Command and control regulation: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 01:10, 31 March 2014

Revision as of 10:13, 15 April 2014

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*[[Enforcement]]: This constitutes a very significant dilemma for a CAC regulatory approach. One of the key issues is the expense of enforcement, especially when a complex system of rules has been developed. There are also problems of scope.

Critics of CAC often point to incentive based regulation as an alternative. Possible benefits of this approach may include cheaper administration costs and a reduction in the risk of [[regulatory capture]]. However the view that incentive-based regulation is radically different tofrom CAC has been scrutinised. The advantages can be exaggerated, a complex system of rules is often necessary to allow an effective system, this can cause many incentive-based schemes to appear to replicate some of the characteristics of CAC. Inspection and enforcement may also be essential to prevent evasion of liability, again resembling CAC and possibly removing the posited benefits in terms of cost.<ref name="Baldwin"/> While practices may be changed at a superficial level through the use of CAC, it may not be able to achieve the changes of behaviour necessary for more sustainable environmental practices.<ref name="gandg">Gunningham, N., Grabosky, P. (1998) Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy. USA: Oxford University Press.</ref>

There are some commentators on the topic who prefer to use ‘direct regulatory instrument’ instead of ‘command and control’ instrument because of the negative connotations surrounding the term.<ref name="goulder">Goulder, L., Parry, I. (2008) Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy. 2: 2. pp. 152-174.</ref>