Content deleted Content added
m Typo fixing, typo(s) fixed: Quine’s → Quine's (6) |
No edit summary Tags: Visual edit Mobile edit Mobile web edit |
||
Line 22:
==Synopsis==
Quine emphasizes his [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]], the doctrine that philosophy should be pursued as part of natural science.<ref name="Hookway772">{{cite book |author=Hookway, C. J. |editor=Honderich, Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |___location=Oxford |year=2005 |page=779 |isbn=0-19-926479-1 |oclc= |doi= |accessdate=}}</ref> He argues in favor of naturalizing [[epistemology]], supports [[physicalism]] over [[phenomenalism]] and mind-body dualism, and [[extensionality]] over [[intension]]ality, develops a behavioristic conception of sentence-meaning, theorizes about language learning, speculates on the ontogenesis of reference, explains various forms of ambiguity and vagueness, recommends measures for regimenting language to eliminate ambiguity and vagueness as well as to make perspicuous the logic and [[ontic]] commitments of theories, argues against quantified modal logic and the [[essentialism]] it presupposes, argues for [[Platonic realism]] in mathematics, rejects [[instrumentalism]] in favor of [[scientific realism]], develops a view of philosophical analysis as explication, argues against analyticity and for [[holism]], against countenancing propositions, and tries to show that the meanings of theoretical sentences are indeterminate and that the reference of terms is inscrutable.<ref name="Gibsonarticle">{{cite book |author=Gibson, Roger F. |editor=Audi, Robert |title=The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy |publisher=Cambridge University Press |___location=Cambridge |year=1999 |pages=767–768 |isbn=0-521-63722-8 |oclc= |doi= |accessdate=}}</ref>
==Behaviorism==
| |||