Self-categorization theory: Difference between revisions

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The theory was developed by [[John C. Turner|John Turner]] and colleagues, and along with [[social identity theory]] it is a constituent part of the [[social identity approach]]. It was in part developed to address questions that arose in response to social identity theory about the mechanistic underpinnings of social identification.<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986).">{{cite journal|last = Turner|first = John|last2=Oakes|first2=Penny|title = The significance of the social identity concept for social psychology with reference to individualism, interactionism and social influence|journal = British Journal of Social Psychology|volume = 25| issue = 3| pages = 237–252|year = 1986|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8309.1986.tb00732.x}}</ref><ref name="Haslam et al. (1996).">{{cite journal | last1 = Haslam | first1 = Alex | last2 = Oakes | first2 = Penny | last3 = Turner | first3 = John | last4 = McGarty | first4 = Craig | editor-last = Sorrentino | editor-first = Richard | editor2-last = Higgins | editor2-first = Edward | year = 1996 | title = Social identity, self-categorization, and the perceived homogeneity of ingroups and outgroups: The interaction between social motivation and cognition | journal = Handbook of motivation and cognition: the interpersonal context, Handbook of motivation and cognition | volume = 3 | pages = 182–222 | ___location = New York | publisher = Guilford Press}}</ref><ref name="Turner (1999)">{{cite journal|last=Turner|first=J. C.|title=Some current issues in research on social identity and self-categorization theories|journal=Social identity|year=1999|pages=6–34|editor1-first=N.|editor1-last=Ellemers|editor2-first=R.|editor2-last=Spears|editor3-first=B.|editor3-last=Doosje|publisher=Blackwell|___location=Oxford}}</ref><ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001).">[[Alex Haslam|Haslam, A. S.]] (2001). Psychology in Organizations. London, SAGE Publications.</ref> For example, what makes people define themselves in terms of one group membership rather than another?<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/>

[[File:Rugby 2.jpg|thumb|right|350px|alt= Rugby operates using self-categorization theory processes.|The clear intergroup structure of team sports means that such contexts are often used to illustrate self-categorization theory processes.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011).">{{cite book |last=Haslam |first=S. Alexander |last2=Reicher |first2=Stephen D. |last3=Platow |first3=Michael J. |title=The new psychology of leadership: Identity, influence and power |year=2011 |publisher=Psychology Press |___location=New York, NY |isbn=978-1-84169-610-2}}</ref>]] Self-categorization theory has been influential in the academic field of [[social psychology]] and beyond.<ref name="Postmes, T. & Branscombe, N. (2010)">Postmes, T. & Branscombe, N. (2010). Sources of social identity. In T. Postmes & N. Branscombe (Eds). Rediscovering Social Identity: Core Sources. Psychology Press.</ref> It was first applied to the topics of [[Self-categorization theory#Social influence|social influence]], [[Group cohesiveness|group cohesion]], [[group polarization]], and [[collective action]].<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987).">Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D. & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford: Blackwell</ref> In subsequent years the theory, often as part of the social identity approach, has been applied to further topics such as [[leadership]],<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/> [[personality]],<ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)">{{cite journal|last1=Turner|first1=J. C.|last2=Onorato|first2=R. S.|title=Social identity, personality, and the self-concept: A self-categorization perspective|journal=The psychology of the social self|year=1998|pages=11–46|editor1-first=T. R.|editor1-last=Tyler|editor2-first=R. M.|editor2-last=Kramer|editor3-first=O. P.|editor3-last=John|publisher=Psychology Press}}</ref> [[Self-categorization theory#Out-group homogeneity|outgroup homogeneity]], and [[power (social and political)|power]].<ref name="Turner (2005)">{{cite journal|last=Turner|first=J. C.|title=Explaining the nature of power: A three-process theory|journal=European Journal of Social Psychology|year=2005|volume=35|issue=1|pages=1–22|doi=10.1002/ejsp.244}}</ref> One tenet of the theory is that the self should not be considered as a foundational aspect of [[cognition]], but rather the self should be seen as a product of the cognitive system at work.<ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994).">{{cite journal | last1 = Turner | first1 = J. C. | last2 = Oakes | first2 = P. J. | last3 = Haslam | first3 = S. A. | last4 = McGarty | first4 = C. | year = 1994 | title = Self and collective: Cognition and social context | url = | journal = Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | volume = 20 | issue = 5| pages = 454–463 | doi=10.1177/0146167294205002}}</ref><ref name="Reynolds & Turner (2006).">{{cite journal |last1= Reynolds |first1= K. J. |last2= Turner |first2= J. C.|year= 2006|title= Individuality and the prejudiced personality |journal= European Review of Social Psychology| volume= 17|issue= 1|pages= 233–270|publisher= Psychology Press |doi=10.1080/10463280601050880}}</ref><ref name="Onorato & Turner (2004)">{{cite journal|last=Onorato|author2=Turner |title=Fluidity in the self-concept: The shift from personal to social identity|journal=European Journal of Social Psychology|year=2004|volume=34|pages=257–278|doi=10.1002/espj.195|doi_inactivedate=2014-02-01|doi_brokendate=2015-02-01 }}</ref> Or in other words, the self is an outcome of cognitive processes rather than a "thing" at the heart of cognition.

==Aspects of the theory==

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In self-categorization theory categorizing people does not simply involve the redescription of characteristics and categories present in social stimuli. Rather, salient ''social categories'' form the basis of a social world that is enriched with meaning. This is achieved through a non-conscious process of accentuation, where ''differences between'' social categories are accentuated along with the ''similarities within'' social categories.<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/><ref name="Haslam et al. (1995)">{{cite journal | last1 = Haslam | first1 = S. A. | last2 = Oakes | first2 = P. J. | last3 = Turner | first3 = J. C. | last4 = McGarty | first4 = C. | year = 1995 | title = Social categorization and group homogeneity: Changes in the perceived applicability of stereotype content as a function of comparative context and trait favourableness | url = | journal = British Journal of Social Psychology | volume = 34 | issue = 2| pages = 139–160 | doi=10.1111/j.2044-8309.1995.tb01054.x}}</ref> The resulting augmentation of social content allows the perceiver to interact with others with greater confidence and ease.

The accentuation component of self-categorization theory stems from prior research that demonstrated an [[accentuation effect]] for categorized non-social stimuli.<ref name="Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010)"/> A prototypical example of non-social accentuation came from Tajfel and Wilkes, who found that when a categorization scheme corresponded to line length participants would view lines belonging to different categories as more different than if no categorization scheme was present.<ref name="Tajfel & Wilkes (1963)">{{cite journal|last1=Tajfel|first1=H.|last2=Wilkes|first2=A. L.|title=Classification and quantitative judgement|journal=British journal of psychology|year=1963|volume=54|issue=2|pages=101–114|pmid=13980241|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8295.1963.tb00865.x}}</ref> Consistent with the idea that an efficient cognitive system would, where possible, use the same systems regardless of the social or non-social nature of the stimuli,<ref name="Van rooy et al. (2003)">{{cite journal | last1 = Van Rooy | first1 = D. | last2 = Van Overwalle | first2 = F. | last3 = Vanhoomissen | first3 = T. | last4 = Labiouse | first4 = C. | last5 = French | first5 = R. | year = 2003 | title = A recurrent connectionist model of group biases | url = | journal = Psychological Review | volume = 110 | issue = 3| pages = 536–563 | pmid = 12885114 | doi=10.1037/0033-295x.110.3.536}}</ref> self-categorization theorists have demonstrated similar effects for social stimuli. For example, Haslam and Turner found that a perceiver would describe another person as more or less similar to themselves as a function of the likely categorization scheme.<ref name="Haslam & Turner (1992).">{{cite journal | last1 = Haslam | first1 = Alex | last2 = Turner | first2 = John | year = 1992 | title = Context-dependent variation in social stereotyping 2: The relationship between frame of reference, self-categorization and accentuation. | journal = European Journal of Social Psychology| volume = 22 | issue = 3| pages = 251–277 | doi=10.1002/ejsp.2420220305}}</ref>

===Depersonalization and self-stereotyping ===

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In social psychology a category [[prototype]] may be thought of as a “representative exemplar” of a category.<ref name="Billig, M. (1987)">Billig, M. (1987). Arguing and thinking: A rhetorical approach to social psychology: Cambridge University Press.</ref> Self-categorization theory predicts that what is prototypical of a category is contingent on the context in which the category is encountered.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/> More specifically, when the [[Self-categorization theory#Comparative fit|comparative context]] changes (i.e., the psychologically available stimuli change) this has implications for how the self category is perceived and the nature of subsequent [[Self-categorization theory#Depersonalization and self-stereotyping|depersonalization]]. To continue with a prior example, when physicists are a psychologically available comparison group to psychologists, those psychologists are more likely to adopt behaviours that reflect a perception that the ingroup is comparably unscientific. However, when artists are the psychologically available comparison group, those same psychologists are more likely to behave in a manner that highlights the scientific aspects of the category. To rephrase the above process in the language of the theory, self-categorization theory predicts that individuals adopt the features of a salient self category (self-stereotyping), and the content of the category they adopt depends on the present comparative context.

An individual’s degree of prototypicality also varies in relation to changes in the comparative context, and self-categorization theory expects this to have direct implications for interpersonal phenomenon. Specifically, prototypicality plays an important role in the social identity approach to [[Social identity approach#Leadership|leadership]],<ref name="Platow, M. J. et al. (1997).">{{cite journal | last1 = Platow | first1 = M. J. | last2 = Hoar | first2 = S. | last3 = Reid | first3 = S. Harley | last4 = Morrison | first4 = D. | last5 = Morrison | first5 = Dianne | year = 1997 | title = Endorsement of distributively fair and unfair leaders in interpersonal and intergroup situations | url = | journal = European Journal of Social Psychology | volume = 27 | issue = 4| pages = 465–494 | doi=10.1002/(sici)1099-0992(199707)27:4<465::aid-ejsp817>3.0.co;2-8}}</ref> influence, and [[interpersonal attraction]]. For example, on interpersonal attraction, self-categorization theory states that "self and others are evaluated positively to the degree that they are perceived as prototypical (representative, exemplary, etc.) of the next more inclusive (positively valued) self-category of which they are being compared".<ref name="Turner (1985)"/>

Levels of individual prototypicality may be gauged using the meta-contrast principle, and indeed it is this purpose the meta-contrast ratio is more often used for.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/> Furthermore, although prototypicality is most often discussed in relation to the perception of individuals within a group, groups may also be assessed in terms of how prototypical they are of a superordinate category.<ref>Rubin, M. (2012). Group status is related to group prototypicality in the absence of social identity concerns. ''Journal of Social Psychology, 152, 386–389. doi: 10.1080/00224545.2011.614648''[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00224545.2011.614648 [View<nowiki>]</nowiki>]</ref>

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{{main|social influence}}

Self-categorization theory provides an account of social influence.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)">Turner, J. C. (1991). Social influence. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.</ref> This account is sometimes referred to as the theory of ''referent informational influence''.<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/> According to self-categorization theory, as social identities become salient, and depersonalization and self-stereotyping occurs, people adopt the norms, beliefs, and behaviors of fellow ingroup members. They also distance themselves from the norms, beliefs, and behaviors of comparison outgroup members. When someone observes a difference between themselves and a fellow ingroup member that person will experience subjective uncertainty. That uncertainty can be resolved by either a) recategorizing people or the situation to reflect those perceived differences, or b) engaging in a social influence process whereby one person makes changes to become more similar to the other. Which person adopts the views or behaviors of the other (i.e. who influences who) is predicted to be that person who is most prototypical of the ingroup. In other words, the person who exemplifies the norms, values, and behaviors of the ingroup the most. The self-categorization theory account of social influence has received a large amount of empirical support.<ref name="McGarty & Turner (1992).">{{cite journal|last1 = McGarty|first1 = C.|last2=Turner|first2=J. C. |title = The effects of categorization on social judgement|journal = British Journal of Social Psychology|volume = 31|issue = 4| pages = 253–268|year = 1992|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8309.1992.tb00971.x}}</ref><ref name="Makie & Wright (2001)">{{cite journal | last1 = Mackie | first1 =D. M. | last2 = Wright | first2 = C. L. | editor1-last = Brown | editor1-first = Rupert | editor2-last = Gaertner |editor2-first = Sam L. | year = 2001 | chapter = Social Influence in an Intergroup context |chapter-url=http://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC&pg=PA281| title = Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intergroup Processes |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC| volume = 3 | issue = 1 |isbn=978-0-470-69270-7 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Livingstone|first1=A. G.|last2=Haslam|first2=S. A.|last3=Postmes|first3=T.|last4=Jetten|first4=J.|title="We Are, Therefore We Should": Evidence That In-Group Identification Mediates the Acquisition of In-Group Norms|journal=Journal of Applied Social Psychology|year=2011|volume=41|issue=8|pages=1857–1876|doi=10.1111/j.1559-1816.2011.00794.x}}</ref>

Self-categorization theory’s account of social influence differs from other social psychological approaches to social influence. It rejects the traditional distinction between [[informational influence]] and [[normative influence]],<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)"/><ref name="Turner & Oakes, (1997)">{{cite journal | last1 = Turner | first1 = J. C. | last2 = Oakes | first2 = P. J. | editor1-last = McGarty | editor1-first = C. | editor2-last = Haslam | editor2-first = S. A. | year = 1997 | title = The socially structured mind | journal = The message of social psychology | pages = 355–373 | ___location = Cambridge, MA | publisher = Blackwell }}</ref> where informational influence involves the assessment of social information based on its merit and normative influence involves public compliance to the expectations of group members. For self-categorization theory social information does not have merit independent of self-categorization. Instead, information is perceived as valid to the extent that it is perceived to be a normative belief of the ingroup. Normative influence, on the other hand, is not normative at all. Rather, it is counter-normative influence based compliance to expectations of psychological outgroup members. In a similar vein self-categorization theory also challenges the distinction between objective reality testing and social reality testing (e.g. the [[elaboration likelihood model]]).<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994)."/><ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)"/><ref name="Turner & Oakes, (1997)"/><ref name="Oakes & Reynolds (1997)">{{cite journal|last1=Oakes|first1=P. J.|last2=Reynolds|first2=R. J.|title=Asking the accuracy question: is measurement the answer?|journal=The social psychology of stereotyping and group life|year=1997|pages=119–143|editor1-first=R.|editor1-last=Spears|editor2-first=P.J.|editor2-last=Oakes|editor3-first=N.|editor3-last=Ellemers|editor4-first=S.A.|editor4-last=Haslam|publisher=Blackwell|___location=Oxford}}</ref> It argues that there is no such thing as objective reality testing isolated from social reality testing. Sensory data is always interpreted with respect of the beliefs and ideas of the perceiver, which in turn are bound up in the psychological group memberships of that perceiver.