Advanced Access Content System: Difference between revisions

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Rescuing 6 sources and tagging 0 as dead. #IABot (v2.0beta9)
Rescuing 6 sources and tagging 0 as dead. #IABot (v2.0beta14)
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|date=3 March 2007
|work=Doom9.net forums| archiveurl= https://web.archive.org/web/20070329033807/http://forum.doom9.org/showthread.php?t=122969| archivedate= 29 March 2007 <!--DASHBot-->| deadurl= no}}</ref>
(a key signed by the AACS LA used for hand-shaking between host and HD drive; required for reading the Volume ID). The first unprotected HD movies were available soon afterwards.<ref>
{{cite web
|url=http://www.dailytech.com/article.aspx?newsid=5747
|title=First Pirated HD DVDs Released
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|last=Yam
|date=17 January 2007
|work=DailyTech}}</ref>
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070219103102/http://www.dailytech.com/article.aspx?newsid=5747
|archive-date=19 February 2007
|dead-url=yes
|df=dmy-all
}}
}}</ref>
The [[AACS encryption key controversy|processing key was widely published]] on the Internet after it was found and the AACS LA sent multiple [[DMCA takedown notice]]s in the aim of censoring it.<ref>{{cite web
|url=http://www.chillingeffects.org/notice.cgi?sID=3218
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The AACS key extractions highlight the inherent weakness in any DRM system that permit software players for PCs to be used for playback of content. No matter how many layers of encryption are employed, it does not offer any true protection, since the keys needed to obtain the unencrypted content stream must be available somewhere in memory for playback to be possible. The PC platform offers no way to prevent memory snooping attacks on such keys, since a PC configuration can always be emulated by a [[virtual machine]], in theory without any running program or external system being able to detect the virtualization. The only way to wholly prevent attacks like this would require changes to the PC platform (see [[Trusted Computing]]) which could provide protection against such attacks. This would require that content distributors do not permit their content to be played on PCs without trusted computing technology, by not providing the companies making software players for non-trusted PCs with the needed encryption keys.
 
On 16 April 2007, the AACS consortium announced that it had expired certain encryption keys used by PC-based applications. Patches were available for WinDVD and PowerDVD which used new and uncompromised encryption keys.<ref>{{cite web
{{cite web| url= http://www.aacsla.com/press/| title= Press Messages: AACS – Advanced Access Content System| accessdate= 2007-05-02| archiveurl= https://web.archive.org/web/20070430070403/http://www.aacsla.com/press/| archivedate= 30 April 2007 <!--DASHBot-->| deadurl= noyes| df= dmy-all}}</ref>
|url=http://www.aacsla.com/press/
</ref>
|title=Press Messages: AACS – Advanced Access Content System
<ref>
|accessdate=2007-05-02| archiveurl= https://web.archive.org/web/20070430070403/http://www.aacsla.com/press/| archivedate= 30 April 2007 <!--DASHBot-->| deadurl= no}}</ref>
<ref>{{cite web
|url=http://dailytech.com/AACS+Responds+to+Cracked+HD+DVD+and+Bluray+Disc+Protections/article5879.htm
|title=AACS Responds to Cracked HD DVD and Blu-ray Disc Protections
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|last=Yam
|date=26 January 2007
|work=DailyTech }}</ref>
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070211005800/http://dailytech.com/AACS+Responds+to+Cracked+HD+DVD+and+Bluray+Disc+Protections/article5879.htm
|archive-date=11 February 2007
|dead-url=yes
|df=dmy-all
}}
</ref>
The old, compromised keys can still be used to decrypt old titles, but not newer releases as they will be encrypted with these new keys. All users of the affected players (even those considered "legitimate" by the AACS LA) are forced to upgrade or replace their player software in order to view new titles.
 
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|title=Blu-ray and HD DVD Encryption Cracked
|accessdate=2007-05-29
|author =Lindsay Martell
|date=26 January 2007
|work=NewsFactor Network
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071103050531/http://www.newsfactor.com/news/Blu-ray--HD-DVD-Encryption-Cracked/story.xhtml?story_id=121000E3UUOA
}}</ref>
|archive-date=3 November 2007
|dead-url=yes
|df=dmy-all
}}
</ref>
The AACS LA has sent [[DMCA takedown notice]]s to such sites on at least one occasion.<ref>
{{cite web
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==External links==
{{wikinews|High definition anti-piracy DRM possibly hacked}}
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20100306013059/http://www.aacsla.com/home AACS homepage]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20070128110342/http://www.aacsla.com/specifications/ AACS specifications]
* [http://forum.doom9.org/showthread.php?t=122363 Understanding AACS], an introductory forum thread.
* [http://www.isan.org ISAN homepage], ISAN as required in the Content ID defined in AACS [https://web.archive.org/web/20070302130221/http://www.aacsla.com/specifications/specs091/AACS_Spec_Common_0.91.pdf Introduction and Common Cryptographic Elements rev 0.91]