Material conditional: Difference between revisions

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== Philosophical problems with material conditional ==

Outside of mathematics, it is a matter of some controversy as to whether the [[truth function]] for [[material implication (rule of inference)|material implication]] provides an adequate treatment of conditional statements in English (a [[sentence (mathematical logic)|sentence]] in the [[indicative mood]] with a [[conditional clause]] attached, i.e., an [[indicative conditional]], or false-to-fact sentences in the [[subjunctive mood]], i.e., a [[counterfactual conditional]]).<ref name="sep-conditionals"/> That is to say, critics argue that in some non-mathematical cases, the truth value of a compound statement, "if ''p'' then ''q''", is not adequately determined by the truth values of ''p'' and ''q''.<ref name="sep-conditionals"/> Examples of non-truth-functional statements include: "''pq'' because ''qp''", "''p'' before ''q''" and "it is possible that ''p''".<ref name="sep-conditionals"/> “[Of] the sixteen possible truth-functions of ''A'' and ''B'', material implication is the only serious candidate. First, it is uncontroversial that when ''A'' is true and ''B'' is false, "If ''A'', ''B''" is false. A basic rule of inference is [[modus ponens]]: from "If ''A'', ''B''" and ''A'', we can infer ''B''. If it were possible to have ''A'' true, ''B'' false and "If ''A'', ''B''" true, this inference would be invalid. Second, it is uncontroversial that "If ''A'', ''B''" is sometimes true when ''A'' and ''B'' are respectively (true, true), or (false, true), or (false, false)… Non-truth-functional accounts agree that "If ''A'', ''B''" is false when ''A'' is true and ''B'' is false; and they agree that the conditional is sometimes true for the other three combinations of truth-values for the components; but they deny that the conditional is always true in each of these three cases. Some agree with the truth-functionalist that when ''A'' and ''B'' are both true, "If ''A'', ''B''" must be true. Some do not, demanding a further relation between the facts that ''A'' and that ''B''.”<ref name="sep-conditionals">{{cite web |first=Dorothy |last=Edgington |editor=Edward N. Zalta |year=2008 |title=Conditionals |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |edition=Winter 2008 |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/conditionals/}}</ref>

{{quotation|The truth-functional theory of the conditional was integral to [[Gottlob Frege|Frege]]'s new logic (1879). It was taken up enthusiastically by [[Bertrand Russell|Russell]] (who called it "material implication"), [[Ludwig Wittgenstein|Wittgenstein]] in the ''[[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus|Tractatus]]'', and the [[logical positivist]]s, and it is now found in every logic text. It is the first theory of conditionals which students encounter. Typically, it does not strike students as ''obviously'' correct. It is logic's first surprise. Yet, as the textbooks testify, it does a creditable job in many circumstances. And it has many defenders. It is a strikingly simple theory: "If ''A'', ''B''" is false when ''A'' is true and ''B'' is false. In all other cases, "If ''A'', ''B''" is true. It is thus equivalent to "~(''A''&~''B'')" and to "~''A'' or ''B''". "''A'' ⊃ ''B''" has, by stipulation, these truth conditions.|[[Dorothy Edgington]]|The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|"Conditionals"<ref name="sep-conditionals"/>}}