Causal theory of reference: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 20:18, 18 February 2019

Revision as of 11:35, 28 February 2019

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A causal theory avoids these difficulties. A name refers rigidly to the bearer to which it is causally connected, regardless of any particular facts about the bearer, and in all [[possible worlds]].

The same motivations apply to causal theories in regard to other sorts of terms. Putnam, for instance, attempted to establish that 'water' refers rigidly to the stuff that we do in fact call 'water', to the exclusion of any possible identical water-like substance for which we have no causal connection. These considerations motivate [[semantic externalism]]. Because speakers interact with a natural kind such as water regularly, and because there is generally no naming ceremony through which their names are formalized, the multiple groundings described above are even more essential to a causal account of such terms. A speaker whose environment changes may thus observe that the referents of his terms shift, as described in the [[Twin Earth thought experiment|Twin Earth]] and [[Swamp manSwampman]] [[thought experiment]]s.

== Variations<!--'Causal-historical theory of reference', 'Causal-descriptive theory of reference', and 'Descriptive-causal theory of reference' redirect here--> ==