Totskoye nuclear exercise: Difference between revisions

Content deleted Content added
Reverted to revision 819202027 by Kaiketsu (talk): Inappropriate sources. (TW)
Line 4:
 
==History==
In mid-September 1954, [[nuclear bomb]]ing tests were performed at the Totskoye proving ground during the training exercise ''Snezhok'' ({{lang-ru|Снежок}}, ''Snowball'' or ''Light Snow'') with some 45,000 people, all Soviet soldiers and officers,<ref name=Exercises19/> who explored the explosion site of a bomb twice as powerful as the one dropped on [[Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki|Hiroshima]] nine years earlier. The participants were carefully selected from Soviet military servicemen, informed that they would take part in an exercise with the use of a new kind of weapons, sworn to secrecy and earned a salary for three months' salaryahead.<ref>[http://elib.biblioatom.ru/text/yadernye-ispytaniya_kn2_2006/go,122/ Memoirs of M. A. Kutsenko, a participant of the operation Snowball, published in ''Nuclear Exercises'', V. II, 2006, p. 122]</ref> A delegation of high-ranking government officials and senior military officers arrived to the region on the eve of the exercise, which included First Secretary [[Nikita Khrushchev]], [[Nikolai Bulganin]], Generals [[Aleksandr Vasilevsky]], [[Konstantin Rokossovsky]], [[Ivan Konev]] and [[Rodion Malinovsky]].<ref name=Danilenko144/> The operation was commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and initiated by the Soviet Ministry of Defense.<ref>[http://elib.biblioatom.ru/text/yadernye-ispytaniya_kn2_2006/go,18/ ''Nuclear Exercises'', V. II. 2006. P. 18]</ref> At 9:33&nbsp;a.m. on 14 September 1954, a Soviet [[Tupolev Tu-4|Tu-4 bomber]] dropped a {{convert|40|kt(TNT)|lk=in|adj=on}}<ref name=Exercises19/> atomic weapon - an [[RDS-4|RDS-4 bomb]], which had been previously tested in 1951 at the [[Semipalatinsk Test Site]],<ref name=Exercises19/><ref>[http://elib.biblioatom.ru/text/yadernye-ispytaniya_kn2_2006/go,11/ ''Nuclear Exercises'', V. II, 2006, p. 11]</ref> - from {{convert|8,000|m|ft}}. The bomb exploded {{convert|350|m|ft}} above Totskoye range, {{convert|13|km|0}} from [[Totskoye]].<ref name=Exercises19/>
 
The exercise involved the [[270th Rifle Division]],<ref>V.I. Feskov et al., "The Soviet Army in the Cold War 1945–90", Tomsk, 2004, p. 94</ref> 320 planes, 600 [[tank]]s and [[self-propelled gun]]s, 600 [[armoured personnel carriers]], 500 artillery pieces and mortars and 6,000 automobiles.<ref name=Exercises19>[http://elib.biblioatom.ru/text/yadernye-ispytaniya_kn2_2006/go,19/ ''Nuclear Exercises'', V. II. 2006. P. 19]</ref>
 
Following the explosion, a [[Li-2]] airplane was put to use on a reconnaissance mission to report the movement of a radioactive cloud produced by the blast,<ref name=Exercises41/> and the most dangerous areas were explored and marked by special reconnaissance troops.<ref name=Levykin142>[http://elib.biblioatom.ru/text/yadernye-ispytaniya_kn2_2006/go,142/ Memoirs of Colonel V. I. Levykin published in ''Nuclear Exercises'', V. II, 2006, p. 142]</ref> After the reconnaissance was complete and the Soviet command gained enough information on the level of radiation, the army moved in. Much attention was paid to personal safety: the participants were provided with [[personal protective equipment]], tinted glasses or lenses for [[gas masks]] and had individual radiation [[dosimeter]]s.<ref>[http://elib.biblioatom.ru/text/yadernye-ispytaniya_kn2_2006/go,132/ Memoirs of Colonel Professor M. P. Arkhipov published in ''Nuclear Exercises'', V. II, 2006, p. 132]</ref> Gamma-roentgenometers measured the level of radiation exposure in the epicentre, dosimeters were used to estimate the radiation dose deposited in an individual wearing or a vehicle after the troops completed their task, and the troops received a 'chemical alert' signal if the radiation was too high.<ref name=Exercises68>[http://elib.biblioatom.ru/text/yadernye-ispytaniya_kn2_2006/go,68/ ''Nuclear Exercises'', V. II. 2006. P. 68]</ref> The soldiers wore gas masks, protective suits and respirators,<ref name=Levykin142/> special gloves and capes<ref name=Exercises68/> and moved around the territory in armoured personnel carriers, holding athe distance of 400<ref name=Exercises41>[http://elib.biblioatom.ru/text/yadernye-ispytaniya_kn2_2006/go,40/ ''Nuclear Exercises'', V. II. 2006. P. 41]</ref>-600 metres from the [[hypocentre]] and avoiding the most dangerous areas of the explosion site.<ref name=Danilenko144/> A relatively low level of radiation, strong wind and the extensive use of personal protective equipment allowed them to move 400–500 metres from the epicentre, whereas tanks and armoured personnel carriers could safely get even closer.<ref name=Exercises41/>
 
Some accounts of the test, however, claim that the protective measures were insufficient in reality. According to one veteran in a Soviet documentary of the event, "Some, the majority even, had no protective clothing, and besides it was impossible to use gas masks" [in the 115 degree temperatures of the area]. Additionally, insufficient care was taken to remove and dispose of contaminated clothing of the event. Evacuations were haphazard, where villagers who chose to stay were told to "dig ditches" to avoid effects. Yuri Sorokin filed suit in 1993 against the Russian government to receive compensation for medical injuries that he attributed to the exercise. <ref>https://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/07/world/soviet-atom-test-used-thousands-as-guinea-pigs-archives-show.html</ref>
 
Deputy Defense Minister Georgy Zhukov witnessed the blast from an underground nuclear bunker. The planes were ordered to bomb the explosion site five minutes after the blast, and three hours later (after the demarcation of the radioactive zone) the armored vehicles were ordered to practice the taking of a hostile area after a nuclear attack.<ref name=Exercises19/>
 
The residents of villages (Bogdanovka, Fyodorovka and others) that were situated around {{convert|6|km|mi|0|abbr=on}} from the epicenter of the future explosion were offered temporary evacuation outside the {{convert|50|km|mi|abbr=on}} radius and given instructions. They were evacuated by the military and temporarily accommodated in military tents. During the exercise, the residents received daily payment, while their property was insured. Those of them who decided not to return after the operation was complete, were provided with newly built four-room furnished houses near the Samarka river or obtained financial compensation.<ref name=Danilenko144>[http://elib.biblioatom.ru/text/yadernye-ispytaniya_kn2_2006/go,144/ Memoirs of Lieutenant-Colonel N. V. Danilenko published in ''Nuclear Exercises'', V. II, 2006, p. 144]</ref>
The nearest villages were generally not affected by the blast,<ref name=Danilenko144/> except for a number of houses located less than {{convert|8|km|mi|abbr=on}} from the explosion site that caught fire and burned down.<ref name=Exercises41/> Their owners received new housing.<ref>[http://elib.biblioatom.ru/text/yadernye-ispytaniya_kn2_2006/go,65/ ''Nuclear Exercises'', V. II, 2006, p. 65]</ref>
 
Post-explosion radiation explosion controls were virtually non-existent. Villagers were allowed back within days of the test. According to documentary footage, evacuees returned to devastated villages with roaming fire trucks still dousing burning military vehicles. A interviewee states that "they actually allowed us to eat everything right away." Dr. Nikolai Sidorov, against local government opposition, kept statistics that showed an increase in tumorous illness that increased %500 over the 40-year period from the 1950's to the 1990's.<ref>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kk_nVyhL1MI</ref>
 
A few days after the explosion, Soviet scientists received detailed reports on the test and began to study the impact of the nuclear blast on model houses, shelters, vehicles, vegetation and experimental animals that had been affected by the explosion.<ref name="Levykin142"/> On 17 September 1954, the Soviet newspaper ''[[Pravda]]'' published a report on the exercise: "In accordance with the plan of scientific and experimental works, a test of one of the types of nuclear weapons has been conducted in the Soviet Union in the last few days. The purpose of the test was to examine the effects of nuclear explosion. Valuable results have been obtained that will help Soviet scientists and engineers to successfully solve the task of protecting the country from nuclear attack".<ref>Pravda, 17 September 1954</ref> These results were discussed at a large scientific conference at the Kuybyshev Military Academy in [[Moscow]] and for many years served as the basis for the Soviet program of defense against [[nuclear warfare]].<ref>[http://elib.biblioatom.ru/text/yadernye-ispytaniya_kn2_2006/go,143/ Memoirs of Colonel V. I. Levykin published in ''Nuclear Exercises'', V. II, 2006, p. 143]</ref>