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Some have moved defend certain aspects of a CAC approach, arguing against the commonly held belief that these regimes are inherently inefficient.<ref name="candg"/> Economics incentives are frequently referred to as a considerably more efficient approach to regulation. The most commonly used incentives in this method relate to tax. The administrative costs of tax collection can be understated. Advocates of incentives have been accused of making simplifying assumptions and not fully taking into account the costs of administrating tax systems<ref name="candg">Cole, D., Grossman, P. (2002) Toward a total-cost approach to environmental instrument choice. 20. pp. 223-241.</ref><ref name="ogus"/>
In some circumstances, CAC regulation can end up being a less costly option. Whilst economic instruments may act to reduce compliance costs, in certain cases their total costs may actually be higher, This may stem from the high level of monitoring that is required to make an incentivised method viable and
==Environmental Regulation==
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*There was an effective scientific lobbying alliance that played a key role in convincing the US Government and the commercial sector (in particular DuPont, then one the largest manufacturers of CFCs)
Defining this agreement as a CAC approach is slightly problematic as the agreement does not directly instruct states how to meet their targets. However, the aim of the Montreal Protocol has been to eliminate the source of CFC emissions, as a result the only really feasible way for a state to achieve this would be through a ban on substances related to Ozone depletion. Montreal is considered by some to be a 'special case' of a
====Climate Change====
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