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Self-categorization theory provides an account of social influence.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)">Turner, J. C. (1991). Social influence. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.</ref> This account is sometimes referred to as the theory of ''referent informational influence''.<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/> According to self-categorization theory, as social identities become salient, and depersonalization and self-stereotyping occurs, people adopt the norms, beliefs, and behaviors of fellow ingroup members. They also distance themselves from the norms, beliefs, and behaviors of comparison outgroup members. When someone observes a difference between themselves and a fellow ingroup member that person will experience subjective uncertainty. That uncertainty can be resolved by either a) recategorizing people or the situation to reflect those perceived differences, or b) engaging in a social influence process whereby one person makes changes to become more similar to the other. Which person adopts the views or behaviors of the other (i.e. who influences who) is predicted to be that person who is most prototypical of the ingroup. In other words, the person who exemplifies the norms, values, and behaviors of the ingroup the most. The self-categorization theory account of social influence has received a large amount of empirical support.<ref name="McGarty & Turner (1992).">{{cite journal|last1 = McGarty|first1 = C.|last2=Turner|first2=J. C. |title = The effects of categorization on social judgement|journal = British Journal of Social Psychology|volume = 31|issue = 4| pages = 253–268|year = 1992|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8309.1992.tb00971.x}}</ref><ref name="Makie & Wright (2001)">{{cite
Self-categorization theory’s account of social influence differs from other social psychological approaches to social influence. It rejects the traditional distinction between [[informational influence]] and [[normative influence]],<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)"/><ref name="Turner & Oakes, (1997)">{{cite journal | last1 = Turner | first1 = J. C. | last2 = Oakes | first2 = P. J. | editor1-last = McGarty | editor1-first = C. | editor2-last = Haslam | editor2-first = S. A. | year = 1997 | title = The socially structured mind | journal = The message of social psychology | pages = 355–373 | ___location = Cambridge, MA | publisher = Blackwell }}</ref> where informational influence involves the assessment of social information based on its merit and normative influence involves public compliance to the expectations of group members. For self-categorization theory social information does not have merit independent of self-categorization. Instead, information is perceived as valid to the extent that it is perceived to be a normative belief of the ingroup. Normative influence, on the other hand, is not normative at all. Rather, it is counter-normative influence based compliance to expectations of psychological outgroup members. In a similar vein self-categorization theory also challenges the distinction between objective reality testing and social reality testing (e.g. the [[elaboration likelihood model]]).<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994)."/><ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)"/><ref name="Turner & Oakes, (1997)"/><ref name="Oakes & Reynolds (1997)">{{cite journal|last1=Oakes|first1=P. J.|last2=Reynolds|first2=R. J.|title=Asking the accuracy question: is measurement the answer?|journal=The social psychology of stereotyping and group life|year=1997|pages=119–143|editor1-first=R.|editor1-last=Spears|editor2-first=P.J.|editor2-last=Oakes|editor3-first=N.|editor3-last=Ellemers|editor4-first=S.A.|display-editors = 3 |editor4-last=Haslam|publisher=Blackwell|___location=Oxford}}</ref> It argues that there is no such thing as objective reality testing isolated from social reality testing. Sensory data is always interpreted with respect of the beliefs and ideas of the perceiver, which in turn are bound up in the psychological group memberships of that perceiver.
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