Self-categorization theory: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 17:10, 7 April 2018

Revision as of 17:16, 7 April 2018

Line 1:

'''Self-categorization theory''' is a theory in [[social psychology]] that describes the circumstances under which a person will perceive collections of people (including themselves) as a group, as well as the consequences of perceiving people in group terms.<ref name="Haslam (1997)">{{cite journal|last=Haslam|first=S. A.|title=Stereotyping and social influence: Foundations of stereotype consensus|journal=The social psychology of stereotyping and group life|year=1997|pages=119–143|editor1-first=R.|editor1-last=Spears|editor2-first=P.J.|editor2-last=Oakes|editor3-first=N.|editor3-last=Ellemers|editor4-first=S.A.|display-editors = 3 |editor4-last=Haslam|publisher=Blackwell|___location=Oxford}}</ref> Although the theory is often introduced as an explanation of psychological group formation (which was one of its early goals), it is more accurately thought of as general analysis of the functioning of [[categorization]] processes in [[social perception]] and interaction that speaks to issues of individual identity as much as group phenomena.<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994).">{{cite book | last1 = Oakes | first1 = Penny | last2 = Haslam | first2 = Alex | last3 = Turner | first3 = John | title = Stereotyping and social reality | year = 1994 | publisher = Oxford | ___location = Blackwell}}</ref> It was developed by [[John C. Turner|John Turner]] and colleagues, and along with [[social identity theory]] it is a constituent part of the [[social identity approach]]. It was in part developed to address questions that arose in response to social identity theory about the mechanistic underpinnings of social identification.<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986).">{{cite journal|last = Turner|first = John|last2=Oakes|first2=Penny|title = The significance of the social identity concept for social psychology with reference to individualism, interactionism and social influence|journal = British Journal of Social Psychology|volume = 25| issue = 3| pages = 237–252|year = 1986|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8309.1986.tb00732.x}}</ref><ref name="Haslam et al. (1996).">{{cite journal | last1 = Haslam | first1 = Alex | last2 = Oakes | first2 = Penny | last3 = Turner | first3 = John | last4 = McGarty | first4 = Craig | editor-last = Sorrentino | editor-first = Richard | editor2-last = Higgins | editor2-first = Edward | year = 1996 | title = Social identity, self-categorization, and the perceived homogeneity of ingroups and outgroups: The interaction between social motivation and cognition | journal = Handbook of motivation and cognition: the interpersonal context, Handbook of motivation and cognition | volume = 3 | pages = 182–222 | ___location = New York | publisher = Guilford Press}}</ref><ref name="Turner (1999)">{{cite journal|last=Turner|first=J. C.|title=Some current issues in research on social identity and self-categorization theories|journal=Social identity|year=1999|pages=6–34|editor1-first=N.|editor1-last=Ellemers|editor2-first=R.|editor2-last=Spears|editor3-first=B.|editor3-last=Doosje|publisher=Blackwell|___location=Oxford}}</ref><ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001).">[[Alex Haslam|Haslam, A. S.]] (2001). Psychology in Organizations. London, SAGE Publications.</ref> For example, what makes people define themselves in terms of one group membership rather than another?<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/>

[[File:UNSW Rugby players.jpg|thumb|right|350px|alt= Rugby operates using self-categorization theory processes.|The clear intergroup structure of team sports means that such contexts are often used to illustrate self-categorization theory processes.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011).">{{cite book |last=Haslam |first=S. Alexander |last2=Reicher |first2=Stephen D. |last3=Platow |first3=Michael J. |title=The new psychology of leadership: Identity, influence and power |year=2011 |publisher=Psychology Press |___location=New York, NY |isbn=978-1-84169-610-2}}</ref>]] Self-categorization theory has been influential in the academic field of [[social psychology]] and beyond.<ref name="Postmes, T. & Branscombe, N. (2010)">Postmes, T. & Branscombe, N. (2010). Sources of social identity. In T. Postmes & N. Branscombe (Eds). Rediscovering Social Identity: Core Sources. Psychology Press.</ref> It was first applied to the topics of [[Self-categorization theory#Social influence|social influence]], [[Group cohesiveness|group cohesion]], [[group polarization]], and [[collective action]].<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987).">Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D. & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford: Blackwell</ref> In subsequent years the theory, often as part of the social identity approach, has been applied to further topics such as [[leadership]],<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/> [[personality]],<ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)">{{cite journal|last1=Turner|first1=J. C.|last2=Onorato|first2=R. S.|title=Social identity, personality, and the self-concept: A self-categorization perspective|journal=The psychology of the social self|year=1998|pages=11–46|editor1-first=T. R.|editor1-last=Tyler|editor2-first=R. M.|editor2-last=Kramer|editor3-first=O. P.|editor3-last=John|publisher=Psychology Press}}</ref> [[Self-categorization theory#Out-group homogeneity|outgroup homogeneity]], and [[power (social and political)|power]].<ref name="Turner (2005)">{{cite journal|last=Turner|first=J. C.|title=Explaining the nature of power: A three-process theory|journal=European Journal of Social Psychology|year=2005|volume=35|issue=1|pages=1–22|doi=10.1002/ejsp.244}}</ref> One tenet of the theory is that the self should not be considered as a foundational aspect of [[cognition]], but rather the self should be seen as a product of the cognitive system at work.<ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994).">{{cite journal | last1 = Turner | first1 = J. C. | last2 = Oakes | first2 = P. J. | last3 = Haslam | first3 = S. A. | last4 = McGarty | first4 = C. | year = 1994 | title = Self and collective: Cognition and social context | url = | journal = Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | volume = 20 | issue = 5| pages = 454–463 | doi=10.1177/0146167294205002}}</ref><ref name="Reynolds & Turner (2006).">{{cite journal |last1= Reynolds |first1= K. J. |last2= Turner |first2= J. C.|year= 2006|title= Individuality and the prejudiced personality |journal= European Review of Social Psychology| volume= 17|issue= 1|pages= 233–270|publisher= Psychology Press |doi=10.1080/10463280601050880}}</ref><ref name="Onorato & Turner (2004)">{{cite journal|last=Onorato|author2=Turner |title=Fluidity in the self-concept: The shift from personal to social identity|journal=European Journal of Social Psychology|year=2004|volume=34|pages=257–278|doi=10.1002/ejsp.195 }}</ref> Or in other words, the self is an outcome of cognitive processes rather than a "thing" at the heart of cognition.

==Aspects of the theory==

[[File:UNSW Rugby players.jpg|thumb|alt= Rugby operates using self-categorization theory processes.|The clear intergroup structure of team sports means that such contexts are often used to illustrate self-categorization theory processes.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011).">{{cite book |last=Haslam |first=S. Alexander |last2=Reicher |first2=Stephen D. |last3=Platow |first3=Michael J. |title=The new psychology of leadership: Identity, influence and power |year=2011 |publisher=Psychology Press |___location=New York, NY |isbn=978-1-84169-610-2}}</ref>]]

===Levels of abstraction===

[[File:SCT Levels of abstraction.JPG|thumb|right|450px|alt= A hypothetical self-categorical hierarchy for a person in an organization.| Figure 1. A hypothetical self-categorical hierarchy for a person in an organization. The darkly shaded regions indicate those others who are included in Sam’s definition of self at different levels of abstraction. The lightly shaded regions indicate others who are compared with self at different levels of abstraction.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/>]]Drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology,<ref name="Turner (1985)">{{cite journal| last1=Turner| first1=J.C.| editor-last =Lawler| editor-first =E. J.| year=1985| title=Social categorization and the self-concept: A social cognitive theory of group behavoir| journal=Advances in group processes: Theory and research|volume=2|pages=77–122|___location=Greenwich, CT| publisher=JAI press}}</ref><ref name="Oakes & Turner (1990)">{{cite journal|last1=Oakes|first1=P. J.|last2=Turner|first2=J. C.|title=Is limited information processing capacity the cause of social stereotyping|journal=European review of social psychology|year=1990|volume=1|issue=1|pages=111–135|doi=10.1080/14792779108401859}}</ref><ref name="Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010)">Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010). The story of social identity. In T. Postmes & N. Branscombe (Eds). Rediscovering Social Identity: Core Sources. Psychology Press.</ref> self-categorization theory assumes that the self can be categorized at various levels of abstraction. In other words, humans may categorize the self as a singular “I”(personal identity), or as a more inclusive “we”(social identity). In the latter case the self is cognitively grouped as identical and interchangeable to other stimuli within that category.<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/> It is argued that it is this variation in self categorization that underpins many intergroup phenomenon,<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/> including those described in social identity theory.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/>

To demonstrate the notion of varying [[Principle of abstraction|levels of abstraction]] and inclusiveness, three types of self category are often given as examples.<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/><ref name="Haslam et al. (1996)."/><ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/> The lowest level of abstraction is given as a personal self, where the perceiver self categorizes as “I”. A higher level of abstraction corresponds to a social self, where the perceiver self categorizes as “we” in comparison to a salient outgroup (them). A highest level of abstraction is represented by ''we humans'', where the salient outgroup is animals or other non-humans. A common misconception is that these three example categories represent ''the'' self categories that humans use. Instead, the theory posits that there are innumerable self categories that a perceiver may use (see, [[Self-categorization theory#Online category formation|online category formation]]), and in particular that there are a myriad of different personal and social identities that a perceiver may invoke in his or her day-to-day life.<ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)"/><ref name="Reynolds & Turner (2006)."/> The misconception may also be attributable to the early writing of Turner where a singular social identity was contrasted against a singular personal identity.<ref name="Turner (1982)">{{cite journal| last1=Turner| first1=J.C.| editor-last =Tajfel| editor-first =H.| year=1982| title=Toward a cognitive redefinition of the social group| journal=Social identity and intergroup relations| pages=15–40| ___location=Cambridge, UK| publisher=Cambridge university press}}</ref> This however predates the formal statement of self-categorization theory.