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# if the economy relies on a substantial external rent – and therefore does not require a strong domestic productive sector
# if only a small proportion of the working population is actually involved in the generation of the rent
# and, perhaps most importantly, that the state’s government is the principal recipient of the external rent.<ref name="Beblawi">ibid, p.87-88</ref> ------------------------------------>
TheL'emergere emergencedei ofnuovi the newstati [[petroleumPetrolio|oilpetroliferi]] statese andla theirloro ------------------------------------>crescente importanza nel commercio mondiale negli [[Anni 1970|anni '70]] portò un rinnovato interesse nel pensiero sulle economie di rendita nelle sopramenzionate discipline delle [[scienze politiche]] e delle [[relazioni internazionali]].<!------------------------in thinking on rentier economies ----------------------------->nelle sopramenzionate <!----------<ref name="Beblawi">ibid</ref> -----------------disciplines of --------------------------->[[scienze politiche]] e [[relazioni internazionali]].<!-------------------------<ref name="Beblawi">ibid</ref> ------------------------>Tra gli esempi di ''rentier state'', rientrano i paesi produttori di petrolio presenti sia nella regione del [[Medio Oriente]], tra cui [[Arabia Saudita]], [[Emirati Arabi Uniti]], [[Iraq]], [[Iran]], [[Kuwait]] e [[Qatar]], così come stati qualisia il [[Venezuela]] in [[America latina]] e la [[Libia]] nel [[Nordafrica]], <!----------------------alli ofquali sono whomtutti membri dell'[[OPEC]].<!---------------------------------->sono membri dell'[[OPEC]].<!--------------------------------------<ref name="Beblawi">ibid</ref> <ref>Anderson, L., 1987, The State in the Middle East North Africa, ''Comparative Politics'', Volume 20, Issue 1, Pages 1-18</ref> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->La teoria del ''rentier state'' è stata una delle molte avanzate per spiegare la predominanza di regimi autoritaristi nel Medio Oriente e l'apparente mancanza di successo <!-----------------------------ofdella [[Democracy in the Middle East|democracydemocrazia innella the regionregione]].<ref>Smith, B., 2004, Oil Wealth & Regime Survival in the Developing World: 1960-1999, ''American Journal of Political Science'', Volume 48, Issue 2, Pages 232-246 </ref> While many states [[export]] resources or license their development by foreign parties, rentier states are characterized by the relative absence of [[revenue]] from domestic [[taxation]], as their naturally occurring wealth precludes the need to extract income from their [[citizenship|citizenry]]. According to Douglas Yates (cited [http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_227.html here]), the economic behavior of a rentier state
<blockquote>embodies a break in the work-reward causation ... [r]ewards of income and wealth for the rentier do not come as the result of work but rather are the result of chance or situation.</blockquote>
Hazem Beblawi has argued that this could create a “rentier mentality,”<ref name="Beblawi">ibid, p.88</ref> while [[Political science|political scientist]] [[Fareed Zakaria]] has posited that such states fail to develop politically because, in the absence of taxes, citizens have less incentive to place pressure on the government to become responsive to their needs. Instead, the government essentially 'bribes' the citizenry with extensive [[social welfare]] programs, becoming an '''allocation''' or '''distributive state'''. The budget, in effect, is little more than an expenditure programme.<ref name="Beblawi">ibid, p.90</ref> Moreover, because control of the rent-producing resources is concentrated in the hands of the authorities, it may be used to alternately coerce or coopt their populace, while the distinction between public service and private interest becomes increasingly blurred.<ref name="Beblawi">ibid, p.91</ref> There is, in the words of [[Noah Feldman]] in his book ''After Jihad'',
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