Ring learning with errors key exchange: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 11:49, 23 February 2019

Revision as of 19:45, 11 August 2019

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Also in their November 2015 paper, Alkim, Ducas, Popplemann and Schwabe recommend that the choice of the base polynomial for the key exchange ( a(x) above ) be either generated randomly from a secure random number generator for each exchange or created in a verifiable fashion using a "nothing up my sleeve" or NUMS technique.<ref name=":3" /> An example of parameters generated in this way are the prime numbers for the Internet Key Exchange (<nowiki>RFC 2409</nowiki>) which embed the digits of the mathematical constant pi in the digital representation of the prime number.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2409|title=The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)|last=D.|first=Carrel|last2=D.|first2=Harkins|website=tools.ietf.org|language=en|access-date=2017-03-16}}</ref> Their first method prevents amortization of attack costs across many key exchanges at the risk of leaving open the possibility of a hidden attack like that described by Dan Bernstein against the NIST elliptic curves.<ref>{{Cite web|url=httphttps://crypto.stackexchange.com/questionsq/35488/is-the-new-hope-lattice-key-exchange-vulnerable-to-a-lattice-analog-of-the-ber |title=Is the "New Hope" Lattice Key Exchange vulnerable to a lattice analog of the Bernstein BADA55 Attack?|website=crypto.stackexchange.com|access-date=2017-03-16}}</ref> The NUMS approach is open to amortization but generally avoids the Bernstein attack if only common mathematical constants such as pi and e are used.

== Key exchange security ==