Talk:Stable matching problem: Difference between revisions

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[[User:ExpertIdeasBot|ExpertIdeasBot]] ([[User talk:ExpertIdeasBot|talk]]) 12:51, 7 June 2016 (UTC)
== Dr. Romero Medina's comment on this article ==
 
 
Dr. Romero Medina has reviewed [https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Stable_marriage_problem&oldid=733328992 this Wikipedia page], and provided us with the following comments to improve its quality:
 
 
{{quote|text=<<The stable marriage problem has been stated as follows:>>
Reference Gale, D.; Shapley, L. S. (1962).
Consider the possibility of n=/m.
<<Algorithms for finding solutions to the stable marriage problem have applications in a variety of real-world situations, perhaps the best known of these being in the assignment of graduating medical students to their first hospital appointments>>
Is a case of many to one matching problem different from the one to one case of the marriage problem.
<<This algorithm guarantees that:
 
Everyone gets married
At the end, there cannot be a man and a woman both unengaged>>
This is under the assumption the every one is admissible to all the agents on the other side of the market.
}}
 
 
We hope Wikipedians on this talk page can take advantage of these comments and improve the quality of the article accordingly.
 
We believe Dr. Romero Medina has expertise on the topic of this article, since he has published relevant scholarly research:
 
 
 
*'''Reference ''': Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2011. "Games with capacity manipulation : incentives and Nash equilibria," Economics Working Papers we1125, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economia.
 
[[User:ExpertIdeasBot|ExpertIdeasBot]] ([[User talk:ExpertIdeasBot|talk]]) 15:46, 24 August 2016 (UTC)