Mediated reference theory: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 11:08, 10 February 2006

Revision as of 11:25, 10 February 2006

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[[Image:Mediated_reference.gif|thumb|Mediated Reference]]

Frege saw that meaningthe semantics of words and expressions could be explaineddivided asup consisting ofinto two elements. For Frege,: a meaning has a(or ''sense'',) which is whatevera attributes(usually surrounddefinite) ordescription(s) inhereby withinwhich we come to know the reference of an object; and the ''reference'', which is the actual thing being referred to. Moreover, sentencesFor andexample, names"the havemorning different kinds of sensesstar" and referents."the Theevening sensestar" ofare atwo sentencedifferent issenses a(i.e. proposition,meanings or statemodes ofor affairs;presentation) thewhich referenceboth isrefer ato truththe valueobject --Venus. Both "true"the ormorning star"false". Theand sense"the ofevening astar", properfor nameFrege, isare a[[abstract conceptobjects]] thatwhich describesexist somein person;a the''third referentrealm'' of athoughts, properindependent name isof the actualmind individual inor the external physical world.

Moreover, sentences and names have different kinds of senses and referents. The sense of a sentence is a proposition, or state of affairs; the reference is a truth value -- "true" or "false". The sense of a proper name is a concept that describes some person; the referent of a proper name is the actual individual in the world.

[Russell thought that names were a sort of description in disguise, which seems to be a similar position to Frege's. However, some scholars (such as [[Gareth Evans]]) have questioned whether Frege did hold such a view.]

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[[Category:Philosophy of language]]

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