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==Africa 1941-43==
[[Image:AKrommel.jpg|thumb|250px|Erwin Rommel, 1941]]
His campaign in Africa earned Rommel the nickname "The Desert Fox". He spent most of 1941 building up his forces, the Italian component of which had suffered a string of defeats at the hands of [[Commonwealth of Nations|British Commonwealth]] forces under Major General [[Richard O'Connor]]. An offensive pushed the Allied forces out of [[Libya]]. Though ordered not to advance beyond the [[oasis]] of Maradah, Rommel disobeyed and was shortly stalled exacyly on the Egyption border at the Helfaya pass, after he, disregarding the obgections of his staff and divisional commanders, ordered that the important port of [[Siege ofandTobruk|Tobruk]], be outflanked, hoping thus to trap the bulk of the enemy force in Tobruk. This outflanking could not be crried out as rapidly as necessary due to logistical overstretch, the road paralel to the coastal road's not reconnecting to the coastal road, spoiling flank attacks from Tobruk and before long a sand storm. although surrounded, Tobruk was still held by Allied forces under the [[Australia]]n General, [[Leslie Morshead]]. The Allied Commander-in-Chief, General [[Archibald Wavell]] made two unsuccessful attempts to relieve Tobruk ([[Operation Brevity]] and [[Operation Battleaxe]]). Both easily defeated as they were hastily prepared due to [[Winston Churchil| Churchil]]'s impatience for speedy action. The assult on Tobruk, whose capture was logistically imperative, was a failure which imperilled Rommel's career. Impatient to secure success Rommel ordered repeated, barely prepared, small-scale attacks which were easily gobbled up by the defenders. Before long his logistically strapped forces became so weak that a break out from tobruk could most likely have reached El Adem, sever the Afrikakorps' communications and topple it. Very luckily for Rommel, Morshead misled by incorrect intelligence assesmemts and believed the German forces opposing Tobruk to be much stronger then they were, thus Rommel was saved. Reflecting on this period, Kircheim, the then commander of the 5th light division said: "I do not like to be reminded of that time because so much blood was needlessly shed" At this time Rommel also began clamouring for reinforcements which the High Command completing the preparations for [[Operation Barbarossa]] could not spare and that, in any event, could not be logistically sustained as Halder had pointed out to him beforehand. [[Franz Halder|Halder]] was sarcastic and commented: "now at last he is constrained to state that his forces are not sufficiently strong to allow him to take full advantage of the 'unique opportunities' offered by the overall situation. That is the impression we have had for quite some time over here". Angry that his order, not to advance beyond Maradah, had been disobeyed and alarmed at mounting losses, Halder, never an admirer of Rommel, dispatched [[Paulus|Freidrich Paulus]] to "head off this soldier gone stark mad" in Halder's words. Upon arrival Paulus soon forbade Rommel from undertaking any more small scale assaults, but to plan a systematic all-out one. His composure restored, Rommel complied. His elaborately prepared great assault scheduled for 21 November was not to take place.
Following the costly failure of ''Battleaxe'', Wavell was relieved by Commander-in-Chief India, General [[Claude Auchinleck]]. Auchinleck launched a major offensive to relieve Tobruk ([[Operation Crusader]]). Initially ''Crusader'' appeared as doomed as ''Brevity'' and ''Battleaxe''. The British (including commonwealth troops) deeply outflanked the German defences along the Egyption frontier and reached a position whence they could strike at both Tobruk and the coastal road, "Via Balbia". The Germans were then supposed to counter-attack so as to drive the British back. This as a result of British numerical superiority in both planes and tanks would result in the Germans' annihilation. Since the Germans, confident in the strengh of the defences covering the Via Babia did not oblige but stayed put waiting on the British's next move, the baffled British felt compelled to attack and try to relieve Tobruk and sever the Via Balbia and were naturally cut to pieces in the effort for which they lacked the necessary artillery. The problem was that Rommel drunk with victory tried to overexploit the success and against the advice of his officers resolved to drive the British further than their start line and himself outflank the border positions through the desert. According to Bernd Stegmann, though he knew his forces ere incapable of driving such an effort home, he believed that the British traumatised by their recent debacle would abandon their defences along the border at the mere appearence of a German threat to their rear. If so his contempt for the enemy proved excessive and the gamble failed. His forces suffered heavy losses from British anti-tank guns and, as they dispersed over the desert, the [[Royal Air Force|RAF]], untouched by earlier fighting. Losses which unlike the British they could not replace and soon could not even hold their initial positions. During the confusion caused by the ''Crusader'' operation, Rommel and his staff found themselves behind Allied lines several times. On one occasion, he visited a New Zealand Army field hospital that was still under Allied control. "[Rommel] inquired if anything was needed, promised the British [''sic''] medical supplies and drove off unhindered." (General [[Fritz Bayerlein]], ''The Rommel Papers'', chapter 8.)
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