Secure two-party computation: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 06:58, 30 June 2011

Revision as of 06:02, 21 December 2011

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==Security==

The security of a two-party computation protocol is usually defined through a comparison with an idealised scenario that is secure by definition. The idealised scenario involves a [[Trusted third party|trusted party]] that collects the input of the two parties over [[secure channel]]s and returns the result if none of the parties chooses to abort. The cryptographic two-party computation protocol is secure, if it behaves no worse than this ideal protocol, but without the additional [[trust (social sciences)|trust]] [[assumption]]s{{Disambiguation needed|date=June 2011}}. This is usually modeled using a simulator. The task of the simulator is to act as a wrapper around the idealised protocol to make it appear like the cryptographic protocol. The simulation succeeds with respect to an [[Information theory|information theoretic]], respectively computationally bounded adversary if the output of the simulator is equal[[statistically close]] to, respectively [[computationally indistinguishable]] from the output of the cryptographic protocol. A two-party computation protocol is secure, if for all adversaries there exists a successful simulator.

==See also==