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'''Self-categorization theory''' is a theory in [[social psychology]] that describes the circumstances under which a person will perceive collections of people (including themselves) as a group, as well as the consequences of perceiving people in group terms.<ref name="Haslam (1997)">{{cite journal|last=Haslam|first=S. A.|title=Stereotyping and social influence: Foundations of stereotype consensus|journal=The socialSocial psychologyPsychology of stereotypingStereotyping and groupGroup lifeLife|year=1997|pages=119–143|editor1-first=R.|editor1-last=Spears|editor2-first=P.J.|editor2-last=Oakes|editor3-first=N.|editor3-last=Ellemers|editor4-first=S.A.|display-editors = 3 |editor4-last=Haslam|publisher=Blackwell|___location=Oxford}}</ref> Although the theory is often introduced as an explanation of psychological group formation (which was one of its early goals), it is more accurately thought of as general analysis of the functioning of [[categorization]] processes in [[social perception]] and interaction that speaks to issues of individual identity as much as group phenomena.<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994).">{{cite book | last1 = Oakes | first1 = Penny | last2 = Haslam | first2 = Alex | last3 = Turner | first3 = John | title = Stereotyping and social reality | year = 1994 | publisher = Oxford | ___location = Blackwell}}</ref> It was developed by [[John C. Turner|John Turner]] and colleagues, and along with [[social identity theory]] it is a constituent part of the [[social identity approach]]. It was in part developed to address questions that arose in response to social identity theory about the mechanistic underpinnings of social identification.<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986).">{{cite journal|last = Turner|first = John|last2=Oakes|first2=Penny|title = The significance of the social identity concept for social psychology with reference to individualism, interactionism and social influence|journal = British Journal of Social Psychology|volume = 25| issue = 3| pages = 237–252|year = 1986|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8309.1986.tb00732.x}}</ref><ref name="Haslam et al. (1996).">{{cite journal | last1 = Haslam | first1 = Alex | last2 = Oakes | first2 = Penny | last3 = Turner | first3 = John | last4 = McGarty | first4 = Craig | editor-last = Sorrentino | editor-first = Richard | editor2-last = Higgins | editor2-first = Edward | year = 1996 | title = Social identity, self-categorization, and the perceived homogeneity of ingroups and outgroups: The interaction between social motivation and cognition | journal = Handbook of motivationMotivation and cognitionCognition: theThe interpersonalInterpersonal contextContext, Handbook of motivationMotivation and cognitionCognition | volume = 3 | pages = 182–222 | ___location = New York | publisher = Guilford Press}}</ref><ref name="Turner (1999)">{{cite journal|last=Turner|first=J. C.|title=Some current issues in research on social identity and self-categorization theories|journal=Social identityIdentity|year=1999|pages=6–34|editor1-first=N.|editor1-last=Ellemers|editor2-first=R.|editor2-last=Spears|editor3-first=B.|editor3-last=Doosje|publisher=Blackwell|___location=Oxford}}</ref><ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001).">[[Alex Haslam|Haslam, A. S.]] (2001). Psychology in Organizations. London, SAGE Publications.</ref>
 
Self-categorization theory has been influential in the academic field of [[social psychology]] and beyond.<ref name="Postmes, T. & Branscombe, N. (2010)">Postmes, T. & Branscombe, N. (2010). Sources of social identity. In T. Postmes & N. Branscombe (Eds). Rediscovering Social Identity: Core Sources. Psychology Press.</ref> It was first applied to the topics of [[Self-categorization theory#Social influence|social influence]], [[Group cohesiveness|group cohesion]], [[group polarization]], and [[collective action]].<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987).">Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D. & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford: Blackwell</ref> In subsequent years the theory, often as part of the social identity approach, has been applied to further topics such as [[leadership]],<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/> [[personality]],<ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)">{{cite journal|last1=Turner|first1=J. C.|last2=Onorato|first2=R. S.|title=Social identity, personality, and the self-concept: A self-categorization perspective|journal=The psychologyPsychology of the socialSocial selfSelf|year=1998|pages=11–46|editor1-first=T. R.|editor1-last=Tyler|editor2-first=R. M.|editor2-last=Kramer|editor3-first=O. P.|editor3-last=John|publisher=Psychology Press}}</ref> [[Self-categorization theory#Out-group homogeneity|outgroup homogeneity]], and [[power (social and political)|power]].<ref name="Turner (2005)">{{cite journal|last=Turner|first=J. C.|title=Explaining the nature of power: A three-process theory|journal=European Journal of Social Psychology|year=2005|volume=35|issue=1|pages=1–22|doi=10.1002/ejsp.244}}</ref> One tenet of the theory is that the self should not be considered as a foundational aspect of [[cognition]], but rather the self should be seen as a product of the cognitive system at work.<ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994).">{{cite journal | last1 = Turner | first1 = J. C. | last2 = Oakes | first2 = P. J. | last3 = Haslam | first3 = S. A. | last4 = McGarty | first4 = C. | year = 1994 | title = Self and collective: Cognition and social context | url = | journal = Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | volume = 20 | issue = 5| pages = 454–463 | doi=10.1177/0146167294205002}}</ref><ref name="Reynolds & Turner (2006).">{{cite journal |last1= Reynolds |first1= K. J. |last2= Turner |first2= J. C.|year= 2006|title= Individuality and the prejudiced personality |journal= European Review of Social Psychology| volume= 17|issue= 1|pages= 233–270|publisher= Psychology Press |doi=10.1080/10463280601050880}}</ref><ref name="Onorato & Turner (2004)">{{cite journal|last=Onorato|author2=Turner |title=Fluidity in the self-concept: The shift from personal to social identity|journal=European Journal of Social Psychology|year=2004|volume=34|issue=3 |pages=257–278|doi=10.1002/ejsp.195 }}</ref>
 
==Aspects of the theory==
[[File:UNSW Rugby players.jpg|thumb|alt= Rugby operates using self-categorization theory processes.|The clear intergroup structure of team sports means that such contexts are often used to illustrate self-categorization theory processes.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011).">{{cite book |last=Haslam |first=S. Alexander |last2=Reicher |first2=Stephen D. |last3=Platow |first3=Michael J. |title=The new psychology of leadership: Identity, influence and power |year=2011 |publisher=Psychology Press |___location=New York, NY |isbn=978-1-84169-610-2}}</ref>]]
===Levels of abstraction===
[[File:SCT Levels of abstraction.JPG|thumb|450px|alt= A hypothetical self-categorical hierarchy for a person in an organization.| Figure 1. A hypothetical self-categorical hierarchy for a person in an organization. The darkly shaded regions indicate those others who are included in Sam’s definition of self at different levels of abstraction. The lightly shaded regions indicate others who are compared with self at different levels of abstraction.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/>]]Drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology,<ref name="Turner (1985)">{{cite journal| last1=Turner| first1=J.C.| editor-last =Lawler| editor-first =E. J.| year=1985| title=Social categorization and the self-concept: A social cognitive theory of group behavior| journal=Advances in groupGroup processesProcesses: Theory and researchResearch|volume=2|pages=77–122|___location=Greenwich, CT| publisher=JAI press}}</ref><ref name="Oakes & Turner (1990)">{{cite journal|last1=Oakes|first1=P. J.|last2=Turner|first2=J. C.|title=Is limited information processing capacity the cause of social stereotyping|journal=European reviewReview of socialSocial psychologyPsychology|year=1990|volume=1|issue=1|pages=111–135|doi=10.1080/14792779108401859}}</ref><ref name="Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010)">Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010). The story of social identity. In T. Postmes & N. Branscombe (Eds). Rediscovering Social Identity: Core Sources. Psychology Press.</ref> self-categorization theory assumes that the self can be categorized at various levels of abstraction. In other words, humans may categorize the self as a singular “I”(personal identity), or as a more inclusive “we”(social identity). In the latter case the self is cognitively grouped as identical and interchangeable to other stimuli within that category.<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/> It is argued that it is this variation in self categorization that underpins many intergroup phenomenon,<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/> including those described in social identity theory.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/>
 
To demonstrate the notion of varying [[Principle of abstraction|levels of abstraction]] and inclusiveness, three types of self category are often given as examples.<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/><ref name="Haslam et al. (1996)."/><ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/> The lowest level of abstraction is given as a personal self, where the perceiver self categorizes as “I”. A higher level of abstraction corresponds to a social self, where the perceiver self categorizes as “we” in comparison to a salient outgroup (them). A highest level of abstraction is represented by ''we humans'', where the salient outgroup is animals or other non-humans. A common misconception is that these three example categories represent ''the'' self categories that humans use. Instead, the theory posits that there are innumerable self categories that a perceiver may use (see, [[Self-categorization theory#Online category formation|online category formation]]), and in particular that there are a myriad of different personal and social identities that a perceiver may invoke in his or her day-to-day life.<ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)"/><ref name="Reynolds & Turner (2006)."/> The misconception may also be attributable to the early writing of Turner where a singular social identity was contrasted against a singular personal identity.<ref name="Turner (1982)">{{cite journal| last1=Turner| first1=J.C.| editor-last =Tajfel| editor-first =H.| year=1982| title=Toward a cognitive redefinition of the social group| journal=Social identityIdentity and intergroupIntergroup relationsRelations| pages=15–40| ___location=Cambridge, UK| publisher=Cambridge university press}}</ref> This however predates the formal statement of self-categorization theory.
 
====Accentuation====
In self-categorization theory, categorizing people does not simply involve the redescription of characteristics and categories present in social stimuli. Rather, salient ''social categories'' form the basis of a social world that is enriched with meaning. This is achieved through a non-conscious process of accentuation, where ''differences between'' social categories are accentuated along with the ''similarities within'' social categories.<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/><ref name="Haslam et al. (1995)">{{cite journal | last1 = Haslam | first1 = S. A. | last2 = Oakes | first2 = P. J. | last3 = Turner | first3 = J. C. | last4 = McGarty | first4 = C. | year = 1995 | title = Social categorization and group homogeneity: Changes in the perceived applicability of stereotype content as a function of comparative context and trait favourableness | url = | journal = British Journal of Social Psychology | volume = 34 | issue = 2| pages = 139–160 | doi=10.1111/j.2044-8309.1995.tb01054.x}}</ref> The resulting augmentation of social content allows the perceiver to interact with others with greater confidence and ease.
 
The accentuation component of self-categorization theory stems from prior research that demonstrated an [[accentuation effect]] for categorized non-social stimuli.<ref name="Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010)"/> A prototypical example of non-social accentuation came from Tajfel and Wilkes, who found that when a categorization scheme corresponded to line length participants would view lines belonging to different categories as more different than if no categorization scheme was present.<ref name="Tajfel & Wilkes (1963)">{{cite journal|last1=Tajfel|first1=H.|last2=Wilkes|first2=A. L.|title=Classification and quantitative judgement|journal=British journalJournal of psychologyPsychology|year=1963|volume=54|issue=2|pages=101–114|pmid=13980241|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8295.1963.tb00865.x}}</ref> Consistent with the idea that an efficient cognitive system would, where possible, use the same systems regardless of the social or non-social nature of the stimuli,<ref name="Van rooy et al. (2003)">{{cite journal | last1 = Van Rooy | first1 = D. | last2 = Van Overwalle | first2 = F. | last3 = Vanhoomissen | first3 = T. | last4 = Labiouse | first4 = C. | last5 = French | first5 = R. | year = 2003 | title = A recurrent connectionist model of group biases | url = | journal = Psychological Review | volume = 110 | issue = 3| pages = 536–563 | pmid = 12885114 | doi=10.1037/0033-295x.110.3.536| citeseerx = 10.1.1.72.3496 }}</ref> self-categorization theorists have demonstrated similar effects for social stimuli. For example, Haslam and Turner found that a perceiver would describe another person as more or less similar to themselves as a function of the likely categorization scheme.<ref name="Haslam & Turner (1992).">{{cite journal | last1 = Haslam | first1 = Alex | last2 = Turner | first2 = John | year = 1992 | title = Context-dependent variation in social stereotyping 2: The relationship between frame of reference, self-categorization and accentuation. | journal = European Journal of Social Psychology| volume = 22 | issue = 3| pages = 251–277 | doi=10.1002/ejsp.2420220305}}</ref>
 
===Depersonalization and self-stereotyping ===
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Self-categorization theorists posit “self-categorization is comparative, inherently variable, fluid and context dependent.”<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/> They reject the notion that self concepts are stored invariant structures that exist ready for application.<ref name="Oakes & Turner (1990)"/> Where stability is observed in self perception this is not attributed to stored stable categories, but rather to stability in both the perceiver and the social context in which the perceiver is situated.<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994)."/><ref name="McGarty, C (1999).">McGarty, C. (1999). Categorization in social psychology. Sage Publications: London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi.</ref><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/> This variability is systematic and occurs in response to the changing context in which the perceiver is situated. As an example, the category of [[psychologists]] can be perceived quite differently if compared to [[physicists]] as opposed to [[artists]] (with variation perhaps on how [[Scientific method|scientific]] psychologists are perceived to be).<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/> In self-categorization theory contextual changes to the salient social category are sometimes referred to as shifting [[Self-categorization theory#Prototypicality|prototypicality]].
 
Although the theory accepts that prior categorization behaviour impacts present perception (i.e., as part of perceiver readiness), self-categorization theory has key advantages over descriptions of social categorization where categories are rigid and invariant cognitive structures that are stored in comparative isolation prior to application. One advantage is that this perspective removes the [[implausibility]] of storing enough categorical information to account for all the nuanced categorization that humans use daily.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/><ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/> Another advantage is that it brings social cognition in line with a [[Connectionism|connectionist approach]] to cognition.<ref name="McGarty (2002)"/> The connectionist approach is a neurologically plausible model of cognition where semantic units are not stored, but rather semantic information forms as a consequence of network pattern activation (both current and prior).<ref name="Smith, E. R. (1996).">{{cite journal | last1 = Smith | first1 = E. R. | year = 1996 | title = What do connectionism and social psychology offer each other? | url = | journal = Journal of Personality and Social Psychology | volume = 70 | issue = 5| pages = 893–912 | pmid = 8656338 | doi=10.1037/0022-3514.70.5.893}}</ref><ref name="Smith, E. R. & Semin, G. R. (2007).">{{cite journal | last1 = Smith | first1 = E. R. | last2 = Semin | first2 = G. R. | year = 2007 | title = Situated social cognition | url = | journal = Current Directions in Psychological Science | volume = 16 | issue = 3| pages = 132–135 | doi=10.1111/j.1467-8721.2007.00490.x| citeseerx = 10.1.1.731.9217 }}</ref>
 
===Prototypicality===
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Self-categorization theory provides an account of social influence.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)">Turner, J. C. (1991). Social influence. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.</ref> This account is sometimes referred to as the theory of ''referent informational influence''.<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/> According to self-categorization theory, as social identities become salient, and depersonalization and self-stereotyping occurs, people adopt the norms, beliefs, and behaviors of fellow ingroup members. They also distance themselves from the norms, beliefs, and behaviors of comparison outgroup members. When someone observes a difference between themselves and a fellow ingroup member that person will experience subjective uncertainty. That uncertainty can be resolved by either a) recategorizing people or the situation to reflect those perceived differences, or b) engaging in a social influence process whereby one person makes changes to become more similar to the other. Which person adopts the views or behaviors of the other (i.e. who influences who) is predicted to be that person who is most prototypical of the ingroup. In other words, the person who exemplifies the norms, values, and behaviors of the ingroup the most. The self-categorization theory account of social influence has received a large amount of empirical support.<ref name="McGarty & Turner (1992).">{{cite journal|last1 = McGarty|first1 = C.|last2=Turner|first2=J. C. |title = The effects of categorization on social judgement|journal = British Journal of Social Psychology|volume = 31|issue = 4| pages = 253–268|year = 1992|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8309.1992.tb00971.x}}</ref><ref name="Makie & Wright (2001)">{{cite book | last1 = Mackie | first1 =D. M. | last2 = Wright | first2 = C. L. | editor1-last = Brown | editor1-first = Rupert | editor2-last = Gaertner |editor2-first = Sam L. | year = 2001 | chapter = Social Influence in an Intergroup context |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC&pg=PA281| title = Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intergroup Processes |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC| volume = 3 | issue = 1 |isbn=978-0-470-69270-7 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Livingstone|first1=A. G.|last2=Haslam|first2=S. A.|last3=Postmes|first3=T.|last4=Jetten|first4=J.|title="We Are, Therefore We Should": Evidence That In-Group Identification Mediates the Acquisition of In-Group Norms|journal=Journal of Applied Social Psychology|year=2011|volume=41|issue=8|pages=1857–1876|doi=10.1111/j.1559-1816.2011.00794.x}}</ref>
 
Self-categorization theory’s account of social influence differs from other social psychological approaches to social influence. It rejects the traditional distinction between [[informational influence]] and [[normative influence]],<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)"/><ref name="Turner & Oakes, (1997)">{{cite journal | last1 = Turner | first1 = J. C. | last2 = Oakes | first2 = P. J. | editor1-last = McGarty | editor1-first = C. | editor2-last = Haslam | editor2-first = S. A. | year = 1997 | title = The socially structured mind | journal = The messageMessage of socialSocial psychologyPsychology | pages = 355–373 | ___location = Cambridge, MA | publisher = Blackwell }}</ref> where informational influence involves the assessment of social information based on its merit and normative influence involves public compliance to the expectations of group members. For self-categorization theory social information does not have merit independent of self-categorization. Instead, information is perceived as valid to the extent that it is perceived to be a normative belief of the ingroup. Normative influence, on the other hand, is not normative at all. Rather, it is counter-normative influence based compliance to expectations of psychological outgroup members. In a similar vein self-categorization theory also challenges the distinction between objective reality testing and social reality testing (e.g. the [[elaboration likelihood model]]).<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994)."/><ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)"/><ref name="Turner & Oakes, (1997)"/><ref name="Oakes & Reynolds (1997)">{{cite journal|last1=Oakes|first1=P. J.|last2=Reynolds|first2=R. J.|title=Asking the accuracy question: is measurement the answer?|journal=The socialSocial psychologyPsychology of stereotypingStereotyping and groupGroup lifeLife|year=1997|pages=119–143|editor1-first=R.|editor1-last=Spears|editor2-first=P.J.|editor2-last=Oakes|editor3-first=N.|editor3-last=Ellemers|editor4-first=S.A.|display-editors = 3 |editor4-last=Haslam|publisher=Blackwell|___location=Oxford}}</ref> It argues that there is no such thing as objective reality testing isolated from social reality testing. Sensory data is always interpreted with respect of the beliefs and ideas of the perceiver, which in turn are bound up in the psychological group memberships of that perceiver.
 
===Out-group homogeneity===
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===Meta-theoretical debate===
The social identity approach explicitly rejects the metatheory of research that regards limited information processing as the cause of social stereotyping.<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994)."/><ref name="McGarty (2002)">{{cite journal |last= McGarty|first= C. |year= 2002|title= Stereotype formation as category formation |journal= Stereotypes as explanationsExplanations |pages= 16–37 |___location= Cambridge |publisher= University Press |editor1-first= C.|editor1-last= McGarty |editor2-first= V.Y. |editor2-last= Yzerbyt |editor3-first= R. |editor3-last= Spears }}</ref><ref name="Oakes & Turner (1996)">{{cite journal | last1 = Oakes | first1 = Penny | last2 = Turner | first2 = John | editor-last = Stroebe | editor-first = Wolfgang | editor-link1= Wolfgang Stroebe|editor2-last = Hewstone | editor2-first = Miles | year = 1990 | title = Is limited information processing capacity the cause of social stereotyping? | journal = European reviewReview of Social Psychology | volume = 1 | pages = 111–135 | ___location = Chichester | publisher = Wiley | doi=10.1080/14792779108401859}}</ref> Specifically, where other researchers adopt the position that stereotyping is second best to other information processing techniques (e.g., individuation), social identity theorists argue that in many contexts a stereotypical perspective is entirely appropriate. Moreover, it is argued that in many intergroup contexts to take an individualistic view would be decidedly maladaptive and demonstrate ignorance of important social realities.<ref name="Haslam et al. (1996)."/><ref name="Haslam & Turner (1992)."/>
 
===Category hierarchies===
Self-categorization theory emphasises the role of category hierarchies in social perception.<ref name="Turner (1999)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/> That is, much like a biological [[Taxonomy (biology)|taxonomy]], social groups at lower [[Self-categorization theory#Levels of abstraction|levels of abstraction]] are subsumed within social groups at higher levels of abstraction. A useful example comes from the world of [[team sport]]s, where a particular social group such as [[Manchester United F.C.|Manchester United]] [[Fan (person)|fans]] may be an ingroup for a perceiver who may compare with a relevant outgroup (e.g., [[Liverpool F.C.|Liverpool]] fans). However, at a higher level of abstraction, both social groups may be subsumed into the singular category of [[Association football|football]] fans. This is known as a superordinate category, and in this context those Liverpool fans once considered outgroup members are now considered fellow ingroup members. The new salient outgroup might instead be [[Rugby union|rugby]] fans. Awareness of category hierarchies has led to the development of the [[common ingroup identity]] model. This model suggests that conflict at one level of abstraction (e.g., between Manchester United fans and Liverpool fans) might be ameliorated by making salient a more inclusive superordinate ingroup.<ref name=" (1993).">{{cite journal | last1 = Gaertner | first1 = S. L. | last2 = Dovidio | first2 = J. F. | last3 = Anastasio | first3 = P. A. | last4 = Bachman | first4 = B. A. | last5 = Rust | first5 = M. C. | year = 1993 | title = The common ingroup identity model: Recategorization and the reduction of intergroup bias | url = | journal = European reviewReview of socialSocial psychologyPsychology | volume = 4 | issue = | pages = 1–26 | doi=10.1080/14792779343000004}}</ref>
 
It has been noted, however, that very few social groups can be described in hierarchical terms. For example, [[Catholics|Catholic people]] in [[Germany]] cannot be always considered a subordinate category of Germans, as there are Catholic people throughout the globe. McGarty proposes that the theory's use of hierarchies as an organizing principle must be relaxed. The alternative proposition is that social psychologists should look to [[Venn diagram|Venn]]-like structures for descriptions of social structure.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/><ref name="McGarty (2002)"/><ref name="McGarty, C. (2006).">McGarty, C. (2006). Hierarchies and minority groups: The roles of salience, overlap, and background knowledge in selecting meaningful social categorizations from multiple alternatives. In R. J. Crisp and M. Hewstone (Eds.), Multiple Social Categorization: Processes Models and Applications (pp. 25-49). Psychology Press.</ref> The awareness of crossed cutting social categories has allowed for the development of further intergroup conflict reduction strategies.<ref name=" (2006).">Dovidio. J. F., Gaertner, S. L., Hodson, G., Riek, B. M., Johnson, K. M., & Houlette, M. (2006). Recategorization and crossed categorization: The implications of group salience and representations for reducing bias. In R. J. Crisp & M. Hewstone, (Eds.). Multiple social categorization: Processes, models and application (pp, 65-89). . New York: Psychology Press. .</ref>
 
===Motivation in the theory===
Brewer and Brown describe self-categorization theory as a “version of social identity theory” that is heavily cognitive and is not attentive to many motivational and affective processes.<ref name="Brewer & Brown (1998)">{{cite journal | last1 = Brewer | first1 = M. B. | last2 = Brown | first2 = R. J. | editor-last = Gilbert | editor-first = D. T. | editor2-last = Fiske | editor2-first = S. T. | editor3-last = Lindzey | editor3-first = G. | year = 1998 | title = Intergroup relations | journal = The handbookHandbook of socialSocial psychologyPsychology | volume = 2 | pages = 554–594 | ___location = New York | publisher = Oxford University Press}}</ref> Turner and Reynolds, in response to this style of commentary, counter that describing self-categorization theory as a replacement to social identity theory is an error, and that self-categorization theory was always intended to complement social identity theory.<ref name="Turner & Reynolds (2001)">{{cite book | last1 = Turner | first1 = John C. | last2 = Reynolds | first2 =Katherine J. | editor1-last = Brown | editor1-first = Rupert | editor2-last = Gaertner | editor2-first = Sam L. | year = 2001 | chapter = The Social Identity Perspective in Intergroup Relations: Theories, Themes, and Controversies |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC&pg=PA133 | title = Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC | volume = 3 | issue = 1 |isbn=978-0-470-69270-7 }}</ref> Turner and Reynolds also argue that such commentary unreasonably discounts the motivational concerns that are articulated in self-categorization theory.<ref name="Turner & Reynolds (2001)"/> For example, the motivation to maintain positive self categories and the motivation to achieve ingroup consensus.<ref name="Turner (1985)"/>
 
==References==