Chip Authentication Program: Difference between revisions

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# Hence the final response is 1100110<sub>2</sub> or 102 in decimal.
 
The real world process is of course somewhat more complex as the card can return the ARQC in one of two formats (either the simple Response Message Template Format type 1 (id. 0x8080{{sub|16}}) or the more complex Response Message Template Format 2 (id. 0x7777{{sub|16}}) which splits the ARQC data into separate TLV values that need to be reassembled sequentially to match that of the type 1 format.
 
In the identify mode, the response depends only on the required bits from the IAI as the amount and reference number are set to zero; this also means that selecting respond and entering a number of 00000000 will in fact generate a valid identify response. More concerningly however, if a respond request is issued by a bank, using the sign mode with the same number and an amount of ¤0.00 will again generate a valid result which creates a possibility for a fraudster to instruct a customer to do a "test" challenge response for an amount of ¤0.00 which is in fact going to be used by the fraudster to verify a respond command in order for them to add themselves as a payee on the victim's account; these attacks were possible to carry out against banks that used strong authentication devices that were not canceling activities until an amount of at least 0.01 was entered.{{clarify|date=August 2012}} The likelihood of these kinds of attacks was addressed in 2009 when new generations of devices were rolled out, implementing secure ___domain separation functionality that is compliant with the MasterCard Application note dated Oct 2010.{{clarify|reason=how does this fix the issue?|date=August 2012}} Similarly of course; a bank that implements the identify command makes it possible for a fraudster to request a victim to do a "test" respond transaction using 00000000 as the reference, and will then be able to successfully login to the victim's account.