Rentier state: differenze tra le versioni

Versione delle 19:15, 23 dic 2009

Versione delle 19:25, 23 dic 2009

Riga 11:

# and, perhaps most importantly, that the state’s government is the principal recipient of the external rent.<ref name="Beblawi">ibid, p.87-88</ref> ------------------------------------>

L'emergere dei nuovi stati [[Petrolio|petroliferi]] e la loro crescente importanza nel commercio mondiale negli [[Anni 1970|anni '70]] portò un rinnovato interesse nel pensiero sulle economie di rendita nelle sopramenzionate discipline delle [[scienze politiche]] e delle [[relazioni internazionali]].<!---------------------------------------------------------------<ref name="Beblawi">ibid</ref> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->Tra gli esempi di ''rentier state'', rientrano i paesi produttori di petrolio presenti sia nella regione del [[Medio Oriente]], tra cui [[Arabia Saudita]], [[Emirati Arabi Uniti]], [[Iraq]], [[Iran]], [[Kuwait]] e [[Qatar]], sia il [[Venezuela]] in [[America latina]] e la [[Libia]] nel [[Nordafrica]], i quali sono tutti membri dell'[[OPEC]].<ref name="Beblawi"/><!---------------------------------------------------<ref name="Beblawi">ibid</ref> <ref>Anderson, L., 1987, The State in the Middle East North Africa, ''Comparative Politics'', Volume 20, Issue 1, Pages 1-18</ref> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->La teoria del ''rentier state'' è stata una delle molte avanzate per spiegare la predominanza di regimi autoritaristi nel Medio Oriente e l'apparente insuccesso della democrazia nella regione.<!-----------------------------<ref>Smith, B., 2004, Oil Wealth & Regime Survival in the Developing World: 1960-1999, ''American Journal of Political Science'', Volume 48, Issue 2, Pages 232-246 </ref> -------------->Mentre molti stati [[Esportazione (commercio)|esportano]] le risorse o rilasciano concessioni per il loro sfruttamentesfruttamento a soggetti stranieri, i ''rentier state'' sono caratterizzati dall'assenza relativa di entrate generate dall'imposizione fiscale interna, <!--------------------------------------------as their naturally occurring wealth precludes the---------------->la neednecessità todi extractprelevare incomereddito fromdalla theirpropria [[Cittadinanza (diritto)|cittadinanza]]. Secondo Douglas Yates <!---------------------------------(cited [http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_227.html here]), ----------------------->il comportamento economico di un ''rentier state'' <!---------------------------------

<blockquote>embodies a break in the work-reward causation ... [r]ewards of income and wealth for the rentier do not come as the result of work but rather are the result of chance or situation.</blockquote>

Hazem Beblawi has argued that this could create a “rentier mentality,”<ref name="Beblawi">ibid, p.88</ref> while [[Political science|political scientist]] [[Fareed Zakaria]] has posited that such states fail to develop politically because, in the absence of taxes, citizens have less incentive to place pressure on the government to become responsive to their needs. Instead, the government essentially 'bribes' the citizenry with extensive [[social welfare]] programs, becoming an '''allocation''' or '''distributive state'''. The budget, in effect, is little more than an expenditure programme.<ref name="Beblawi">ibid, p.90</ref> Moreover, because control of the rent-producing resources is concentrated in the hands of the authorities, it may be used to alternately coerce or coopt their populace, while the distinction between public service and private interest becomes increasingly blurred.<ref name="Beblawi">ibid, p.91</ref> There is, in the words of [[Noah Feldman]] in his book ''After Jihad'',

<blockquote>no fiscal connection between the government and the people. The government has only to keep its people in line so that they do not overthrow it and start collecting the oil rents themselves. (Feldman 139)<ref>Feldman, N., 2003, ''After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy'', New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux </ref></blockquote>

Consequently in these resource-rich rentier states there is a challenge to developing [[civil society]] and [[democratization]]. Hence, theorists such as Beblawi conclude that the nature of rentier states provides a particular explanation for the presence of authoritarian regimes in such resource rich states.<ref name="Beblawi">Beblawi, H., 1990, The Rentier State in the Arab World, in Luciani, G., ''The Arab State'', London, Routledge </ref> ------------------>

Beblawi identifiesidentifica severaldiverse otheraltre characteristicscaratteristiche particularlyparticolarmente associatedassociate withcon “rentier”i oil''rentier statesstate'' petroliferi. Ad For exampleesempio, wheredove theil governmentgoverno isè theil largestpiù grande <!---------------and ultimate employer-------------->datore di lavoro, thela bureaucracyburocrazia isè frequentlyfrequentemente <!----------------------bloated and-----------------> ed inefficiente <!----------------------------- inefficient – and indeed comes to resemble a “rentier class” in---------------------->nella societysocietà. Inoltre Moreover,le localleggi lawslocali oftenrendono makespesso itimpossibile impossibleoperare forin foreignmodo companiesindipendente toalle operatecompagnie independentlystraniere. Ciò Thisporta leadsa touna asituazione situationin wherecui citizenshipla becomescittadinanza diventa <!------------------a financial asset. ----------------->Al Infine order todi dofare businessaffari, foreignle enterprisesimprese engagestraniere aingaggiano localuno <!----------“sponsor” (al-kafil) who---------------------->locale allowsche thepermetta companyalla tocompagnia tradedi commerciare in hissuo namenome in returncambio for adi proportionuna ofporzione thedei proceedsprofitti – anotheril typeche ofrappresenta rent.un altro tipo di rendita. In additionaggiunta, thela oilrendita “rent”petrolifera leadsconduce toa “secondary”rendite rentssecondarie, <!----------------------------------------usually stock market or real estate speculation.<ref name="Beblawi">ibid, p.92</ref>

The crucial nature of oil has led to a situation where non-oil states have started to behave like rentier states. This can be seen for the region as a whole – so some states have been able to exploit “___location rent” due to their strategic ___location, for example for military bases. More significantly, inter-state relations in the region have been affected as oil states try to ensure stability and tranquillity for their rent by buying allegiance from neighbouring states – in effect, sharing the oil rent. Beblawi highlights the case of Egypt whose receipt of financial aid from oil rich neighbours declined significantly after Camp David, and money going instead to Iraq, Syria and the PLO who were considered more “assertive”.<ref name="Beblawi">ibid, p.96</ref>