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lines, the Soviets were eventually able to penetrate through the enemy positions. This created a gapthrough which exploitation forces poured, all seeking to cut off the Polish lines of retreat. The Cavalry Army quickly rushed through the breach and surged towards Poland; unfortunately, they were the only Red Army force capable of such rapid movement. The infantry formations struggled to move quickly enough to keep up with their cavalry and the retreating Poles. Because
of the Soviets' lack of a mobile reserve and few forward stockpiles capable of supporting deep operations, the
Poles were able to conduct an orderly retreat back to their own borders and preserve forces that would otherwise have been cut off and destroyed.(Kimbal p. 10)
Nevertheless, retreat is still a demoralizing position, and the Polish forces found themselves in a race to reestablish new defenses while the Red forces used their success to motivate their soldiers and spur them on to what they perceived as impending victory. By July 10, the Soviets had advanced their forward positions to the prewar borders of Poland, and had launched fresh offensives by the newly constituted 3rd Cavalry Corps, whose mission was to attempt to turn the Polish flanks
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amount of success such deep operations could expect, and the Poles were able to preserve the bulk of their
combat power even as they successively gave up key strategic positions. By August 12, the Red Army stood
on the banks of the Vistula River. (Kimbal p.11)
The infantry-centric organization of the Red Army was wholly unsuitable for the rapid war of movement, exploitation, and pursuit that was waged during the Polish Campaign. The restrictive terrain on which the campaign was waged meant that mobility would be at a premium, as units struggled to capture and hold the vital mobility corridors that allowed access to the Polish interior. Since masses of men could not march across the terrain in waves, the Polish defenders were able to concentrate their defenses on these critical avenues of approach and force the Red Army to come to them. The Red Cavalry might well blow a hole in the enemy lines and be positioned to strike deep into the Polish rear, but no other forces had sufficient mobility to follow them and secure their lines of communication. Without this type of mobile reserve, any deep penetration by the Red Army would quickly turn into a force surrounded by hostile troops and cut off from any type of relief. Although the exploits of the Cavalry Army and other mobile units were highly publicized, these units were very much in the minority. In fact, only seven major cavalry units were committed to the fight, and the majority of them were assigned kimbal p. 17
under the aegis of the Cavalry Army.4 Because of their limited mobility and inability to exploit a major breach, Red forces inevitably surrendered the initiative back to the Polish defenders. Soviet forces also had to contend with threats from the air for the first time since World War I. The Polish air squadrons, although small in number, gave their armed forces a decisive advantage in both observation capabilities and in limited attack roles. These units, operating from fixed bases and supply trains, contained a large number of veteran pilots and foreign volunteers who flew hundreds of sorties in support of the Polish Army. Having never had to face an opponent with air capabilities, the Soviets had no dedicated anti-aircraft artillery, nor did they have an effective air arm of their own. The best that most Red Army units could provide for aerial observation was balloon observers moored to stationary artillery positions, which became easy targets for fires from both the ground and Polish aircraft and were usually destroyed within hours of going aloft. kimball p. 18
A nord, un attacco di supporto contro l'ala destra del fronte bielorusso dello schieramento polacco fu seguito dall'attacco principale condotto dalla 15ª armata contro l'ala sinistra, per ricacciare i polacchi verso le paludi del Pripyat, mentre la 16ª armata attraversava la [[Beresina|Berezina]] per tagliare la strada ai rinforzi polacchi e dividere il fronte.<ref name="Worrell, p. 26"/> A sud, la famosa [[Prima armata di cavalleria russa|Prima armata di cavalleria]] del generale [[Semën Michajlovič Budënnyj|Budënnyj]],<ref name="babel">La Prima armata di cavalleria si trovava allora nel Caucaso settentrionale, dove aveva combattuto contro l'esercito del generale [[Anton Ivanovič Denikin|Denikin]]. Partita dalla città di [[Majkop]], dopo una marcia di trasferimento di mille chilometri, si riorganizzò a [[Uman']], in Ucraina. Cfr. {{cita|Babel'|p. 7, nota 1}} (lo scrittore Isaak Babel' partecipò alla guerra aggregandosi alla sesta divisione della Prima armata di cavalleria con il nome di battaglia di Kirill Ljutov - "Cirillo il crudele" - in qualità di corrispondente dell'Agenzia telegrafica russa e come redattore del giornale ''Il cavalleggere rosso'', organo ufficiale della stessa Prima armata)</ref> attaccava invece l'ala destra del fronte sud (ucraino).<ref name="Worrell, p. 26"/>
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==== La battaglia ====
Fra il 6 e il 13 agosto l'esercito polacco si preparò alla battaglia: le truppe, già stremate dalla lunga ritirata, dovettero essere riposizionate lungo il fronte arrivando a percorrere anche 300 km sotto la costante pressione dell'Armata Rossa.<ref>{{cita|Worrell|p. 33
On August 6, recognizing the untenability of his current positions, Pilsudski completely reorganized the Polish Army's operational command structure, consolidating four field armies into three and assigning them entirely new objectives. The Northern Army, holding terrain where mobility would be highly restrictive, and facing well-emplaced Red forces, was given mostly reserve armies charged solely with holding their current positions against any incursion. The Southern Army was given similar resources and charged with preventing any type of effective traffic or communication between the Red Western and Southwestern fronts. The Central Army was given priority of troops and support in every category, as well as every mobile asset available to the Polish Army to enhance their striking power.44 All of these actions were taken under the looming threat of capture and destruction by the Red forces, and were successful only because of Pilsudski's command ability and unchallenged authority. Kimbal p. 16
Il 13 agosto Tuchačevskij lanciò l'Armata Rossa all'attacco: la 13ª e la 14ª da nord attaccarono le posizioni fortificate tenute dalla 5ª armata polacca; fra il 14 e il 15 agosto l'Armata Rossa si avvicinò fino a 25 km da Varsavia e mentre la 5ª armata polacca, con una serie di contrattacchi, cercava di mantenere le sue posizioni mettendo in capo tutte le proprie riserve sotto il rischio costante di essere aggirata e accerchiata, la 1ª armata polacca partì all'assalto con l'appoggio di quarantasette carri armati.<ref>{{cita|Worrell|p. 34}}.</ref>
Alle 04.00 del mattino del 16 agosto, Piłsudski ordinò la mossa decisiva: la 3ª e la 4ª armata polacca si lanciarono all'attacco verso nord-est penetrando in profondità nel debole fianco sinistro dello schieramento sovietico; la mossa colse di sorpresa l'Armata Rossa e le truppe polacche penetrarono nelle retrovie sovietiche quasi senza opposizione. Il 18 agosto Tuchačevskij fu costretto a ordinare la ritirata generale che si trasformò ben presto in rotta: inseguita dalle truppe polacche in una situazione di generale confusione, con alcuni reparti che fuggivano o si sbandavano<ref>{{cita|Worrell|pp. 34-35}}.</ref> (circa trentamila soldati sconfinarono nella Prussia orientale, dove furono internati) mentre altri continuavano coraggiosamente a combattere, l'Armata Rossa fu costretta a ritirarsi di 500 km oltre il Bug. Le perdite subite dall'Armata Rossa furono enormi: i polacchi catturarono circa 65 000 prigionieri e ingenti quantità di armi, cavalli e veicoli; i morti furono 25 000.<ref name="Cienciala" />
The Poles took advantage of a seam that had developed between the Soviet Western and Southwestern Armies,
and struck deep behind the positions of both forces to cut key lines of communication and strike panic into
the soldiers of the enemy. One of the chief reasons for the development of the seam was the invasion of
the Crimea by Baron P. N. Wrangel, a tsarist cavalry division commander during World War I who took
advantage of the Soviet focus on Poland to marshal his forces and strike at relatively undefended areas,
rapidly advancing through the southwestern areas of Soviet territory. This unexpected assault caused the
Soviet High Command to shift focus and resources to fend against Wrangel during a critical time in the
Polish campaign. Finding his forces divided and unable to mount a coordinated counterattack, M. N. Tukhachevsky, the commander of Red Army forces in the West, ordered a withdrawal to the Soviet frontier. Here, after a series of sporadic small-unit actions, the border finally stabilized after extensive negotiations between the Soviets and the Poles. (Kimbal p.11)
A sud, le forze del fronte sud-occidentale sovietico che avanzavano verso Leopoli furono fermate nella [[Battaglia di Brody (1920)|battaglia di Brody]] (29 luglio - 2 agosto) e poi in quella di [[Battaglia di Zadwórze|Zadwórze]] (17 agosto). Il 31 agosto la Prima armata di cavalleria abbandonò l'attacco a Leopoli tentando di correre in aiuto delle truppe sovietiche in ritirata a nord, ma nella [[battaglia di Komarów]], nei pressi di [[Zamość]], si scontrò con la cavalleria polacca nel più grande scontro tra truppe montate mai combattuto dal 1813: la vittoria arrise ai polacchi, la cavalleria sovietica fu costretta a ritirarsi dopo aver subito pesanti perdite.<ref name="encyklopedia.pwn.pl">{{cita web|url=http://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo.php?id=3997498|titolo=wojna polsko-bolszewicka|lingua=pl|opera=encyklopedia.pwn.pl|editore=Internetowa encyklopedia PWN|accesso=23 gennaio 2013}}</ref> Le forze del generale Egorov furono sconfitte dalle forze ucraine di Petljura che, il 18 settembre, presero il controllo della riva sinistra del fiume Zbruč<ref name="kubijovic">{{cita|Kubijovic|}}.</ref>
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== La lezione del conflitto ==
In a strategic sense, the Soviets never really understood who they were fighting during the Polish campaign. Obsessed with the idea that the White forces and their foreign supporters were behind every misfortune and threat to the Soviet system, the Bolshevik leadership consistently labeled the Polish threat as a tool of capitalist oppression. Lenin labeled the Polish offensives of 1919 as White offensives, even though the Communist Party chief of Wilno emphatically stated in a letter to the Voenni Vyshii Soviet (VVS, or Supreme Military Council) that the occupiers of the city were Polish regulars, not White infantry."5 In a December 15, 1919, editorial in L'Internationale Communist, Trotsky proclaimed that "the Polish lords and gentry will snatch a temporary, marauders' victory, but when we have finished with Denikin, we shall throw the full weight of our reserves onto the Polish front." Soviet citizens responded to such appeals with enthusiasm, and many ex-Imperial officers who had previously refused 12 to fight on either side joined the Red Army specifically to serve in the Polish campaign. 6 Nor was all of this simply propaganda for external consumption; official documents, communiques, and internal government traffic during this time routinely refers to Poles as belopolyaki ("White Poles") and Poland as "White Poland" or "White Guard Poland."37 The quality of strategic intelligence did not improve during the campaign either; the focus on Warsaw as the center of gravity of the Polish resistance was largely motivated by a belief that the Polish armed forces were worn out and that a large symbolic defeat would be enough to dissolve the army completely.38 The lack of Soviet understanding of the composition and motivation of their enemies extended to the operational and tactical level as well. There were wide disparities between the estimates of higher headquarters and field commands on the actual strength and composition of Polish forces. In late May 1920, the General Staff estimated the strength of the Polish Army at 75,000, while Tukhachevsky's field intelligence officer put the number at only 56,000. Actual contact and combat with the enemy only made these disparities worse; a July 4 estimate published by the field headquarters put the number of enemy effectives at 95,000, while in reality the Polish Army had only 58,000 in position on the front at that time.39 One of the main reasons for this disparity in actionable intelligence was the lack of tactical and strategic assets on the Soviet side. Throughout the fight, the Poles were screening their lines with partisan bands, so the Red forces had no current intelligence until the Cavalry Army made its initial penetration. Even worse, that force, intended to be the "eyes and ears" of the entire Western Front, had no means to relay back its findings 13 or reports on enemy dispositions except through ad hoc messages from the Army rear command post.40 Red Commanders were routinely surprised by the high quality and discipline of Polish troops. In a message to Tukhachevsky during his initial offensive, Budyenny expressed his surprise that the Polish infantry did not try to save their lives by joining the Red Army when overrun, a frequent practice of captured White forces. Tukhachevsky himself reported in a June 12 summary that "the enemy handles his armies excellently" and "the Polish Army exudes Europeanism"; in many ways, he regarded them as superior in training and discipline to the Red forces. Tukhachevsky was continually frustrated by his inability to consummate the destruction of an enemy unit; he believed that if he could cut off a Polish force, it would dissolve into mass retreat as its White counterpart had during the Civil War.4' The Soviets completely failed to understand that they were no longer fighting White forces, but a completely different enemy with an entirely different set of strengths and weaknesses. Unfortunately, the Red Army had no means of assessing ahead of time exactly what those strengths and weaknesses were because it had never developed any type of intelligence apparatus. Such specialized units were wholly unnecessary during the campaigns against the Whites, where most of the opposing leadership was intimately known by the Red Army commanders. Those Red commanders who needed additional information about the strength or composition of their opponents could easily get it from any of the partisan or anarchist forces operating in the White Rear. Against an enemy fighting on his own terrain with an entirely different ethnic and social identity, the Red Army found itself 14 completely deprived of any means of collecting usable battlefield intelligence, and consequently went into the fight "blind." (kimbal 12, 13, 14)
The failures in command and control on the part of the Red Army were plentiful and apparent from the start of the Polish campaign. There was little to no attempted coordination by the civil authorities or the General Staff between the Western and Southwestern Armies; instead, each was given a vague list of objectives and told to exploit them as best they could. Neither army was ever defined as the main effort nor given adequate means to support its operations; instead, the Red Army command simply reinforced whoever was enjoying the most success at a given time.42 This organizational friction was compounded by the unduly competitive spirit present between the Army commanders and the desire to obtain the glory of victory at all costs. Lateral coordination between the two forces was nonexistent, and no attempt was ever made to coordinate attacks or movements to better enhance the goals and objectives of the total force. Ultimately, this allowed field commanders at all levels to dispute orders that they disagreed with and drag their feet in execution, often letting fleeting opportunities for exploitation slip by.43 In comparison, the Polish forces maintained a unity of command that served them well even under the most trying conditions. Pilsudski also had to contend with a wide variety of talented commanders who each felt that he and he alone had the right combination of ideas and forces that could bring victory for the Polish cause. The crucial difference was that Pilsudski had unquestioned authority over all of them and could 15 make his decrees stick. Kimbal p. 15
L'esperienza della guerra sovietico-polacca ebbe una fondamentale importanza nello sviluppo della dottrine militare sovietica. L'analisi della battaglia di Varsavia rivelò che l'offensiva sovietica era stata condotta con riserve inadeguate, supporto logistico carente e inefficace controllo delle operazioni.<ref>{{cita|Worrell|p. 37}}.</ref> I teorici militari sovietici — Tuchačevskij, Svechin, [[Vladimir Kiriakovič Triandafillov|Triandafillov]] e [[Michail Vasil'evič Frunze|Frunze]] — arrivarono alla conclusione che la complessità della guerra moderna aveva sostanzialmente cambiato il modo in cui la guerra stessa poteva essere condotta e che, fra [[tattica]] e [[strategia]], era necessario un livello operativo intermedio.<ref name="Worrell, p. 36">{{cita|Worrell|p. 36}}.</ref> Nel suo libro ''La campagna della Vistola'', Tuchačevskij scrisse: «... l'impossibilità, data dall'ampiezza dei fronti odierni, di annichilire un esercito nemico con un unico attacco, rende necessario usare una serie di operazioni graduali... [le quali], collegate da un perseguimento continuo del fine, possono soppiantare la battaglia di annientamento, la migliore forma di scontro negli eserciti del passato». Venne quindi introdotto nella dottrina militare sovietica un livello operativo intermedio, denominato "operazionale", definito da Svechin come «... una serie di operazioni divise nel tempo da pause più o meno lunghe, comprendenti differenti settori del teatro di guerra e differenziate nettamente come conseguenza di differenti fini intermedi».<ref name="Worrell, p. 36"/>
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