Self-categorization theory: Difference between revisions

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'''Self-categorization theory''' is a [[social psychological]] theory that describes the circumstances under which a person will perceive collections of people (including themselves) as a group, as well as the consequences of perceiving people in group terms.<ref name="Haslam (1997)">{{cite journal|last=Haslam|first=S. A.|title=Stereotyping and social influence: Fourndations of stereotype consensus|journal=The social psychology of stereotyping and group life|year=1997|pages=119–143|editor1-first=R.|editor1-last=Spears|editor2-first=P.J.|editor2-last=Oakes|editor3-first=N.|editor3-last=Ellemers|editor4-first=S.A.|editor4-last=Haslam|publisher=Blackwell|___location=Oxford}}</ref> Although the theory is often introduced as an explanation of psychological group formation (which was one of its early goals), it is more accurately thought of as general analysis of the functioning of [[categorization]] processes in [[social perception]] and interaction that speaks to issues of individual identity as much as group phenomena.<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994).">{{cite book | last1 = Oakes | first1 = Penny | last2 = Haslam | first2 = Alex | last3 = Turner | first3 = John | title = Stereotyping and social reality | year = 1994 | publisher = Oxford | ___location = Blackwell}}</ref>

The theory was developed by [[John C. Turner|John Turner]] and colleagues, and along with [[social identity theory]] it is a constituent part of the [[social identity approach]]. It was in part developed to address questions that arose in response to social identity theory about the mechanistic underpinnings of social identification.<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986).">{{cite journal|last = Turner|first = John|last2=Oakes|first2=Penny|title = The significance of the social identity concept for social psychology with reference to individualism, interactionism and social influence|journal = British Journal of Social Psychology|volume = 25| issue = 3| pages = 237–252|year = 1986|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8309.1986.tb00732.x}}</ref><ref name="Haslam et al. (1996).">{{cite journal | last1 = Haslam | first1 = Alex | last2 = Oakes | first2 = Penny | last3 = Turner | first3 = John | last4 = McGarty | first4 = Craig | editor-last = Sorrentino | editor-first = Richard | editor2-last = Higgins | editor2-first = Edward | year = 1996 | title = Social identity, self-categorization, and the perceived homogeneity of ingroups and outgroups: The interaction between social motivation and cognition | journal = Handbook of motivation and cognition: the interpersonal context, Handbook of motivation and cognition | volume = 3 | pages = 182–222 | ___location = New York | publisher = Guilford Press}}</ref><ref name="Turner (1999)">{{cite journal|last=Turner|first=J. C.|title=Some current issues in research on social identity and self-categorization thoeriestheories|journal=Social identity|year=1999|pages=6–34|editor1-first=N.|editor1-last=Ellemers|editor2-first=R.|editor2-last=Spears|editor3-first=B.|editor3-last=Doosje|publisher=Blackwell|___location=Oxford}}</ref><ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001).">[[Alex Haslam|Haslam, A. S.]] (2001). Psychology in Organizations. London, SAGE Publications.</ref> For example, what makes people define themselves in terms of one group membership rather than another?<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/>

[[File:Rugby 2.jpg|thumb|right|350px|alt= Rugby operates using self-categorization theory processes.|The clear intergroup structure of team sports means that such contexts are often used to illustrate self-categorization theory processes.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011).">{{cite book |last=Haslam |first=S. Alexander |last2=Reicher |first2=Stephen D. |last3=Platow |first3=Michael J. |title=The new psychology of leadership: Identity, influence and power |year=2011 |publisher=Psychology Press |___location=New York, NY |isbn=978-1-84169-610-2}}</ref>]] Self-categorization theory has been influential in the academic field of [[social psychology]] and beyond.<ref name="Postmes, T. & Branscombe, N. (2010)">Postmes, T. & Branscombe, N. (2010). Sources of social identity. In T. Postmes & N. Branscombe (Eds). Rediscovering Social Identity: Core Sources. Psychology Press.</ref> It was first applied to the topics of [[Self-categorization theory#Social influence|social influence]], [[Group cohesiveness|group cohesion]], [[group polarization]], and [[collective action]].<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987).">Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D. & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford: Blackwell</ref> In subsequent years the theory, often as part of the social identity approach, has been applied to further topics such as [[leadership]],<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/> [[personality]],<ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)">{{cite journal|last1=Turner|first1=J. C.|last2=Onorato|first2=R. S.|title=Social identity, personality, and the self-concept: A self-categorization perspective|journal=The psychology of the social self|year=1998|pages=11–46|editor1-first=T. R.|editor1-last=Tyler|editor2-first=R. M.|editor2-last=Kramer|editor3-first=O. P.|editor3-last=John|publisher=Psychology Press}}</ref> [[Self-categorization theory#Out-group homogeneity|outgroup homogeneity]], and [[power (social and political)|power]].<ref name="Turner (2005)">{{cite journal|last=Turner|first=J. C.|title=Explaining the nature of power: A three-process theory|journal=European Journal of Social Psychology|year=2005|volume=35|issue=1|pages=1–22|doi=10.1002/ejsp.244}}</ref> One tenet of the theory is that the self should not be considered as a foundational aspect of [[cognition]], but rather the self should be seen as a product of the cognitive system at work.<ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994).">{{cite journal | last1 = Turner | first1 = J. C. | last2 = Oakes | first2 = P. J. | last3 = Haslam | first3 = S. A. | last4 = McGarty | first4 = C. | year = 1994 | title = Self and collective: Cognition and social context | url = | journal = Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | volume = 20 | issue = | pages = 454–463 | doi=10.1177/0146167294205002}}</ref><ref name="Reynolds & Turner (2006).">{{cite journal |last1= Reynolds |first1= K. J. |last2= Turner |first2= J. C.|year= 2006|title= Individuality and the prejudiced personality |journal= European Review of Social Psychology| volume= 17|issue= 1|pages= 233–270|publisher= Psychology Press |doi=10.1080/10463280601050880}}</ref><ref name="Onorato & Turner (2004)">{{cite journal|last=Onorato|author2=Turner |title=Fluidity in the self-concept: The shift from personal to social identity|journal=European Journal of Social Psychology|year=2004|volume=34|pages=257–278|doi=10.1002/espj.195|doi_inactivedate=2014-02-01}}</ref> Or in other words, the self is an outcome of cognitive processes rather than a "thing" at the heart of cognition.

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====Comparative fit====

[[File:SCT comparative context.JPG|thumb|right|300px|alt= Variation in self-categorization as a function of comparative context.| Figure 2. Variation in self-categorization as a function of comparative context. In Context 1 Amy and Beth self-categorize in terms of lower-level personal identities that accentuate their differences from each other. However, in Context 2 the comparative is extended to include more different others (here men), and Amy and Beth are now more likely to define themselves in terms of a higher-level social identity. They hence appear more similar to each other. The main theoretical point here is that as comparative context is extended, people tend to self-categorize at a more inclusive, higher level of abstraction.<ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/>]]Comparative fit is determined by the meta-contrast principle—which states that people are more likely to believe that a collection of stimuli represents an entity to the degree that the differences between those stimuli are less than the differences between that collection of stimuli and other stimuli.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/> For predicting whether a group will categorize an individual as an ingroup or outgroup member, the meta-contrast principle may be defined as the ratio of the average similarity of the individual to outgroup members over the average similarity of the individual to ingroup members. The meta-contrast ratio is dependent on the context, or frame of reference, in which the categorization process is occurring.<ref name="Turner, J. C. (1999)">Turner, J. C. (1999). Current issues in research on social identity and self-categorization thoeriestheories. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears, & B. Doosje (Eds), Social identity: Context, commitment, content (pp. 6-34) Oxford, UK. Blackwell.</ref> That is, the ratio is a comparison based on whichever stimuli are cognitively present. For example, if the frame of reference is reduced such that potential outgroup members are no longer cognitively present, ingroup members regard the individual as less similar to the group and are less likely to categorize that individual as belonging to that group.

====Normative fit====