The '''probabilistic voting theory''', also known as the '''probabilistic voting model''', is a [[voting theory]] developed by professor [[PeterAssar J. CoughlinLindbeck]] and Jörgen Weibull, 19921987, which is gradually replacing the [[median voter theory]], thanks to its ability to find an equilibrium in a multi-dimensional space. This theory represents a real break-through in the [[political economy]] literature and allowed to solve problems impossible to solve before. In fact, unlike the median voter theory, what drives the equilibrium policy is both the numerosity and the density of social groups and not the median position of voters on a preference scale. This difference allows to explain why social groups which have a great homogeneity of preferences are more political powerful than those whose preferences are dispersed.
==Applications==
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==References==
* Lindbeck, Assar, and Jörgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition," Public Choice, 52 (1987), 273-297
* {{cite book | author=Coughlin, Peter J.| title=Probabilistic Voting Theory | publisher=Cambridge University Press| year=1992 | ISBN=0521360528}}
* {{cite book | author=Persson, T. & Tabellini, G.| title=Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy | publisher=MIT Press| year=2000 | ISBN=0262661314}}
* Canegrati, Emanuele, 2007. "A Contribution to the Positive Theory of Direct Taxation," MPRA Paper 6117 [http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6117/]
