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Comments on the 32+16 supposed split. |
Additional on the 1 sec removal. |
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: The text says "This fact allows" and that's not true for a start. What would allow this is a major weakness in the alg that allows 16 bits of key to be calculated from ciphertext independently of the other 32 bits. The mere use of the numbers 32 and 16 lead me to think that this choice is arbitrary and the result of unfounded speculation. As an example double DES is susceptable to the [[Meet-in-the-middle_attack]] because it consists of two short key ciphers used sequentially. There is the potential to split this into a 2^56 key store leaving a bruteforce space of 57bits. Note though single DES cannot be broken down the same way. The pdf linked does not support the claim either but does say "Cryptanalyzing both stream and block cipher at the same time seems to be a task too daunting to attempt.". A search reveals successful fault analysis attacks against the complete system but these rely on introducing errors into hardware to reveal the key it has been supplied with. Does anyone have a good reason why the bruteforce in 1 second claims should not be removed from the article? [[User:Ambix|Ambix]] ([[User talk:Ambix|talk]]) 14:49, 20 May 2010 (UTC)
:: I've removed the 1 sec claim, changing as little else as possible. Please remember also that this cipher is a combination of a block and stream cipher and as such well known block cipher/hash breaking methods like rainbow tables do not help. I'd be happy to be corrected on that with explanation, but the lack of any such method in nearly 10 years of published research leads me to think that it cannot be that trivial. [[User:Ambix|Ambix]] ([[User talk:Ambix|talk]]) 13:29, 2 December 2010 (UTC)
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