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In a scramble for overseas markets between the [[Franco-Prussian War]] and [[World War I]], [[Europe]] added almost 9 million square
==Background, the Age of Pax Britannica ==
The [[American Revolution]] discredited mercantilism and contributed to the appeal of the [[classical liberalism]] of [[Adam Smith]]. A disciple of Adam Smith was [[Richard Cobden]], who contended that the costs of occupation often exceeded the financial return to the taxpayer. In other words, formal empire afforded no reciprocal economic benefit when trade would continue whether the overseas political entities were nominally sovereign or not.
Roughly between the [[Congress of Vienna]] and the
==Causes of New [[Imperialism]] and Formal Empire==
As
These problems coincided with the long-term effects of the severe
▲'''Loss of Comparitive Advantage'''
At a time when the contiental powers' abandonment of free trade limited the European market, some business and government leaders, such as [[Leopold II of Belgium|Leopold II]] and [[Jules Ferry]], concluded that sheltered overseas markets would solve the problems of low prices and over-accumulation of surplus capital caused by shrinking continental markets. Among the new conditions were the short-term effects of the severe economic depression of [[1873]], which had followed fifteen years of great economic instability. Business after 1873 in practically every industry suffered from lengthy periods of low profit rates and deflation; profits were falling because too much capital were chasing too few markets, especially after the rise of newly industrializing states in export trade with its traditional markets in continental Europe, [[China]], and [[Latin America]]. ▼
▲As ther newly industrial powers, such as [[France]], [[Germany]], and the [[United States]], rose, however, Britain's comparative advantage in trade of any finished good began diminishing, and it began to face far stiffer competition. Britain’s share of world trade fell from one-forth in 1880, one-sixth in 1913, and one-eight in 1948. Britain was no longer supplying half the needs in manufactured goods of such nations as Germany, France, [[Belgium]], and the United States. Britain was even growing incapable of dominating markets such as India. The nation had lost much of its [[comparative advantage]] in teh manufacturing sector. To make matters worse, British manufactures in the staple industries of the [[Industrial Revolution]] were beginning to experience real competition abroad. The German textiles and metal industries, for example, had by the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War surpassed those of Britain in organization and technical efficiency and usurped British manufactures in the domestic market. By the turn of the century, the German metals and engineering industries would be producing heavily for the free trade market as well. In midst of Britain’s relative industrial decline, the fact that invisible financial exports actually kept Britain “out of the red” is somewhat indicative of both Britain’s pressure to secure overseas markets in both nominally independent states and colonies and its newly precarious hegemony over overseas markets.
▲These problems coincided with the long-term effects of the severe ‘[[Long Depression]]’ of [[1873]]-[[1896]], which had followed fifteen years of great economic instability. Business after [[1873]] in practically every industry suffered from lengthy periods of low—and falling—profit rates and price deflation. This greatest problem during this period was that production often exceeded domestic demand. This forced an adoption of new policies. The manufacturers had become very powerful forces in the more democratic Britain, controlling the purse strings of the major parties. The manufacturers were eager for new destinations for exports and pushed for the government to secure captive markets in Africa.
▲At a time when the contiental powers' abandonment of free trade limited the European market, some business and government leaders, such as Leopold II and Jules Ferry, concluded that sheltered overseas markets would solve the problems of low prices and over-accumulation of surplus capital caused by shrinking continental markets. Among the new conditions were the short-term effects of the severe economic depression of 1873, which had followed fifteen years of great economic instability. Business after 1873 in practically every industry suffered from lengthy periods of low profit rates and deflation; profits were falling because too much capital were chasing too few markets, especially after the rise of newly industrializing states in export trade with its traditional markets in continental Europe, China, and Latin America.
▲'''Improvements in Technology'''
New techonologies also played an important role. The development of steam ships great decreased transportation costs and made previously unviable markets in Africa effective investments. New technologies, especialy [[mass production]], also reduced production costs bringing manufactured goods for the first time into the financial reach of the world's poorest.
The continent of [[Africa]] was also largely unowned. This is mostly because of the decline of what Britain’s [[Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil|Lord Salisbury]] would deem in the [[1890s]]
Continental political developments in the late
Control of tropical Africa had strategic implications in an era of feasible inter-capitalist competition, particularly for Britain, which was under intense economic and thus political pressure to secure lucrative markets such as India, China, and Latin America. In Britain’s case this process of capitalist diffusion had in many regions led it to acquire colonies in the interests of commercial security; France and Germany would later follow suit. For example the [[1869]] completion of the [[Suez Canal]]
New social views of [[colonialism]] also
▲New social views of colonialism also arrised. Rationalized by [[Rudyard Kipling]]-style racism and [[Social Darwinism]] in predominately [[Protestantism|Protestant]] empires and the paternalistic (but [[republic|republican]] and progressive) French-style “mission of civilization”, was attractive to many European statesmen.
== Theories of Imperialism ==
[[J.A. Hobson]] and later [[Vladimir Lenin|Lenin]] linked the problem of shrinking continental markets driving European capital overseas to an inequitable distribution of wealth in industrial Europe. Lenin and that bourgeois economist to his liking contended that the wages of workers did not represent enough purchasing power to absorb the vast amount of capital accumulated during the [[Second Industrial Revolution]]. This charge was not baseless, and its logic is even evident in the causes of the interwar [[Great Depression]] beginning in the US, which had garnered the coveted center of the world’s capitalist economy following the Great War, not just the Long Depression of 1873-96. For instance, a fundamental misdistribution of purchasing power during the great industrial expansion of the post-World War I era might have been the Second Great Depression’s main contributing factor. Porter, however, notes that Britain,
▲[[J.A. Hobson]] and later Lenin linked the problem of shrinking continental markets driving European capital overseas to an inequitable distribution of wealth in industrial Europe. Lenin and that bourgeois economist to his liking contended that the wages of workers did not represent enough purchasing power to absorb the vast amount of capital accumulated during the Second Industrial Revolution. This charge was not baseless, and its logic is even evident in the causes of the interwar Great Depression beginning in the US, which had garnered the coveted center of the world’s capitalist economy following the Great War, not just the Long Depression of 1873-96. For instance, a fundamental misdistribution of purchasing power during the great industrial expansion of the post-World War I era might have been the Second Great Depression’s main contributing factor. Porter, however, notes that Britain, “Struck with outmoded physical plants and outmoded forms of business organization… now felt the less favorable effects of being the first to modernize.” He contends that “a kind of vicious circle had been set up, with domestic industry lagging because capital was going elsewhere because industry was lagging.” Unlike [[J.A. Hobson]], however, who links under-consumption to a misdistribution of purchasing power, Porter argues that “the best thing that Britain could have done to correct [its balance of payments] would have been to make her export industry more competitive—improve her methods of manufacturing and marketing in order to sell more abroad.”
In the [[1870s]], [[London]] financial houses also achieved an unprecedented control of industry, contributing to an increasing concerns among elite policymakers regarding British
▲'''[[J.A. Hobson]]'''
▲In the [[1870s]], [[London]] financial houses also achieved an unprecedented control of industry, contributing to an increasing concerns among elite policymakers regarding British ‘protection’ of overseas investments—particularly those in the securities of foreign governments and in foreign-government-backed development activities such as [[railroad]]s. Although it had been official British policy for years to support such investments, with the large expansion of these investments after about 1860 and with the economic and political instability of many areas of high investment (such as [[Egypt]]), calls upon the government for methodical protection became increasingly pronounced in the years leading up to the Crystal Palace Speech. After the more gentlemanly service sector of the economy (banking, insurance, shipping) became more prominent—possibly at the expense of manufacturing—the influence of London’s financial interest began rising precipitously.
New Imperialism was one way of capturing new overseas markets. By the eve of the Great War, Europe, for instance, represented the largest share (27 percent) of the global
▲[[J.A. Hobson]], a British [[Political liberalism|liberal]] writing at the time of the fierce debate on imperialism during the [[Boer War]], observed the spectacle of the ‘[[Colonization of Africa|Scramble for Africa]]’ and emphasized changes in European social structures and attitudes as well as capital flow, though his emphasis on the latter seems to have been the most influential and provocative. His so-called accumulation theory suggested that that capitalism suffered from under-consumption due the rise of [[monopoly]] capitalism and the resultant concentration of wealth in fewer hands, which apparently gave rise to a misdistribution of purchasing power. Logically, this argument is sound, given the huge impoverished industrial working class then often far too poor to consume the goods produced by an industrialized economy. His analysis of capital flight and the rise of mammoth cartels later influenced [[Vladimir Lenin|Lenin]] in his ''Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism'', which has become a basis for the modern neo-[[Marxism|Marxist]] analysis of imperialism. Thus some have argued that the New Imperialism was caused essentially a flight of foreign capital.
During the post [[1870]] period the amount of foreign trade increased. For western European nations in [[1840]], 7.7 million pounds of its export and 9.2 million pounds of its import trade was done outside Europe; in [[1880]] the figures were 38.4 million and 73 million. Europe’s economic contacts with the wider world were multiplying, much as Britain’s had been doing for years. In these non-industrial regions (such as the
▲New Imperialism was one way of capturing new overseas markets. By the eve of the Great War, Europe, for instance, represented the largest share (27 percent) of the global ‘zones of investment’, followed by [[North America]] (24 percent), [[Latin America]] (19 percent), [[Asia]] (16 percent), [[Africa]] (9 percent), and [[Oceania]] (5 percent) for all industrial powers. Britain, the forerunner of Europe’s capitalist powers, however, was clearly the chief world investor, though the direction of its investments underwent a striking change, becoming oriented less toward Europe, the United States, and India, and more toward the rest of the [[Commonwealth]] and Latin America.
Some have criticized
▲During the post [[1870]] period the amount of foreign trade increased. For western European nations in 1840, 7.7 million pounds of its export and 9.2 million pounds of its import trade was done outside Europe; in 1880 the figures were 38.4 million and 73 million. Europe’s economic contacts with the wider world were multiplying, much as Britain’s had been doing for years. In these non-industrial regions (such as the Russian and Ottoman empires), which were the principal sources of surplus French capital, and other overseas territories that lacked both the knowledge and the power to direct the capital flow, served to colonize rather than develop them, destroying native industries and creating dangerous political and economic pressures which would, in time, produce the so-called ‘north/south divide’. The contemporary Dependency Theory, devised largely by Latin American academics, draws on this inference.
▲Some have criticized [[J.A. Hobson]]’s analysis of over-accumulation and under-consumption, arguing it does not explain why less developed nations with little surplus capital, such as Italy, participated in colonial expansion. Nor does it fully explain the expansionism of the great powers of the next century—the United States and Russia, which were in fact, net borrowers of foreign capital. Opponents of his accumulation theory also point to many instances in which foreign rulers needed and requested Western capital, such as the hapless modernizer Khedive [[Ismail Pasha]].
Contemporary World-Systems theorist [[Immanuel Wallerstein]] addresses these counterarguments without degrading Hobson’s underlying inferences. Wallerstein’s conception of imperialism as a part of a general, gradual extension of capital investment from the “center” of the industrial countries to an overseas “periphery” thus coincides with Hobson’s. According to Wallerstein,
▲'''Immanual Wallerstein'''
Since the
▲Contemporary World-Systems theorist [[Immanuel Wallerstein]] addresses these counterarguments without degrading Hobson’s underlying inferences. Wallerstein’s conception of imperialism as a part of a general, gradual extension of capital investment from the “center” of the industrial countries to an overseas “periphery” thus coincides with Hobson’s. According to Wallerstein, “Mercantilism… became the major tool of [newly industrializing, increasingly competitive] semi-peripheral countries [Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, etc.] seeking to become core countries . Wallerstein hence perceives formal empire as performing a function “analogous to that of the mercantilist drives of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England and France.” The expansion of the Industrial Revolution hence contributed to the emergence of an era of aggressive national rivalry, leading to the late nineteenth century ‘scramble for Africa’ and formal empire. Hobson’s theory is thus useful in explaining the role of over-accumulation in overseas economic and colonial expansionism while Wallerstein perhaps better explains the dynamic of inter-capitalist geopolitical competition.
Second, any such statistics only obscure the fact that African formal control of tropical Africa had strategic implications in an era of feasible inter-capitalist competition, particularly for Britain, which was under intense economic and thus political pressure to secure lucrative markets such as India, China, and Latin America. In Britain’s case this process of capitalist diffusion had in many regions led it to acquire colonies in the interests of commercial security; France and Germany would later follow suit. For example, although the then inconspicuously moribund
▲'''Counterarguments addressed'''
These fears became especially pronounced following the [[1869]] completion of the
▲Since the “Scramble for Africa’ was the predominate feature of New Imperialism and formal empire, opponents of Hobson’s accumulation theory often point to frequent cases when military and bureaucratic costs of occupation exceeded financial returns. In Africa (exclusive of South Africa) the amount of capital investment by Europeans was relatively small before and after the 1885 Congress of Berlin, and the companies involved in tropical African commerce were small and politically insignificant, exerting only a tiny influence on domestic politics. First, this observation might detract from the pro-imperialist arguments of Leopold II, Francesco Crispi, and Jules Ferry, but Hobson argued against imperialism from a slightly different standpoint. He concluded that finance was manipulating events to its own profit, but often against broader national interests.
▲Second, any such statistics only obscure the fact that African formal control of tropical Africa had strategic implications in an era of feasible inter-capitalist competition, particularly for Britain, which was under intense economic and thus political pressure to secure lucrative markets such as India, China, and Latin America. In Britain’s case this process of capitalist diffusion had in many regions led it to acquire colonies in the interests of commercial security; France and Germany would later follow suit. For example, although the then inconspicuously moribund Czarist Empire proved to be little treat to Great Britain following its stunning defeat in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, British Conservatives in particular feared that Russia would continue to usurp Ottoman territory and acquire a port on the Mediterranean or even [[Constantinople]]—a long touted goal of Orthodoxy.
In this sense, historian [[Bernard Porter]] argues that formal imperialism for Britain was a symptom and an effect of its relative decline in the world, and not of strength. Symbolic overtures, in fact, such as [[Victoria of the United Kingdom|Queen Victoria]]’s grandiose title of
▲These fears became especially pronounced following the 1869 completion of the near-by [[Suez Canal]], prompting the official rationale behind Disraeli’s purchase of the waterway. The close proximity of the Czar’s (territorially) expanding empire in Central Asia to India also terrified Lord Curzon, thus triggering the Afghan Wars. [[Cecil J. Rhodes|Rhodes]] and Milner also advocated the prospect of a “Cape to Cairo” empire, which would link by rail the extrinsically important canal to the intrinsically mineral and diamond rich South, from a strategic standpoint. Though hampered by German conquest of [[Tanganyika]] until the end of the Great War, Rhodes successfully lobbied on behalf of such a sprawling East African empire.
▲'''Bernard Porter'''
▲In this sense, historian [[Bernard Porter]] argues that formal imperialism for Britain was a symptom and an effect of its relative decline in the world, and not of strength. Symbolic overtures, in fact, such as [[Victoria of the United Kingdom|Queen Victoria]]’s grandiose title of “Empress of India”, celebrated during Disraeli’s second premiership in the 1870s, helped to obscure this fact. Joseph Chamberlain thus argued that formal imperialism was necessary for Britain because of the relative decline of the British share of the world’s export trade and the rise of German, American, and French economic competition.
== Age of Aggressive National Rivalry ==
Following the lead of Britain under Disraeli, even the once hesitantly imperialistic Bismarck was eventually brought to realize the value of colonies for securing (in his words) “new markets for German industry, the expansion of trade, and a new field for German, activity, civilization, and capital”. Examples of strategic competition following the passing of the scene of Bismarck, the era’s premier diplomat, that would intensify the drive to consolidate existing spheres of influence and grab new colonies, include the [[Moroccan Crisis]] of [[1905]], the [[Tangier Crisis]] resulting from [[Wilhelm II of Germany|Kaiser
The absolutist [[Central Powers]], led by a newly unified, dynamically industrializing Germany, with its expanding
▲Following the lead of Britain under Disraeli, even the once hesitantly imperialistic Bismarck was eventually brought to realize the value of colonies for securing (in his words) “new markets for German industry, the expansion of trade, and a new field for German, activity, civilization, and capital”. Examples of strategic competition following the passing of the scene of Bismarck, the era’s premier diplomat, that would intensify the drive to consolidate existing spheres of influence and grab new colonies, include the Moroccan Crisis of [[1905]], the Tangier Crisis resulting from Kaiser Wilhelm’s recognition of [[Morocco|Moroccan]] independence, an the second Moroccan Crisis, in which Germany sent its navy to Morocco, thereby testing the precarious Anglo-French Entente. The [[Entente Cordiale]], in fact, was a gentleman’s agreement between Britain and France to curtail further German expansion. The Entente Cordiale and the Franco-Russian alliances were also made because of a common interest.
But those who disagree that imperialism was sort of a symptom of a gradual movement of surplus capital from a center to an overseas periphery, who contend that export of capital seems to have little direct connection with territorial expansion, point to the United States. Historian and imperial critic [[William L. Langer]], for instance, who emphasized the roles of nationalism and mass psychology in the rise of New Imperialism’s empire for
▲The absolutist Central Powers, led by a newly unified, dynamically industrializing Germany, with its expanding navy—doubling in size between the Franco-Prussian War and the Great War—were a strategic threat to the markets of these relatively declining empires that would one day consist of the Great War Allies. British policymakers feared the prospect of another German military victory over France, which could have reasonably resulted in a German take-over of France’s formal colonies, a sort of reversal of the actual outcome of the Great War, after which Britain occupied the vast majority of German and Ottoman colonies as “protectorates”. This prospect was especially frightening considering that French colonies tended to be closely situated to Britain’s; Nigeria, for instance, was surrounded by French territory, India was near French Indochina, and so forth.
American expansionism, of course, had roots in domestic concerns and economics, as in other newly industrializing nations. Therefore, Hobson’s conclusions, which were drawn predominately from analysis of the British economy, might not automatically pertain to the unique circumstances of the US. The United States was a newly industrializing nation, like Germany, where investments overall assisted and accelerated economic progress, aiding the creation of costly infrastructure, such as railways and other public works. The findings of the [[1890]] [[Census]], however, popularized by historian [[Frederick Jackson Turner]] in his paper entitled ''The Significance of the Frontier in American History'', contributed to fears of dwindling natural resources . The [[Panic of 1893]] and the ensuing depression also led some businessmen and politicians to come to the same conclusion as Leopold II, Ferry, Disraeli,
▲But those who disagree that imperialism was sort of a symptom of a gradual movement of surplus capital from a center to an overseas periphery, who contend that export of capital seems to have little direct connection with territorial expansion, point to the United States. Historian and imperial critic William L. Langer, for instance, who emphasized the roles of nationalism and mass psychology in the rise of New Imperialism’s empire for empire’s sake notes, “At that time [of American expansionism] the United States was still a debtor nation, importing rather than exporting capital.” They also point to the expansionism of Crispi’s Italy and Meiji Japan, which were, in many respects, following Britain’s lead although their economies had not yet grown so intrinsically dependent on overseas financial returns. The liberal nationalism Italian figures such as [[Giuseppe Mazzini|Mazzini]], Cavour, and [[Giuseppe Garibaldi|Garibaldi]] strongly favored modernization, which was associated with the British. Italian, and to a lesser extent French imperialism was often motivated by the desire to ‘catch up’ with Britain economically and culturally.
Like the Long Depression in Europe, which bred doubts regarding growing strength of political resistance of world capitalism, the main features of this depression included deflation, rural decline, and unemployment (indicative of under-consumption), which aggravated the bitter social protests of the [[Gilded
▲American expansionism, of course, had roots in domestic concerns and economics, as in other newly industrializing nations. Therefore, Hobson’s conclusions, which were drawn predominately from analysis of the British economy, might not automatically pertain to the unique circumstances of the US. The United States was a newly industrializing nation, like Germany, where investments overall assisted and accelerated economic progress, aiding the creation of costly infrastructure, such as railways and other public works. The findings of the 1890 Census, however, popularized by historian Frederick Jackson Turner in his paper entitled ''The Significance of the Frontier in American History'', contributed to fears of dwindling natural resources . The Panic of 1893 and the ensuing depression also led some businessmen and politicians to come to the same conclusion as Leopold II, Ferry, Disraeli, [[Joseph Chamberlain|Chamberlain]], and Crispi had formulated nearly a generation earlier —that industry had apparently over-expanded, producing more goods than domestic consumers could buy.
While Germany, the United States, Italy, and other more recently industrialized empires were under relatively less pressure to offload surplus capital than Britain, these nations would resort to protectionism and formal empire, once attacked by adherents to laissez-faire, to usurp Britain’s unfair advantages on international markets . Some politicians, such as [[Henry Cabot Lodge]], [[William McKinley]], and [[Theodore Roosevelt]], advocated a more aggressive foreign policy to pull the United States out of the depression of the second [[Grover Cleveland|Cleveland Administration]], known for a [[laissez-faire]] domestic (and foreign) policy that in some ways paralleled the policies of the [[William Ewart Gladstone|Gladstonian]] liberals. By World War I, the rise of US imperialism and militarism, however, would, in effect, save the Allies, the older, more established, and more liberal empires, albeit at a huge cost (literally), from the emergent threat of the absolutist and
▲Like the Long Depression in Europe, which bred doubts regarding growing strength of political resistance of world capitalism, the main features of this depression included deflation, rural decline, and unemployment (indicative of under-consumption), which aggravated the bitter social protests of the Gilded Age—the Populist movement, the free-silver crusade, and violent labor disputes such as the Pullman Strike. Similarly, the post-1873 in Europe period saw a reemergence of far more militant working-class organization and cycles of large strikes. In fact, the rapid turn to imperialism in the late nineteenth century can be correlated with cyclically spaced economic depressions that adversely affected many elite groups. Like the Long Depression, an era of increasing unemployment and deflated prices for manufactured goods, the Panic of 1893 contributed to fierce competition over markets in the growing ‘spheres of influence’ of the United States, which tended to overlap with Britain’s—especially in the Pacific and South America.
Just as the German Reich reacted to depression with the adoption of protective tariff protection in 1879 , so would the United States with the landslide election victory of William McKinley, who had risen to national prominence six years earlier with the passage of the McKinley Tariff of 1890. Britain’s economic threat from the United States, hence, was (at the time at least) intensified by America’s rise as a great military and political power after the [[American Civil War]], its adoption of such protective [[tariff]] protection, its acquisition of a colonial empire in [[1898]], and its building of a powerful
▲While Germany, the United States, Italy, and other more recently industrialized empires were under relatively less pressure to offload surplus capital than Britain, these nations would resort to protectionism and formal empire, once attacked by adherents to laissez-faire, to usurp Britain’s unfair advantages on international markets . Some politicians, such as [[Henry Cabot Lodge]], [[William McKinley]], and [[Theodore Roosevelt]], advocated a more aggressive foreign policy to pull the United States out of the depression of the second Cleveland Administration, known for a laissez-faire domestic (and foreign) policy that in some ways paralleled the policies of the Gladstonian liberals. By World War I, the rise of US imperialism and militarism, however, would, in effect, save the Allies, the older, more established, and more liberal empires, albeit at a huge cost (literally), from the emergent threat of the absolutist and ‘neo-mercantilist’ (Wallerstein) Prussians.
Although US capital investments within the [[Philippines]] and [[Puerto Rico]] were relatively small (figures that would seemingly detract from the broader economic implications on first glance), these colonies were strategic outposts for expanding trade with Asia, particularly China and Latin America, enabling the United States to reap the benefit of China’s
▲Just as the German Reich reacted to depression with the adoption of protective tariff protection in 1879 , so would the United States with the landslide election victory of William McKinley, who had risen to national prominence six years earlier with the passage of the McKinley Tariff of 1890. Britain’s economic threat from the United States, hence, was (at the time at least) intensified by America’s rise as a great military and political power after the Civil War, its adoption of such protective tariff protection, its acquisition of a colonial empire in 1898, and its building of a powerful navy—the Great White Fleet—under the slain McKinley’s more “big stick”, racist, and militarist successor, Theodore Roosevelt. This course of events, ushered in by the Second Industrial Revolution—paralleled a similar trend in Germany, which emerged as a potential military power after its own unification, its adoption of a tariff in 1879, its acquisition of a colonial empire in 1884-85, and its building of a powerful navy after 1898. On the Pacific, since the [[Meiji Era|Meiji]] Restoration, Japan’s development followed a similar pattern, following the Western lead in industrialization and militarism, enabling it to gain a foothold or ‘sphere of influence’ in Qing China.
▲Although US capital investments within the [[Philippines]] and [[Puerto Rico]] were relatively small (figures that would seemingly detract from the broader economic implications on first glance), these colonies were strategic outposts for expanding trade with Asia, particularly China and Latin America, enabling the United States to reap the benefit of China’s ‘Open Door’ and Dollar Diplomacy under Taft—a sort of US variant of Britain’s informal colonialism. Such developments, whether in Germany, Japan or in the United States, hence disseminated fears that formal imperialism was necessary for Britain because of its relative decline of the British share of the world’s export trade. Imperialism for the United States, however, marked by the reaffirmation of the [[Monroe Doctrine]] (formalized by the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904), would thus herald the trend of the United States replacing Britain as the predominant ‘investor’ in Latin America—a process largely completed by the end of the Great War.
== The Scramble for Africa ==
The late 19th century saw the transition from
While some British colonies were already a century old,
▲The late 19th century saw the transition from 'informal empire' of control through economic dominance to direct control, marked by the scramble for further territory in [[Africa]] from the late 1870's in areas previously regarded as open to British trade and influence. The Berlin Conference (1884-85) regulated the imperial competition between Britain, France and [[Germany]], defining "effective occupation" as the criterion for international recognition of colonial claims, codifying the imposition of direct rule, accomplished usually through armed force.
Formal empire in [[Sub-Saharan Africa]], the last vast region of the world largely untouched by
▲While some British colonies were already a century old, [[Egypt]] was occupied by British forces in [[1882]] (although not formally declared a protectorate until [[1914]]); [[Nigeria]], [[Kenya]] and [[Uganda]] were subjugated in the [[1890s]] and early [[1900s]]; and in the south, the [[Cape Colony]] (first acquired in [[1795]]) provided a base for the subjugation of neighbouring African states and the Dutch [[Afrikaner]] settlers who had left the Cape to found their own republics (see [[Boer War]]).
Each of Europe’s major elites also found some advantages in formal, overseas expansion: mammoth monopolies wanted imperial support to secure overseas investments against competition and domestic political tensions abroad; bureaucrats wanted more occupations, military officers desired promotion, and the traditional but waning landed gentry wanted formal titles. Observing the rise of trade unionism, socialism, and other protest movements during an era of mass society in both Europe and later North America, the elite in particular was able to utilize imperial
▲Formal empire in Sub-Saharan Africa, the last vast region of the world largely untouched by ‘informal imperialism’ and “civilization”, was also attractive to Europe’s ruling elites for other potential reasons. First, insofar as the “Dark Continent” was agricultural or extractive, and no longer ‘stagnant’ since its integration with the world’s interdependent capitalist economy, it required more capital for development that it could provide itself . Second, during a time when in nearly every year since the 1813 liberalization of trade onward Britain’s balance of trade showed a deficit, and a time of shrinking and increasingly protectionist continental markets, Africa offered Britain an open market that would garner it a trade surplus—a market that bought more from the metropole than it sold overall . Britain, like most other industrial countries, had long since begun to run an unfavorable balance of trade (which was increasingly offset, however, by the income from overseas investments). As perhaps the world’s first post-industrial nation, financial services became an increasingly more important sector of its economy. Invisible financial exports, as mentioned, kept Britain out of the red, especially capital investments outside Europe, particularly to the developing and open markets in Africa, predominately white ‘settler colonies’, the Middle East, the Indian Subcontinent, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific .
▲Each of Europe’s major elites also found some advantages in formal, overseas expansion: mammoth monopolies wanted imperial support to secure overseas investments against competition and domestic political tensions abroad; bureaucrats wanted more occupations, military officers desired promotion, and the traditional but waning landed gentry wanted formal titles. Observing the rise of trade unionism, socialism, and other protest movements during an era of mass society in both Europe and later North America, the elite in particular was able to utilize imperial “jingoism” to co-opt the support of the impoverished industrial working class. Riding the sentiments of the late nineteenth century Romantic Age, imperialism inculcated the masses with ‘glorious’ neo-aristocratic virtues and helped instill broad, nationalist sentiments.
===Changes in African Society===
Capitalism, an economic system in which capital, or wealth, is put to work to produce more capital, revolutionized traditional economies, inducing social changes and political consequences that revolutionized African and Asian societies. Maximizing production and minimizing cost did not necessarily coincide with traditional, seasonal patterns of agricultural production. The ethic wage productivity was thus, in many respects, a new concept to supposedly
▲Capitalism, an economic system in which capital, or wealth, is put to work to produce more capital, revolutionized traditional economies, inducing social changes and political consequences that revolutionized African and Asian societies. Maximizing production and minimizing cost did not necessarily coincide with traditional, seasonal patterns of agricultural production. The ethic wage productivity was thus, in many respects, a new concept to supposedly ‘idle’ natives merely accustomed to older patterns of production. Balanced, subsistence-based economies shifted to specialization and accumulation of surpluses. Tribal states or empires organized along precarious, unwritten cultural traditions also shifted to a division of labor based on legal protection of land and labor—once inalienable, but now commodities to be bought, sold, or traded.
===The Congo Free State===
As an aside, it must be noted that the integration of traditional economies in Africa within the framework of the modern, capitalist economy was also particularly exploitative. Leopold’s fortunes, ploughed back into monumental buildings in [[Brussels]], for instance, was made mainly on the proceeds of
Exploitation of the [[Dutch East Indies]], French Indochina, [[German Southwest Africa]], [[Rhodesia]], and South Africa paled in comparison to that of the [[Belgian Congo]]. The most infamous example of this is the [[Congo Free State]]. The fortunes of King Leopold II, for instance, the famed philanthropist, abolitionist, and self-anointed sovereign of Congo Free State (1885)
▲As an aside, it must be noted that the integration of traditional economies in Africa within the framework of the modern, capitalist economy was also particularly exploitative. Leopold’s fortunes, ploughed back into monumental buildings in Brussels, for instance, was made mainly on the proceeds of Congolese rubber, which had never been mass-produced in surplus quantities.
▲Exploitation of the Dutch East Indies, French Indochina, German Southwest Africa, Rhodesia, and South Africa paled in comparison to that of the Belgian Congo. The most infamous example of this is the Congo Free State. The fortunes of King Leopold II, for instance, the famed philanthropist, abolitionist, and self-anointed sovereign of Congo Free State (1885)—76 times larger geographically than Belgium itself—and those of the multinational concessionary companies under his auspices, were mainly made on the proceeds of Congolese rubber, which had historically never been mass-produced in surplus quantities. Between 1880 and 1920 the population of Congo thus halved; over 10 million ‘indolent natives’ unaccustomed to the bourgeois ethos of labor productivity, were the victims of murder, starvation, exhaustion induced by over-work, and disease.
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