Rentier state: differenze tra le versioni

Versione delle 06:55, 23 dic 2009

Versione delle 07:20, 23 dic 2009

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<!----------------------------------------------A '''rentier''' is an individual who depends on income derived from rents, which, in turn, are defined as “a reward for ownership of all risorse naturali”, or the “income derived from the gift of nature.”<ref name="Beblawi">p.85, Beblawi, H., 1990, The Rentier State in the Arab World, in Luciani, G., ''The Arab State'', London, Routledge </ref> ----------------------->'''Rentier state''' è un termine utilizzato nelle [[scienze politiche]] e nella teoria delle [[relazioni internazionali]] per classificare quegli [[Stato|stati]] che traggono tutto o una pozione sostanziale del loro reddito nazionale dalla [[Rendita (economia)|rendita]] assicurata dalla vendita delle risorse indigene a clienti esterni. <!-----------------------------------------Il termine è most frequently applicato agli stati ricchi di highly valued risorse naturali come il [[petrolio]], however it could also be applied to those nations which trade on their strategic resources (such as permitting the development of an important [[military base]] in their territory). Dependent as they are on this source of income, rentier states may generate rents externally by manipulating the global political and economic environment. Such manipulation may include [[monopolies]], trading restrictions, and the solicitation of [[subsidies]] or [[aid]] in exchange for political influence.--------------------->

Hazem Beblawi ha proposto quattro caratteristiche che determinano se uno stato può o meno essere identificato come "''rentier state''":

Hazem Beblawi suggested four characteristics that would determine whether or not a state could be identified as “rentier”:

<!------------------------

# if rent situations predominate

# if the economy relies on a substantial external rent – and therefore does not require a strong domestic productive sector

# if only a small proportion of the working population is actually involved in the generation of the rent

# and, perhaps most importantly, that the state’s government is the principal recipient of the external rent.<ref name="Beblawi">ibid, p.87-88</ref>

The emergence of the new [[petroleum|oil]] states and their increasing------------------------------------>crescente importanceimportanza innel worldcommercio trademondiale innegli the[[Anni 1970s1970|anni brought'70]] aportò renewedun interestrinnovato interesse <!------------------------in thinking on rentier economies in the----------------------------->nelle aforementionedsopramenzionate <!-------------------------disciplines of --------------------------->[[politicalscienze sciencepolitiche]] ande [[internationalrelazioni relationsinternazionali]].<!-------------------------<ref name="Beblawi">ibid</ref> Examples------------------------>Tra ofgli esempi di ''rentier statesstate'', includerientrano oili producingpaesi countriesproduttori indi thepetrolio nella regione del [[Middlemedio Eastoriente]], regiontra includingcui [[Saudi Arabia Saudita]], [[UnitedEmirati ArabArabi EmiratesUniti]], [[Iraq]], [[Iran]], [[Kuwait]] ande [[Qatar]], ascosì wellcome asstati statesquali such asil [[Venezuela]] andin America latina e la [[LibyaLibia]] in Latinnel America and North AfricaNordafrica, <!----------------------all of whom are---------------------------------->sono members ofmembri dell'[[OPEC]].<!--------------------------------------<ref name="Beblawi">ibid</ref> <ref>Anderson, L., 1987, The State in the Middle East North Africa, ''Comparative Politics'', Volume 20, Issue 1, Pages 1-18</ref> Rentier------------------------->La stateteoria theorydel has''rentier beenstate'' oneè ofstata severaluna advanceddelle tomolte explainavanzate theper predominancespiegare ofla authoritarianpredominanza regimesdi inregimi theautoritaristi Middlenel Eastmedio andoriente thee apparentl'apparente lackmancanza ofdi successsuccesso <!-----------------------------of [[Democracy in the Middle East|democracy in the region]].<ref>Smith, B., 2004, Oil Wealth & Regime Survival in the Developing World: 1960-1999, ''American Journal of Political Science'', Volume 48, Issue 2, Pages 232-246 </ref> While many states [[export]] resources or license their development by foreign parties, rentier states are characterized by the relative absence of [[revenue]] from domestic [[taxation]], as their naturally occurring wealth precludes the need to extract income from their [[citizenship|citizenry]]. According to Douglas Yates (cited [http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_227.html here]), the economic behavior of a rentier state

#if rent situations predominate

#if the economy relies on a substantial external rent – and therefore does not require a strong domestic productive sector

#if only a small proportion of the working population is actually involved in the generation of the rent

#and, perhaps most importantly, that the state’s government is the principal recipient of the external rent.<ref name="Beblawi">ibid, p.87-88</ref>

The emergence of the new [[petroleum|oil]] states and their increasing importance in world trade in the 1970s brought a renewed interest in thinking on rentier economies in the aforementioned disciplines of [[political science]] and [[international relations]].<ref name="Beblawi">ibid</ref> Examples of rentier states include oil producing countries in the [[Middle East]] region including [[Saudi Arabia]], [[United Arab Emirates]], [[Iraq]], [[Iran]], [[Kuwait]] and [[Qatar]] as well as states such as [[Venezuela]] and [[Libya]] in Latin America and North Africa, all of whom are members of [[OPEC]].<ref name="Beblawi">ibid</ref> <ref>Anderson, L., 1987, The State in the Middle East North Africa, ''Comparative Politics'', Volume 20, Issue 1, Pages 1-18</ref> Rentier state theory has been one of several advanced to explain the predominance of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and the apparent lack of success of [[Democracy in the Middle East|democracy in the region]].<ref>Smith, B., 2004, Oil Wealth & Regime Survival in the Developing World: 1960-1999, ''American Journal of Political Science'', Volume 48, Issue 2, Pages 232-246 </ref> While many states [[export]] resources or license their development by foreign parties, rentier states are characterized by the relative absence of [[revenue]] from domestic [[taxation]], as their naturally occurring wealth precludes the need to extract income from their [[citizenship|citizenry]]. According to Douglas Yates (cited [http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_227.html here]), the economic behavior of a rentier state

<blockquote>embodies a break in the work-reward causation ... [r]ewards of income and wealth for the rentier do not come as the result of work but rather are the result of chance or situation.</blockquote>

Hazem Beblawi has argued that this could create a “rentier mentality,”<ref name="Beblawi">ibid, p.88</ref> while [[Political science|political scientist]] [[Fareed Zakaria]] has posited that such states fail to develop politically because, in the absence of taxes, citizens have less incentive to place pressure on the government to become responsive to their needs. Instead, the government essentially 'bribes' the citizenry with extensive [[social welfare]] programs, becoming an '''allocation''' or '''distributive state'''. The budget, in effect, is little more than an expenditure programme.<ref name="Beblawi">ibid, p.90</ref> Moreover, because control of the rent-producing resources is concentrated in the hands of the authorities, it may be used to alternately coerce or coopt their populace, while the distinction between public service and private interest becomes increasingly blurred.<ref name="Beblawi">ibid, p.91</ref> There is, in the words of [[Noah Feldman]] in his book ''After Jihad'',