Talk:Hardware-based full disk encryption: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 03:32, 3 September 2011

Revision as of 22:10, 5 September 2011

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{{quote|FDE is only safe when the computer is off or hibernated. When the computer is stolen while it is turned on or suspended, a restart which boots from a [[Universal Serial Bus|USB]] stick will reveal the data without need for the password. The problem is that these so called warm reboots will not prompt for the HD password, nor the power-on-password for that matter. This is as a security risk. In contrast, software-based encryption will prompt for the password on a warm reboot.}}

[[user:Music Sorter|'''<span style="font-family:veranda,sans-serif;background:lightblue;color:Blue">&sect;&nbsp;Music&nbsp;Sorter&nbsp;&sect;</span>''']] ([[User talk:Music Sorter#top|talk]]) 03:32, 3 September 2011 (UTC)

I had added this, and I'm disappointed you removed it. It is consistent with my experience on a Thinkpad laptop both X61 and T61. If you do a restart from the OS, i.e. a warm reboot, you are not prompted for the password

THis is indeed what seagate also states.

http://seagate.custkb.com/seagate/crm/selfservice/search.jsp?DocId=205983

When I researched this issue I came across a discussion stating that making the machine prompt for a password with a warm reboot was technically difficult.

Maybe this has been improved on recent machines, or it is unique to seagate discs.