Command and control regulation: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 09:49, 26 December 2011

Revision as of 19:40, 10 January 2012

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CAC encompasses a variety of methods. Influencing behaviour through: laws, incentives, threats, contracts and agreements. In CAC, there is a perception of a problem and the solution for it’s control is developed and subsequently implemented.<ref name="holling">Holling, C., Meffe, G. (1996) Command and Control an the Pathology of Natural Resource Management. "Conservation Biology. 10: 2. pp. 328-337."</ref>

Although environmental policy has a long history, a profileration of policy making in this area occuredoccurred in the 1970s and continued to today. The CAC approach dominated policy in industrial nations during this decade because the general focus was on that of remedial policies rather than more comprehensive prevention techniques.<ref name="bocher">Bocher, M. (2011) A theorectical framework for explaining the choice of instruments in environmental policy. "Forest Policy and Economics'. Elsevier</ref> Whilst many view CAC negatively, direct regulatory control is still used in many countries environmental policy.<ref name="bocher"/>

==Enforcement and Compliance==

To deliver it’s obejctives, direct regulation must ensure the highest level of compliance possible. This can be achieved through appropriate implementation and enforcement . Non-compliance to CAC regulation presents a serious challenge to its effectiveness <ref name="abbot">Abbot, C. (2009) The Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008. ''Environmental Law Review. 38.''</ref> The manner in which CAC is enforced differs between countries. For example, in the USA, some regulators who are tasked with implementing CAC techniques are given rule-making powers. Whereas in the UK, regulatory standards are more commonly set by departments of government. This is achieved through both primary and secondary legislation which is subsequently exacted by regulatory bureaucracies.<ref name="Baldwin"/> Regulation differs within countries as well, in the UK the current regulatory sanctioning system possesses variations between powers and practices among regulators.<ref name="macrory">Macrory, R. (2006) Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective. ''Final Report''</ref>

Enforcement of CAC often involves the use of uniform sanctions, this can result in small businesses feeling the burdens of regulation more severlyseverely than than companies of a larger size.<ref name="macrory"/>

==Strengths and Weaknesses of approach==

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*[[Enforcement]]: This constitutes a very significant dilemma for a CAC regulatory approach. One of the key issues is the expense of enforcement, especially when a complex system of rules has been developed. There are also problems of scope.

Critics of CAC often point to incentive based regulation as an alternative. Possible benefits of this approach may include cheaper administration costs and a reduction in the risk of regulatory capture. However the view that incentive-based regulation is radically different to CAC has been scrutinised. The advantages can be exaggerated, a complex system of rules is often necessary to allow an effective system, this can cause many incentive-based schemes to appear to replicate some of the characteristics of CAC. Inspection and enforcement may also be essential to prevent evasion of liability, again resembling CAC and possibly removing the posited benefits in terms of cost.<ref name="Baldwin"/> While praticespractices may be changed at a superficalsuperficial level through the use of CAC, it may not be able to achieve the changes of behaviour necessary for more sustainable environmental practices.<ref name="gandg">Gunningham, N., Grabosky, P. (1998) Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy. USA: Oxford University Press.</ref>

There are some commentators on the topic who prefer to use ‘direct regulatory instrument’ instead of ‘command and control’ instrument because of the negative connotations surrounding the term.<ref name="goulder">Goulder, L., Parry, I. (2008) Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy. 2: 2. pp. 152-174.</ref>

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===The future CAC in environmental policy===

The international nature of many contemporary environmental issues makes CAC regulatory approaches difficult. Since the 1970s enthusiasm for the implementation of economic incentives for regulation has been on the increase. This is due, in part, to the disenchantment with command and control.<ref name="handm">Harrington, W., Morgenstern, R. (2004) Economic Instruments versus Command and Control. ''Resources. pp. 13-17.''</ref> The shift away from CAC does not seem to be slowing, the increased particpationparticipation of a variety of actors may be the answer. The role of environmental [[NGOs]] in policy making has changed drastically in recent decades. Their numbers and the influence they exert over national governments and negotiations at interntianal level has risen.<ref name="mc"/> The involvement of NGOs has assisted the development of international policy in a number of ways. A great deal of environmental policy has been influenced by research collected by these organisations. They also act as whistleblowers, updating the regulators of progress and compliance. A blend of different approaches, involving a range of actors and regulatory types may be the best answer. However, it is likely that many governments will persist with CAC because of the political benefits and the fact that it is not always as inflexible and inefficient as many economists would suggest.<ref name="mc">McCormick, J. (1999) The Role of Environmental NGOs in International Regimes. ''In: Vig, N., Axelrod, R. (Eds.) The Global Environment: Institutions, Laws and Policy.'' UK: Earthscan.</ref>

==References==

{{reflist}}

[[Category:Economics of regulation]]