dworkin]]'s theses on the nature of [[law]], but the word can also cover continental [[legal hermeneutics]] and authors such as [[Helmut Coing]] and [[Emilio Betti]]. Legal hermeneutics can be seen as a branch of philosophical [[hermeneutics]], whose main authors are [[Martin Heidegger|Heidegger]] and [[Hans-Georg Gadamer|Gadamer]].
In a wider sense, interpretivism could even include the theses of, in chronological order, [[Josef Esser]], [[Theodor Viehweg]], [[Chaïm Perelman]], [[Wolfgang Fikentscher]], [[António Castanheira Neves|Castanheira Neves]], [[Friedrich Müller]], [[Aulis Aarnio]] and [[Robert Alexy]].
The main claims of interpretivism are:
*Law is not a set of given data, conventions or physical facts, but what [[lawyer]]s aim to construct or obtain in their [[practice]]. This marks a first difference between interpretivism and [[legal positivism]].
*There is no separation between law and [[morality]], although there are differences. This is the opposite of the main claim of legal positivism.
*Law is not [[immanent]] in nature nor do legal values and principles exist independently and outside of the legal practice itself. This is the opposite of the main claim of [[natural law]] theory.
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