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Hukkim and Mishpatim

"Decrees." These are the mitzvot that transcend rational reason, unlike both mishpatim and edot. The quintessential chok (singular for chukim) is the mitzvah of the red heifer.

A post in honor of David Guttmann, whose thoughtful question motivated me to finally commit these ideas to writing.

It is well known that the commandments of the Torah are traditionally divided into two categories, "Hukkim" and "Mishpatim". Mitsvot that regulate social behavior and whose benefit to society is obvious are termed "Mishpatim". Examples of this include laws against theft and murder. By contrast, "Hukkim" are mitsvot whose purpose is not so easy to divine, such as laws against wearing wool and linen together or eating non-kosher foods.

On the surface, it is difficult to understand why this method of classification is justified. Does it make sense to categorize commandments simply based on whether we can provide a logical explanation for them or not? Isn't there a more meaningful criterion to use for grouping the mitsvot?

The Rambam, at the end of Hilchot Meilah, presents a lengthy discussion of the distinction between hukkim and mishpatim:

It is proper for a person to contemplate the laws of the Holy Torah and to grasp their purpose according to his ability. And something for which he cannot find a reason and he does not know a cause - it should not be light in his eyes...And his thinking about it should not be like his thinking regarding mundane matters. Look at how strict the Torah was with meilah (misappropriating items that were designated for the Temple.) Sticks, stones, dirt and ashes, once they had the name of the Master of the World called upon them, with words alone they become consecrated - and anyone who treats them as mundane commits sacrilege and even if he sins inadvertently, he requires atonement. How much more so a commandment that the Holy One, Blessed is He formulated for us...

Behold, it says in the Torah, "And you shall keep all of My statutes (hukkim) and My ordinances (mishpatim) and do them" The Rabbis said that this verse commands "keeping" and "doing" for the hukkim and mishpatim. "Doing" is obvious - it means performing the hukkim. And "keeping" means being careful with them, and not imagining that they are less than the mishpatim. And mishpatim are the commandments whose reason is obvious and the benefit of their fulfillment in this world is known, such as the prohibitions of theft, murder, and the commandment to respect parents. And the hukkim are commandments whose reason is not obvious...

And the inclination of man resists them, and the nations of the world argue against them - like the prohibition of pork or meat and milk, the commandment of the decapitated calf, the red heifer and the scapegoat. King David was terribly distressed over the fact that the heretics and idolaters rejected the hukkim. And the more they chased after him with false arguments that they formulated according to the frailty of the human intellect, the more King David became attached to the Torah...

And all of the sacrifices are included among the hukkim. The Rabbis say that it is because of the sacrificial service that the world continues to exist. For by virtue of the performance of the hukkim and mishpatim, the righteous earn a portion in the World to Come. And the Torah gave precedence to the fulfillment of the hukkim, as it says, "And you shall keep My statutes and My ordinances which a man does, and lives by them."

In these halachot, the Rambam seems to raise more questions than he answers. First of all, why does he launch into an elaborate analysis of hukkim and mishpatim at the end of Hilchot Meilah? Throughout the Mishneh Torah, the Rambam expounds upon every one of the 613 commandments - hukkim and mishpatim - yet he reserves his primary treatment of the topic of hukkim for this unusual context.

Second, what is the Rambam's essential point about hukkim? He mentions that they are scorned by the nations of the world, while at the same time emphasizing their overall superiority to mishpatim. It seems as if the Rambam maintains that the very fact that the gentiles ridicule the hukkim is proof of their importance. Why should this be the case?

And finally, if the arguments of the nations of the world against the hukkim are false, why doesn't King David refute them rather than ignoring them?

I believe that the concept the Rambam is identifying here is of crucial significance for a proper understanding of the Torah in general. Human beings have an intuitive sense of good and bad and right and wrong when it comes to matters of material importance. There is no question in our minds that these issues are very real and very serious. For this reason, all societies have laws that regulate commerce, prohibit murder and theft, and generally protect the physical welfare of their members. These laws - mishpatim - have a purpose that is manifestly obvious to the nations of the world, precisely because the values that mishpatim promote - i.e., material values - are acknowledged as significant by all people, everywhere.

This is what makes the hukkim seem so mysterious. Any search for a mundane explanation of hukkim would necessarily be in vain. This is because hukkim are not designed to promote the material welfare of the Jews and cannot be fathomed in that context. On the contrary, hukkim serve to facilitate intellectual and moral growth alone. Whether it is through restricting our instinctual gratification or directing our minds to the perception of God's hand in nature, the hukkim serve to move us closer to the philosophical goal for which we were divinely chosen.

From the perspective of the committed Jew, the hukkim are the very lifeblood of a meaningful, grounded, spiritually attuned existence. Yet they are rooted in ideals and principles that seem otherworldly and even counterintuitive to an outsider. Precisely because the benefit of hukkim cannot be explained in terms that make sense to a materialistic person, they are scorned and derided by the nations of the world.

Two examples will illustrate my point more clearly. The notion of an FDA that prohibits the sale of unhealthy or tainted food is comprehensible to anyone, because unhealthy food can harm the body, and all human beings value the condition of their bodies. By contrast, only individuals who strive for a good that transcends the physical can possibly appreciate the ideas exemplified in kashrut, which places a limit on hedonistic indulgence in order to increase spiritual growth.

Similarly, any person can grasp the benefit to be had from an education that prepares one to enter the workforce and make a living. However, only individuals who attach value to the metaphysical objectives of the Torah can possibly appreciate the beauty of Shabbat, a day dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake.

A pure pragmatist who thinks only in terms of physical pleasure, material gain and economic productivity will dismiss the hukkim as at best useless and at worst nonsensical. Within the framework of his value system, he simply cannot see the merit of rituals and restrictions that yield no concrete benefit whatsoever. This is why King David did not even try to defend the hukkim in the eyes of the world. He realized that the failure of his contemporaries to perceive the beauty of the hukkim was the result of the inherent poverty of their outlook on life. Their total commitment to materialistic priorities necessarily robbed the hukkim of any value in their eyes; they simply refused to attribute any substance to matters of the spirit.

Herein lies the connection between hukkim and meilah, or sacrifices in general. The concept of consecration is, by its very definition, a contradiction to materialistic sensibilities - it is an abstract, metaphysical phenomenon that nonetheless exerts a major influence on human behavior. The mere designation of an animal as a sacrifice suddenly removes a perfectly useful source of food or labor from the ___domain of human control, relegating it to Temple use. Thus, the very institution of sacrificial laws demands that we acknowledge the real existence of a realm of values and principles that transcends our personal and petty interests and even requires us to curb them - "once they have the name of the Master of the World called upon them...anyone who treats them as mundane commits sacrilege, etc."

We must recognize that there is a framework of tremendous significance and glorious beauty that lies totally outside of the world of the concrete and practical; namely, the framework of Divine Service. Once an item is consecrated and it enters that framework, it is placed outside of the reach of our pragmatic agendas, appetites and business plans. This makes the laws of sacrifices a perfect example of the ultimate objective of the hukkim - namely, to teach us that we must treat the spiritual with an even greater sense of reality and urgency than we typically associate with the physical.

Now we can fathom why the Rambam extols the hukkim above the mishpatim. Safeguarding the physical welfare of society is the most basic aim of any legal system; indeed, for most legal systems, it is the only aim. The Torah shares this objective and legislates mishpatim accordingly. However, with its introduction of the hukkim, the Torah demonstrates its uniqueness as a guide to human life. The hukkim do not enhance our mastery or our enjoyment of the physical world per se. If anything, they stand in the way of the endless pursuit of instinctual gratification and material wealth; indeed, their whole function is to contradict our natural inclination to measure goodness and substance in physical terms. They require us to pull our energies away from the concrete and channel them into the intellectual, metaphysical and transcendent.

This explains another unusual comment of the Rambam. In Pirkei Avot, we read:

Shimon the Righteous was one of the last of the Men of the Great Assembly. He used to say: On three things does the world stand: On Torah, on Divine Service, and on acts of lovingkindness.

The Rambam remarks:

He said that by virtue of knowledge (which is the Torah), and excellences of character (which are acts of lovingkindness), and fulfillment of the commandments (which are sacrifices), the design of the world and the harmony of its existence continues in the most perfect manner.

In light of our analysis here, we can understand why, for the Rambam, sacrifices are the ultimate example of "commandments" as distinct from "acts of lovingkindness." Acts of lovingkindness fall under the category of mishpatim - their benefit is understandable, even from a purely practical standpoint. After all, generosity of spirit and nobility of character foster peace, civility and harmony in society, and this is praiseworthy by any standard.

By contrast, hukkim ask us to break free from the narrow confines of the pragmatic and make the pursuit of knowledge, wisdom and sanctity our highest priority. This is best exemplified in the sacrifices. By definition, sacrifice involves the subordination of precious material resources to a metaphysical purpose that flies in the face of utilitarianism. As such, the sacrifices are the paradigm for all Divine Service. They differentiate the community of Israel, which strives to actualize its potential as a wise and understanding nation that sanctifies God's name from communities that measure their growth in terms of the Dow Jones industrial average and the Gross National Product.

A society that has mishpatim but lacks hukkim may develop wonderful methods for enhancing the "quality of life", all the while leaving its citizens in the dark when it comes to the purpose of life itself. This is a paradoxical situation that Einstein aptly described as a "perfection of means" coupled with a "confusion of ends."

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Generally speaking, the mitzvot are divided into two categories: logical mishpatim ("laws" or "judgements") and supra-rational chukkim ("decrees").

The mishpatim are mitzvot such as the commandment to give charity or the prohibitions against theft and murder, whose reason and utility are obvious to us, and which we would arguably have instituted on our own if G-d had not commanded them. The chukkim are those mitzvot, such as the dietary laws or the laws of family purity, which we accept as divine decrees, despite their incomprehensibility and -- in the most extreme of chukkim -- their irrationality.

[A third category, the eidot ("testimonials"), occupies the middle ground between the decrees and the laws. A testimonial is a mitzvah which commemorates or represents something -- e.g., the commandments to put on tefillin, rest on Shabbat, or eat matzah on Passover. These are laws which we would not have devised on our own, certainly not in the exact manner in which the Torah commands; nevertheless, they are rational acts. Once their significance is explained to us, we can appreciate their import and utility.]

Yet each of these terms -- mishpatim, chukkim and eidot -- is also used by the Torah as a synonym for "mitzvah" and a reference to all commandments of the Torah. A case in point is the Torah section of Mishpatim (Exodus 21-24), which opens with G-ds words to Moses, "And these are the mishpatim that you shall set before them." The 53 mitzvot that follow are indeed primarily logical laws, but they also include a number of "testimonials" and at least one supra-rational "decree" -- the last mitzvah in the series, which is the prohibition against mixing meat with milk ("Do not cook a kid in its mother's milk").

Chassidic teaching explains that every mitzvah is, in essence, a supra-rational chok, and at the same time, every mitzvah is also a comprehensible mishpat.

G-d created the human mind and the logic by which it operates. Obviously, then, it would be nothing less than ridiculous to assume that G-d desires something because it is logical. Rather, the reverse is true: something is logical because G-d desires it. In other words, the reason the commandment "Do not kill" is logical to us is that G-d desired a world in which life is sacred, and molded our minds in accordance with His vision of reality. In essence, however, "Do not kill" is no more logical than the mitzvah of parah adumah (the commandment to sprinkle the ashes of the Red Heifer upon someone who has been ritually contaminated through contact with a corpse -- often cited as the ultimate chok). So the rationality of the commandment "Do not kill" is but an external "garment" behind which lies the mitzvah's essential nature as the supra-rational will of G-d.

In the words of the Tanya: "The rationales of the mitzvot have not been revealed, for they are beyond reason and understanding. Also in those instances in which there has been revealed and explained a certain reason which is apparently comprehensible to us, this is not ... the ultimate reason, for within it is contained an inner, sublime wisdom that is beyond reason and understanding."

On the other hand, even the most irrational decree has its rational elements that can be analyzed by the human mind and appreciated by it as a lesson in life. As Maimonides writes, "Although all the chukkim of the Torah are supra-rational decrees... it is fitting to contemplate them, and whatever can be explained, should be explained."

Thus, every mitzvah -- whether categorized as a chok or a mishpat -- is basically a supra-rational decree which can nevertheless be experienced as an illuminating guide to life. Every mitzvah is an act of submission to the divine will, an act that recognizes that our finite minds cannot fathom the axioms that are the basis of our reality and must ultimately accept them on faith from their divine conceiver. At the same time, every mitzvah is a rational act in the sense that it relates to our rational selves and aids us to achieve a better understanding of our nature and our purpose in life.

The only difference between chukkim and mishpatim is: which of these two elements dominates. The chok emphasizes the supra-rationality of our commitment to G-d, while the mishpat stresses the function of the mitzvot as educators and enlighteners of human life.

The Wise Son Asks

This is the deeper significance of the question posed by the "Wise Son" in the Haggadah, "What are the eidot, chukkim and mishpatim that G-d commanded you?" Why the need for different types of mitzvot, the Wise Son is asking, characterized by varying degrees of rationality? What can be more significant and more meaningful than the simple fact that one fulfills a Divine command?

To answer the Wise Son's question, the Haggadah says to "tell him the procedures of the Passover offering, [including the law that] after eating the Passover offering, one may not conclude the meal with a dessert."

Passover, so named after G-d's passing over all norms to redeem His people, represents the transcendence of the natural and the reasonable in our relationship with G-d. But Passover, too, has its "procedures." Also the loftiest, most supra-rational truths are to be incorporated into our natural existence -- an existence characterized by logical laws and rational processes. Indeed -- we continue to explain to the Wise Son -- the law is that, "After eating the Passover offering, one may not conclude the meal with a dessert," in order that the taste of the Passover offering should linger in our mouths. Also the reason-transcending Passover aspect of our relationship with G-d should impart a taste -- an intellectual and emotional savor -- to the palate of the soul.

This is why the Torah includes decrees, testimonials and laws. For though it is in essence a divine decree, it is to be experienced as a program for life that addresses our every plane of being, from its technical-logical aspects to our capacity to abnegate reason in subservience to the divine will. Furthermore, not only does the Torah include both chukkim and mishpatim, but also its most supra-rational decree can, and should, be assimilated by our thinking and feeling selves as a source of enlightenment and feeling.

Axiom or Instrument?

In addition to the distinction between supra-rational chukkim and rational mishpatim, these two facets of the mitzvah -- the mitzvah as divine decree and as a program for life -- are also expressed in other divisions and categorizations of the mitzvot.

For example, the law states:

If a Jew is forced to either transgress any of the mitzvot commanded by the Torah or else be killed, he should transgress rather than be killed. For regarding the mitzvot, it is written, "[You shall keep My chukkim and mishpatim,] which man should do and live by them" -- live by them and not die by them... When does the above apply? In regard to all mitzvot, except for [the prohibitions against] idolatry, [certain] sexual sins, and murder. Regarding these three transgressions, if a person is told to either commit one of them or else be killed, he should be killed rather than transgress. (Mishneh Torah, Laws of the Fundamentals of Torah, 5:1-2).

Why this distinction between mitzvot? If the mitzvot exist to live by rather than to die for, this should apply to all mitzvot. On the other hand, if a person ought to give his life rather than violate the divine will, then this should apply to all mitzvot, since every mitzvah is equally a command of G-d.

Indeed, the mitzvah is both superior to human existence and integral to it. As a divine decree, dictated solely by the infinite and absolute will of G-d, it is greater than life, greater, certainly, than life's finite and equivocal manifestation in a physical body. On the other hand, as illuminator, enhancer and sanctifier of life, the mitzvah is something that comes to serve life, not to supersede it.

When a person is confronted with the choice to violate a mitzvah or die, the two faces of the mitzvah are brought in conflict with each other. The question then is: which element of the mitzvah dominates? Which should give way before the other? In most cases, the "live by them" element of the mitzvah takes precedence. But there are certain mitzvot in which the "divine decree" aspect dominates: what is most significant is that G-d commanded and man must obey, regardless of the consequences to man's ephemeral existence as a physical being.

Man-Made Decrees

Another expression of the chuk and mishpat elements within the mitzvot is the distinction between biblical commandments (mitzvot d'oraita) and rabbinical commandments (mitzvot d'rabbanan).

The biblical commandments are the 613 mitzvot explicitly or implicitly contained in the Five Books of Moses. The rabbinical commandments are the laws instituted by sages throughout the generations. (For example, praying three times a day, reciting kaddish after the dead, making a blessing before eating, lighting Shabbat candles, and the festivals of Chanukah and Purim are all rabbinical institutions. Indeed, a major part of what we call "Judaism" is of rabbinic origin.)

Both are equally binding upon the Jew. The sages institute their laws by the divine authority expressed in the verse: "And you shall observe all that they shall instruct you" (Deuteronomy 17:10). Thus, the blessing recited before the performance of a mitzvah -- "Blessed are You, L-rd our G-d, King of the Universe, Who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to..." -- is recited over rabbinical mitzvot as well. G-d is the sole commander of a mitzvah, whether it is written or alluded to in His Torah, or instituted by human beings to whom He imparted the authority to interpret and safeguard His laws and legislate Jewish life.

Nevertheless, Halachah (Torah law) distinguishes between biblical and rabbinical laws, applying a different set of standards to each of the two categories. One of these differences is that, according to many halachic authorities, biblical laws define the nature of their object, while rabbinical degrees are only prohibitions upon the person. For example, if biblical law forbids a certain food, this indicates that the very substance of the food is intrinsically negative and profane; on the other hand, rabbinical proscription of a certain food is strictly a prohibition upon the person not to eat it.

At first glance, this seems to indicate that rabbinical mitzvot are less "real" than biblical ones; that while the biblical law affects the very nature of its subject, the rabbinical law is superimposed over human life, having the authority to command and instruct but not to define reality. On a deeper level, however, this alludes to the fact that the rabbinical law is the more profound expression of the essence of the mitzvah as divine will.

The biblical mitzvot define the nature of our world, expressing the fact that their predominant element is the mitzvah's role as molder and illuminator of the created reality. Not so the rabbinical commandment, which is concerned only with what man should or should not do, not with how this affects him or his world. Thus it asserts the "decree" element of the mitzvah: the mitzvah as it transcends all relation to physical life, its sole purpose being the fulfillment of a divine desire.

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There are two main types of mitzvos; chukim and mishpatim; not murdering is an example of the former, and the parah adumah typifies the latter. What is the difference between a chok and a mishpat? The ‘traditional answer’ is that a chok has no reason behind it, whilst a mishpat has a reason which is easily and fully understandable to man.[1] However, as we shall see, this definition is not so simple or watertight… (the journey begins; fasten your seatbelts.)

There are two main avenues of question on the traditional answer; one challenging its definition of chukim and the other challenging that of mishpatim. With regards to chukim, the Torah states in parshas Va’eschanan[2] that other nations will ‘hear of these chukim and say ‘what a clever and wise nation is this great nation (for keeping the chukim).’’ Thus, it would seem that chukim do have a reason; since the other nations can fathom them.[3] The other indication that chukim have a reason is that Chazal tell us that Shlomo HaMelech understood all chukim apart from the parah adumah[4] and that Moshe Rabeinu understood even parah adumah.[5] Indeed, the Rambam writes[6] that one should look into chukim and ascribe a reason for them whenever possible. Therefore, a whole army of commentators argue that chukim do have reasons, but we just do not know these reasons. The authorities I have caught singing this tune are the Rambam,[7] the Ran,[8] the Maharal,[9] the Kli Yakar,[10] the Malbim,[11] and Rav Yerucham Levovitz.[12]

With regards to mishpatim, our ‘traditional approach’ was that mishpatim’s reasons are fully understandable by the human intellect. This assumption is not so simple either. Firstly, we have a general rule that we cannot be ‘doresh ta’ama dekra.’[13] What this means is that one may not limit the application of a Torah law via applying a reason to it. For example, the Torah forbids taking a loan collateral from a widow. One is not allowed to apply a reason for this law, e.g. lest she need the object and you forget to return it to her to use each day, and to then turn around and say that ‘since this reason is true, the law should only apply to a poor widow and not to a rich widow who has an abundance of possessions.’[14] This is true no matter how logical the reason suggested is, and as such implies that we do not know the true reason for the mitzvah; if we did know the reason, why can we not make halachic implications from our suggested reasons? Similarly, the Mishna[15] tells us that we quieten (/hush) one who says in their prayer that the reason for the mitzvah of shilu’ach haken (sending away the mother bird) is because of HaShem’s mercy. Why? For we do not know the reasons for the mitzvos for sure.[16] It should not bother us that we cannot understand HaShem’s mitzvos; human intellect simply does not have the capacity to fully understand HaShem and His mitzvos. Indeed, to compare HaShem’s limitless Intellect and our limited intellect is as unfathomable as us fully understanding His mitzvos in the first place.

Here we can ask a pertinent clarification question; can we really not understand mishpatim? Let’s take the mitzvah of not murdering. I know very well that the reason one cannot murder is to keep a stable functioning society; why is that beyond my comprehension? The answer is that there is a difference between a ‘reason’ and a ‘purpose.’ As the Rambam points out,[17] it is impossible to speak about a reason for HaShem mandating a certain mitzvah, for this would ‘limit HaShem’ (c’v) by implying that HaShem was forced to command any given mitzvah. To ask ‘why’ and give a reason would be to assert that the reason pre-dated HaShem, which is impossible to say about an Omnipotent Creator. Rather, our entire discussion of ‘giving reasons’ for mitzvos actually refers to understanding the purpose of any given mitzvah. What is a purpose? Every mitzvah has a certain [specific] effect; both in our world and in other spiritual worlds. The purpose of a mitzvah refers to this effect. So whenever we say ‘reason’ we really mean ‘purpose.’ Thus, going back to our example of not murdering, one ‘reason’ (purpose really) of this law might very well be to keep a stable society; but that is only one suggestion - there could be more spiritual effects like keeping another soul in this world or training oneself to avoid cruelty, not to mention any other effect in other realms, etc. or spiritual effects that we are unaware of. So let’s summarise what we have said so far and move on to redefining the difference between chukim and mishpatim…

We cited many who held that chukim do have a reason (‘purpose,’ remember!), just that we cannot understand this reason in general. Similarly, we said that we cannot really understand mishpatim either. If so, what is the difference between a chok and a mishpat? And what is special about the parah adumah that it merits to be the ‘table-topping’ chok?

As Rav Yerucham Levovitz highlights,[18] there is not really so much difference between a chok and a mishpat. We cannot plumb the deepest levels of reason for either a chok or a mishpat. Nevertheless, as defined by the Rambam,[19] Malbim,[20] and Ran,[21] the distinction between the two is that on a simple level most people can comprehend the reason for a mishpat, whilst most people cannot comprehend the reason for a chok. And what is so special about the parah adumah? As the Kli Yakar says,[22] the parah adumah is the most chok-like in that it is the chok whose reason is most hidden from us. Thus, whilst some people are able to comprehend other chukim, the only person to have ever really understood parah adumah was Moshe Rabeinu.

So far so good. We have discovered a new working definition of chok and mishpat and have placed parah adumah within that framework. But one question remains, and this is where our discussion becomes more practical. If, as we said, it is beyond our capacity to really understand the true reasons for mitzvos, why do several commentators (e.g. the Rambam and the Sefer HaChinuch) proceed to give reasons for the mitzvos; how can they? I would like to make this question more pointed. The Rambam[23] codifies the Mishna in Brachos which we mentioned above; one is not allowed to say in prayer that the reason for shilu’ach haken is because of HaShem’s mercy, for ‘mitzvos are decrees from Heaven and are not for mercy.’ In other words, we cannot know the reason for the mitzvah. Yet in his Moreh Nevuchim, the Rambam himself proceeds to give reasons for mitzvos. What’s going on?

The key to this is the explanation of the Tosafos Yom Tov[24] on our Mishna. He reveals that it is only a problem to ascribe HaShem’s mercy as the reason for shilu’ach haken when one does so in one’s tefillah, for in doing this ‘one has firmly decided this ‘fact’…which is not the case if one is giving a reason for a mitzvah (outside the realm of tefillah) via drush or pshat.’ What this means is that there are many levels to mitzvos, and on one level all these explanations for their reasons (i.e. the Sefer HaChinuch and Moreh Nevuchim, etc.) are true.[25] But they do not account for the deeper levels of explanation, and so one may not mention them in tefillah, for this would imply that one has decided that the reason offered is completely true at all levels, which is not so. As the Maharal and Ritva explain[26] the Rambam did not believe that the reasons he gave for the mitzvos in his Moreh Nevuchim were one hundred percent true (to the deepest level); he was giving the reasons mainly for the benefit his generation, many of whom were steeped in secular philosophy, so that they would appreciate the depth of mitzvos via their reasons and significance. Indeed, the Sefer HaChinuch writes[27] that he is writing these reasons for mitzvos on a simple level for his son and his son’s friends, but on a deeper level there are many more reasons for mitzvos. It his here that I would like to make a practical point, with which we shall close. The Rambam writes[28] that we should look into chukim (and mishpatim) and ascribe them a reason whenever we can. What is the point of ascribing them a reason; if the truth is that reasons have endless depth that we cannot fully understand, why must we try and ascribe reasons for mitzvos; what good does it do for us?

Perhaps we can answer via something the Alter of Slabodka once said. He asked how can it be that someone who says kriyas shema with such intensity and intention, and thus fully crowns HaShem as King over all the world(s), can then go and commits a sin at one point during his in his day; what happened to his kriyas shema? The Alter would answer that while this person was too busy proclaiming HaShem as King over the whole world, he forgot to make HaShem the King over him too. For our discussion, the point is that it is wonderful to know that mitvos have supernal depth and in truth are unfathomable. But what does that do for our mitzvah observance? Our job is to make the mitzvos relevant to our lives; not only via their physical performance, but via our mental attitudes and approaches towards them. Perhaps this is the key to ascribing reasons for mitzvos. Our looking into reasons for mitzvos gives us a personal connection to mitzvos and reaffirms the relevance of mitzvos to our lives.

I highly recommend setting aside time to learn about one mitzvah each week from the Sefer HaChinuch. One of my most enjoyable learning sessions in high school was my weekly chavrusa in Sefer HaChinuch; it provides a certain relevance and freshness to mitzvos that we could all do with instilling within ourselves. As Rashi cites,[29] each day the mitzvos should be to us like new things that we run to achieve. And let us say Amen!

Have a great Shabbos!

[1] It must be mentioned that the opinion of Rashi (Bereishis 26:5 and Vayikra 19:19) seems to be that chukim have no reason to them (other than that we should gain by listening to HaShem’s command). Indeed, Rashi seems to have support for this view from the simple reading of Midrash Bereishis Rabbah 44:1, though this is disputed by the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim chelek gimmel perek 26. In the main dvar torah we shall ask question’s on Rashi’s understanding, but we will offer possible answers in the footnotes. Either way, as we shall see, most understand that chukim do have a reason; just we are unable to understand the reason. A third opinion seems to be that of the Kedushas Levi (parshas Chukas) and Nefesh HaChaim (sha’ar alef perek 22), quoted in Minchas Osher, who hold that chukim do have a reason, but their reasons have never been revealed to anyone.

[2] Devarim 4:6-7

[3] This is the question posed by the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim chelek gimmel perek 31. An avenue of answer for Rashi (see footnote 1 for Rashi’s opinion) could be via the Drashos HaRan, who explains these psukim to mean that the other nations will be so impressed at our keeping these mitzvos which have no reason; for this shows our devotion to HaShem. Though this answer can be questioned from Rashi Bamidbar 19:2 and Rashi Bereishis 26:5 which says that the other nations will berate us for keeping these mitzvos which don’t have a reason. (There is what to answer, but I can’t make this too long!)

[4] Bamidbar Rabbah 19:3 as cited by Rambam hilchos Temurah 4:13. Though have a look at the Midrash and you’ll see that it does not seem to be talking about chukim per se.

[5] Bamidbar Rabbah 19:6. Rashi (and the aforementioned Kedushas Levi and Nefesh HaChaim) would answer via the Shut Rashba (chelek alef siman 94) who basically says that even the chukim that were revealed to Shlomo HaMelech and Moshe Rabeinu were not fully revealed to them.

[6] Rambam hilchos Temurah 4:13. Seemingly, Rashi would disagree with this assertion of the Rambam, as the Midrash cited in Rashi Bamidbar 19:2 ‘zos’ seems to say.

[7] Rambam Moreh Nevuchim chelek gimmel perakim 26 and 31, as well as hilchos Temurah 4:13 and hilchos Me’ilah 8:8 in the Yad HaChazakah

[8] Drashos HaRan drush 1,5,9,11

[9] Gur Aryeh Vayikra 26:3

[10] Kli Yakar Bamidbar 19:2

[11] Sefer HaCarmel of the Malbim under ‘chok u’mishpat’

[12] Da’as Torah (bi’urim section) parshas Chukas

[13] Lechem Mishna and Kesef Mishna hilchos Avodah Zarah 4:4, as well as Tosafos Sotah 14a ‘kedei’ and the Rambam quoted in Rabeinu Bechaya Devarim 29:28

[14] Gemarra Bava Metzia 115a. We hold like the Rabbanan against Rabbi Shimon. It must be pointed out that there is a case where we do use ta’ama dekra to create halachic outcomes. When we have a genuine doubt as to how to understand the nature of a Torah law (and the pasuk can be read to support each side of the doubt), we may use a suggested reason to pick one of these alternatives and resolve the doubt; which will have halachic ramifications. See Rif Bava Kama 1b and the Rosh Bava Kama 1:1, and then read Tosafos Sotah 14a ‘kedei’ carefully.

[15] Mishna Brachos 33b

[16] Gur Aryeh. See the gemarra and Rashi there.

[17] Rambam Moreh Nevuchim chelek gimmel perek 26

[18] Da’as Torah (bi’urim section) parshas Chukas

[19] Rambam Moreh Nevuchim chelek gimmel perek 26, and hilchos Me’ilah 8:8.

[20] Sefer HaCarmel ‘chok u’mishpat’

[21] Drashos HaRan, drush 9

[22] Kli Yakar Bamidbar 19:2

[23] Rambam hilchos Tefillah 9:7

[24] Tosafos Yom Tov Brachos 5:3, as pointed out by Rav Osher Weiss in his ‘Minchas Osher’ in our sedra.

[25] Rav Yitzchak Berkowitz

[26] Maharal quoted in Minchas Osher. Ritva in Sefer HaZikaron parshas Vayikra

[27] Sefer HaChinuch mitzvah of parah adumah, at the start of parshas Chukas

[28] Rambam hilchos Temurah 4:13

[29] Rashi Devarim 6:6 ‘asher’

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== Voci correlate ==

*[[Halakhah]]