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Erel Segal (talk | contribs) |
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* Ask the agents to reveal their valuations, <math>v</math>.
* Select the outcome based on the social-choice function: <math>x = Outcome[v]</math>.
* Every winning agent (every agent <math>i</math> such that <math>x \in W_i</math>) pays a price equal to the critical value: <math>Price_i(x, v_{-i}) = -c_i(v_{-i})</math>.
* Every losing agent (every agent <math>i</math> such that <math>x \notin W_i</math>) pays nothing: <math>Price_i(x, v_{-i}) = 0</math>.
This mechanism is truthful, because the net utility of each agent is:
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