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Riga 94:
of the deterioration of systematic doubt which
was common towards the end of the century.
==Il metodo epistemologico di Bailly==
{{citazione||Bailly nelle ''Lettres sur l'Atlantide de Platon''.<ref>Bailly, ''Lettres sur l'Atlantide de Platon et sur l'ancienne histoire de l'Asie '', 1779; pp. 6-7, nota ad una lettera di Voltaire</ref>|Le doute est toujours permis dans les sciences, c’est la pierre de touche de la vérité. Cependant le doute doit avoir des bornes; toutes les vérités ne peuvent pas être démontrées comme les vérités mathématiques. Le genre humain aurait trop à perdre, s’il se réduisait à cette classe unique. Les témoignages balancés, les probabilités pesées, les fables rapprochées & éclairées les unes par les autres, forment par leur réunion une lumière forte qui peut conduire à l’évidence. Et lorsque la philosophie avec ces secours arrive à des résultats fondés sur la nature des choses & des hommes, on a des raisons de croire & non pas de douter|lingua=fr}}
Bailly scrisse, in una lettera a [[Voltaire]], that the doubt must have some limits, since not all the truths can be demonstrated as in the case of the mathematical truths. According to him, there are three useful criteria: the balanced testimonies, the weighted probabilities, the fables compared and clarified one with the other; they form all together a strong light that can lead to evidence. Apparently, this is a plausible and reasonable approach. Should we therefore accept that Atlantis was in Spitsbergen?
In my opinion, there are similar crucial problems in the field of cultural astronomy and archaeoastronomy. In particular, the problem of the intentionality of the astronomical orientations of ancient buildings: when is it possible to conclude that such an intentionality is evident? Is there a rigorous demonstration? The big problem of the rigorous proof in archaeoastronomy is a longstanding one, and what I can do here is to write just some comments. Schaefer (2006) has proposed four reasonable and plausible criteria:
(a) statistical significance of the alignments,
(b) the archaeological information that might bear on intention,
(c) the ethnographic evidence concerning
the desires and knowledge of the builders, and
(d) the astronomical case for the utility of the claimed alignments.
The goal of the Author was to answer the key question of whether we can demonstrate that the claimed alignments
were intentionally built into the structures. That is, intention must be proved. Without proof of intention, all we would
have is a fun urban myth (Schaefer 2006).
I suggest there exists a sort of analogy with Bailly’s criteria, that is, (b) and (d) could be put in relation with the «témoignages balancés», (a) with the «probabilités pesées», and (c) with the «fables rapprochées & éclairées les unes par les autres». We could say therefore with Bailly that Schaefer’s four criteria «forment par leur réunion une lumière forte qui peut conduire à l’évidence»; but before that one should clarify the meaning of ‘evidence’ in our field.
The point is that the conclusions about the intentionality, in order to be believable, cannot be just the result of a demonstration in the sense of the hard sciences, even though scientific (astronomical, statistical) methods were rigorously applied. Intentionality by itself seems to be out of the realm of physical sciences. It is in this respect that the sentence by Bailly: «toutes les vérités ne peuvent pas être démontrées comme les vérités mathématiques» would be sound.9 The intentionality is a topic for disciplines other than physics and astronomy, that is humanistic disciplines such as anthropology and archaeology, which have their own principles and methods: the last word is up to them.
Intentionality has nothing to do with the physical principles and laws of the hard science. I think this ambiguity of archaeoastronomy is usually misleading people: since the rigorous and precise methods yield rigorous demonstrations in the field of hard sciences such as astronomy, it is assumed tacitly by the public that the same occurs in archaeoastronomy, that is, the rigorous archaeoastronomical methods can prove the intentionality. This assumption cannot be accepted, since in general that is not true. Even the expression ‘very probable’ or ‘probable’ often used by archaeoastronomers with reference to the intentionality should be used with a lot of care, unless it is supported by archaeological methods.
What are proof, demonstration and evidence in our field? In my opinion, there is no clear answer yet. Aveni (2006) tried to discuss specifically the problem of evidence and intentionality, pointing out the limits and possible flaws of the approach by Schaefer, seen from an anthropological and ethnological point of view. In particular he remarked that tools and methods of physical sciences
cannot be adapted to such human sciences. Ruggles (2011), however, criticized such a strong statement, recalling for example that the “scientific method has become carefully adhered to in rock-art studies”.10
As a practical conclusion, I would recall McCluskey. If archaeoastronomy is anything, it is not just astronomy, or archaeology, or anthropology, or history. Its practitioners should master the methods and questions of their own disciplines, and strive – as best they can – to understand the methods and questions of other disciplines (McCluskey 2007). I think that, in order to be sure about such an understanding and to avoid illusions such as those of Bailly, maybe it would be better to collaborate or at least interact directly with the scholars of the other disciplines. This seems, however, to be a long way.11
===L'importanza della ''vraisemblance''===
==Note==
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