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[[File:UNSW Rugby players.jpg|thumb|alt= Rugby operates using self-categorization theory processes.|The clear intergroup structure of team sports means that such contexts are often used to illustrate self-categorization theory processes.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011).">{{cite book |last=Haslam |first=S. Alexander |last2=Reicher |first2=Stephen D. |last3=Platow |first3=Michael J. |title=The new psychology of leadership: Identity, influence and power |year=2011 |publisher=Psychology Press |___location=New York, NY |isbn=978-1-84169-610-2}}</ref>]]
===Levels of abstraction===
[[File:SCT Levels of abstraction.JPG|thumb|450px|alt= A hypothetical self-categorical hierarchy for a person in an organization.| Figure 1. A hypothetical self-categorical hierarchy for a person in an organization. The darkly shaded regions indicate those others who are included in Sam’sSam's definition of self at different levels of abstraction. The lightly shaded regions indicate others who are compared with self at different levels of abstraction.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/>]]Drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology,<ref name="Turner (1985)">{{cite journal| last1=Turner| first1=J.C.| editor-last =Lawler| editor-first =E. J.| year=1985| title=Social categorization and the self-concept: A social cognitive theory of group behavior| journal=Advances in Group Processes: Theory and Research|volume=2|pages=77–122}}</ref><ref name="Oakes & Turner (1990)">{{cite journal|last1=Oakes|first1=P. J.|last2=Turner|first2=J. C.|title=Is limited information processing capacity the cause of social stereotyping|journal=European Review of Social Psychology|year=1990|volume=1|issue=1|pages=111–135|doi=10.1080/14792779108401859}}</ref><ref name="Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010)">Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010). The story of social identity. In T. Postmes & N. Branscombe (Eds). Rediscovering Social Identity: Core Sources. Psychology Press.</ref> self-categorization theory assumes that the self can be categorized at various levels of abstraction. In other words, humans may categorize the self as a singular “I”"I"(personal identity), or as a more inclusive “we”"we"(social identity). In the latter case the self is cognitively grouped as identical and interchangeable to other stimuli within that category.<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/> It is argued that it is this variation in self categorization that underpins many intergroup phenomena,<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/> including those described in social identity theory.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/>
To demonstrate the notion of varying [[Principle of abstraction|levels of abstraction]] and inclusiveness, three types of self category are often given as examples.<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/><ref name="Haslam et al. (1996)."/><ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/> The lowest level of abstraction is given as a personal self, where the perceiver self categorizes as “I”"I". A higher level of abstraction corresponds to a social self, where the perceiver self categorizes as “we”"we" in comparison to a salient outgroup (them). A highest level of abstraction is represented by ''we humans'', where the salient outgroup is animals or other non-humans. A common misconception is that these three example categories represent ''the'' self categories that humans use. Instead, the theory posits that there are innumerable self categories that a perceiver may use (see, [[Self-categorization theory#Online category formation|online category formation]]), and in particular that there are a myriad of different personal and social identities that a perceiver may invoke in his or her day-to-day life.<ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)"/><ref name="Reynolds & Turner (2006)."/> The misconception may also be attributable to the early writing of Turner where a singular social identity was contrasted against a singular personal identity.<ref name="Turner (1982)">{{cite journal| last1=Turner| first1=J.C.| editor-last =Tajfel| editor-first =H.| year=1982| title=Toward a cognitive redefinition of the social group| journal=Social Identity and Intergroup Relations| pages=15–40}}</ref> This however predates the formal statement of self-categorization theory.
====Accentuation====
===Depersonalization and self-stereotyping ===
According to self-categorization theory, depersonalization describes a process of [[Self-Stereotyping|self-stereotyping]]. This is where, under conditions of social category [[Self-categorization theory#Determinants of categorization|salience]] and consequent accentuation, “people"people come to see themselves more as the interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique personalities defined by their differences from others”others".<ref name="Turner (1985)"/> Under these conditions a perceiver directly bases their behaviour and beliefs on the [[norm (social)|norms]], goals and needs of a salient ingroup.<ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/><ref name="Brown, R. J. & Turner, J. C. (1981).">Brown, R. J. & Turner, J. C. (1981). Interpersonal and intergroup behaviour. In J. C. Turner & H. Giles (Eds.), Intergroup Behaviour (pp. 33-65). Oxford: Blackwell..</ref> For example, if a person's salient self-category becomes 'army officer' then that person is more likely to act in terms of the norms associated with that category (e.g. to wear a uniform, follow orders, and distrust an enemy) and less likely to act in terms of other potential self-categories.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/> Here the person can be said to be accentuating the similarities between his or herself and other members of the 'army officers' category.
Turner and colleagues stress that depersonalization is not a loss of self, but rather a ''redefinition'' of the self in terms of group membership.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/> A depersonalized self, or a social identity, is every bit as valid and meaningful as a personalized self, or personal identity.<ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/> A loss of self is sometimes referred to using the alternative term [[deindividuation]]. Further, although the term [[depersonalization]] has been used in [[clinical psychology]] to describe a type of disordered experience, this is completely different from depersonalization in the sense intended by self-categorization theory authors.
===Determinants of categorization===
In self-categorization theory the formation and use of a social category in a certain context is predicted by an interaction between [[Self-categorization theory#Perceiver readiness|perceiver readiness]] and category-stimulus fit. The latter being broken down into [[Self-categorization theory#Comparative fit|comparative fit]] and [[Self-categorization theory#Normative fit|normative fit]].<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/><ref>{{cite journal|last=Voci|first=Alberto|title=Relevance of social categories, depersonalization and group processes: two field tests of self-categorization theory|journal=European Journal of Social Psychology|date=1 January 2006|volume=36|issue=1|pages=73–90|doi=10.1002/ejsp.259}}</ref> This predictive interaction was heavily influenced by [[Jerome Bruner|Bruner’sBruner's]] accessibility and fit formula.<ref name="Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010)"/><ref name="Bruner (1957)">{{cite journal | last1 = Bruner | first1 = J. S. | year = 1957 | title = On perceptual readiness | url = | journal = Psychological Review | volume = 64 | issue = 2| pages = 123–152 | pmid = 13420288 | doi=10.1037/h0043805}}</ref> A social category that is currently in use is called a ''salient'' social category, and in the case of a self category is called a ''salient social identity''.<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/> The latter should not be confused with ''level of identification'', which is a component of perceiver readiness.<ref name="McGarty, C. (2001)">{{cite journal | last1 = McGarty | first1 = C. | year = 2001 | title = Social Identity Theory does not maintain that identification produces bias, and Self-categorization Theory does not maintain that salience is identification: Two comments on Mummendey, Klink and Brown | url = | journal = British Journal of Social Psychology | volume = 40 | issue = Pt 2| pages = 173–176 | pmid = 11446223 | doi=10.1348/014466601164777}}</ref>
====Perceiver readiness====
Perceiver readiness, which Turner first described as ''relative accessibility'',<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/> “reflects"reflects a person’sperson's past experiences, present expectations, and current motives, values, goals and needs”needs".<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/> It is the relevant aspects of cognition that the perceiver brings to the environment. For example, a perceiver who categorizes frequently on the basis of nationality (e.g., “we"we [[Americans]]”") is, due to that past experience, more likely to formulate a similar self category under new conditions. Accordingly, ''social identification'', or the degree to which the group is valued and self-involving, may be thought of as an important factor that affects a person’sperson's readiness to use a particular social category.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/>
====Comparative fit====
====Normative fit====
Normative fit is the extent that the perceived behaviour or attributes of an individual or collection of individuals conforms to the perceiver’sperceiver's knowledge-based expectations.<ref name="Oakes, et al. (1994)">Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A. & Turner, J. C. (1994). Stereotyping as social reality. Oxford, UK and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.</ref> Thus, normative fit is evaluated with reference to the ''perceiver readiness'' component of the categorisation process.<ref name="Brown, P. M. & Turner, J. C. (2002).">Brown, P. M. & Turner, J. C. (2002). The role of theories in the formation of stereotype content. In C. McGarty, V. Y. Yzerbyt & R. Spears (Eds), Stereotypes as explanations: The formation of meaningful beliefs about social groups. Cambridge.</ref> As an example of the role of normative fit in categorization, although a collection of individuals may be categorized as an entity on the basis of ''comparative fit'', they are only labelled using the specific social category of “science"science students”students" if perceived as hard working. That is, they fit the normative content of that category.
===Online category formation===
Self-categorization theorists posit “self"self-categorization is comparative, inherently variable, fluid and context dependent.”"<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/> They reject the notion that self concepts are stored invariant structures that exist ready for application.<ref name="Oakes & Turner (1990)"/> Where stability is observed in self perception this is not attributed to stored stable categories, but rather to stability in both the perceiver and the social context in which the perceiver is situated.<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994)."/><ref name="McGarty, C (1999).">McGarty, C. (1999). Categorization in social psychology. Sage Publications: London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi.</ref><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/> This variability is systematic and occurs in response to the changing context in which the perceiver is situated. As an example, the category of [[psychologists]] can be perceived quite differently if compared to [[physicists]] as opposed to [[artists]] (with variation perhaps on how [[Scientific method|scientific]] psychologists are perceived to be).<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/> In self-categorization theory contextual changes to the salient social category are sometimes referred to as shifting [[Self-categorization theory#Prototypicality|prototypicality]].
Although the theory accepts that prior categorization behaviour impacts present perception (i.e., as part of perceiver readiness), self-categorization theory has key advantages over descriptions of social categorization where categories are rigid and invariant cognitive structures that are stored in comparative isolation prior to application. One advantage is that this perspective removes the [[implausibility]] of storing enough categorical information to account for all the nuanced categorization that humans use daily.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/><ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/> Another advantage is that it brings social cognition in line with a [[Connectionism|connectionist approach]] to cognition.<ref name="McGarty (2002)"/> The connectionist approach is a neurologically plausible model of cognition where semantic units are not stored, but rather semantic information forms as a consequence of network pattern activation (both current and prior).<ref name="Smith, E. R. (1996).">{{cite journal | last1 = Smith | first1 = E. R. | year = 1996 | title = What do connectionism and social psychology offer each other? | url = | journal = Journal of Personality and Social Psychology | volume = 70 | issue = 5| pages = 893–912 | pmid = 8656338 | doi=10.1037/0022-3514.70.5.893}}</ref><ref name="Smith, E. R. & Semin, G. R. (2007).">{{cite journal | last1 = Smith | first1 = E. R. | last2 = Semin | first2 = G. R. | year = 2007 | title = Situated social cognition | url = | journal = Current Directions in Psychological Science | volume = 16 | issue = 3| pages = 132–135 | doi=10.1111/j.1467-8721.2007.00490.x| citeseerx = 10.1.1.731.9217 }}</ref>
===Prototypicality===
In social psychology a category [[prototype]] may be thought of as a “representative"representative exemplar”exemplar" of a category.<ref name="Billig, M. (1987)">Billig, M. (1987). Arguing and thinking: A rhetorical approach to social psychology: Cambridge University Press.</ref> Self-categorization theory predicts that what is prototypical of a category is contingent on the context in which the category is encountered.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/> More specifically, when the [[Self-categorization theory#Comparative fit|comparative context]] changes (i.e., the psychologically available stimuli change) this has implications for how the self category is perceived and the nature of subsequent [[Self-categorization theory#Depersonalization and self-stereotyping|depersonalization]]. Self-categorization theory predicts that individuals adopt the features of a salient self category (self-stereotyping), and the content of the category they adopt depends on the present comparative context.
An individual’sindividual's degree of prototypicality also varies in relation to changes in the comparative context, and self-categorization theory expects this to have direct implications for interpersonal phenomenon. Specifically, prototypicality plays an important role in the social identity approach to [[Social identity approach#Leadership|leadership]],<ref name="Platow, M. J. et al. (1997).">{{cite journal | last1 = Platow | first1 = M. J. | last2 = Hoar | first2 = S. | last3 = Reid | first3 = S. Harley | last4 = Morrison | first4 = D. | last5 = Morrison | first5 = Dianne | year = 1997 | title = Endorsement of distributively fair and unfair leaders in interpersonal and intergroup situations | url = | journal = European Journal of Social Psychology | volume = 27 | issue = 4| pages = 465–494 | doi=10.1002/(sici)1099-0992(199707)27:4<465::aid-ejsp817>3.0.co;2-8}}</ref> influence, and [[interpersonal attraction]]. For example, on interpersonal attraction, self-categorization theory states that "self and others are evaluated positively to the degree that they are perceived as prototypical (representative, exemplary, etc.) of the next more inclusive (positively valued) self-category of which they are being compared".<ref name="Turner (1985)"/>
Levels of individual prototypicality may be gauged using the meta-contrast principle, and indeed it is this purpose the meta-contrast ratio is more often used for.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/> Furthermore, although prototypicality is most often discussed in relation to the perception of individuals within a group, groups may also be assessed in terms of how prototypical they are of a superordinate category.<ref>Rubin, M. (2012). Group status is related to group prototypicality in the absence of social identity concerns. ''Journal of Social Psychology, 152, 386–389. doi: 10.1080/00224545.2011.614648''[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00224545.2011.614648 [View<nowiki>]</nowiki>]</ref>
Self-categorization theory provides an account of social influence.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)">Turner, J. C. (1991). Social influence. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.</ref> This account is sometimes referred to as the theory of ''referent informational influence''.<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/> According to self-categorization theory, as social identities become salient, and depersonalization and self-stereotyping occurs, people adopt the norms, beliefs, and behaviors of fellow ingroup members. They also distance themselves from the norms, beliefs, and behaviors of comparison outgroup members. When someone observes a difference between themselves and a fellow ingroup member that person will experience subjective uncertainty. That uncertainty can be resolved by either a) recategorizing people or the situation to reflect those perceived differences, or b) engaging in a social influence process whereby one person makes changes to become more similar to the other. Which person adopts the views or behaviors of the other (i.e. who influences who) is predicted to be that person who is most prototypical of the ingroup. In other words, the person who exemplifies the norms, values, and behaviors of the ingroup the most. The self-categorization theory account of social influence has received a large amount of empirical support.<ref name="McGarty & Turner (1992).">{{cite journal|last1 = McGarty|first1 = C.|last2=Turner|first2=J. C. |title = The effects of categorization on social judgement|journal = British Journal of Social Psychology|volume = 31|issue = 4| pages = 253–268|year = 1992|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8309.1992.tb00971.x}}</ref><ref name="Makie & Wright (2001)">{{cite book | last1 = Mackie | first1 =D. M. | last2 = Wright | first2 = C. L. | editor1-last = Brown | editor1-first = Rupert | editor2-last = Gaertner |editor2-first = Sam L. | year = 2001 | chapter = Social Influence in an Intergroup context |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC&pg=PA281| title = Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intergroup Processes |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC| volume = 3 | issue = 1 |isbn=978-0-470-69270-7 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Livingstone|first1=A. G.|last2=Haslam|first2=S. A.|last3=Postmes|first3=T.|last4=Jetten|first4=J.|title="We Are, Therefore We Should": Evidence That In-Group Identification Mediates the Acquisition of In-Group Norms|journal=Journal of Applied Social Psychology|year=2011|volume=41|issue=8|pages=1857–1876|doi=10.1111/j.1559-1816.2011.00794.x}}</ref>
Self-categorization theory’stheory's account of social influence differs from other social psychological approaches to social influence. It rejects the traditional distinction between [[informational influence]] and [[normative influence]],<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)"/><ref name="Turner & Oakes, (1997)">{{cite journal | last1 = Turner | first1 = J. C. | last2 = Oakes | first2 = P. J. | editor1-last = McGarty | editor1-first = C. | editor2-last = Haslam | editor2-first = S. A. | year = 1997 | title = The socially structured mind | journal = The Message of Social Psychology | pages = 355–373 }}</ref> where informational influence involves the assessment of social information based on its merit and normative influence involves public compliance to the expectations of group members. For self-categorization theory social information does not have merit independent of self-categorization. Instead, information is perceived as valid to the extent that it is perceived to be a normative belief of the ingroup. Normative influence, on the other hand, is not normative at all. Rather, it is counter-normative influence based compliance to expectations of psychological outgroup members. In a similar vein self-categorization theory also challenges the distinction between objective reality testing and social reality testing (e.g. the [[elaboration likelihood model]]).<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994)."/><ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)"/><ref name="Turner & Oakes, (1997)"/><ref name="Oakes & Reynolds (1997)">{{cite journal|last1=Oakes|first1=P. J.|last2=Reynolds|first2=R. J.|title=Asking the accuracy question: is measurement the answer?|journal=The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life|year=1997|pages=119–143|editor1-first=R.|editor1-last=Spears|editor2-first=P.J.|editor2-last=Oakes|editor3-first=N.|editor3-last=Ellemers|editor4-first=S.A.|display-editors = 3 |editor4-last=Haslam}}</ref> It argues that there is no such thing as objective reality testing isolated from social reality testing. Sensory data is always interpreted with respect of the beliefs and ideas of the perceiver, which in turn are bound up in the psychological group memberships of that perceiver.
===Out-group homogeneity===
===Motivation in the theory===
Brewer and Brown describe self-categorization theory as a “version"version of social identity theory”theory" that is heavily cognitive and is not attentive to many motivational and affective processes.<ref name="Brewer & Brown (1998)">{{cite journal | last1 = Brewer | first1 = M. B. | last2 = Brown | first2 = R. J. | editor-last = Gilbert | editor-first = D. T. | editor2-last = Fiske | editor2-first = S. T. | editor3-last = Lindzey | editor3-first = G. | year = 1998 | title = Intergroup relations | journal = The Handbook of Social Psychology | volume = 2 | pages = 554–594 }}</ref> Turner and Reynolds, in response to this style of commentary, counter that describing self-categorization theory as a replacement to social identity theory is an error, and that self-categorization theory was always intended to complement social identity theory.<ref name="Turner & Reynolds (2001)">{{cite book | last1 = Turner | first1 = John C. | last2 = Reynolds | first2 =Katherine J. | editor1-last = Brown | editor1-first = Rupert | editor2-last = Gaertner | editor2-first = Sam L. | year = 2001 | chapter = The Social Identity Perspective in Intergroup Relations: Theories, Themes, and Controversies |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC&pg=PA133 | title = Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC | volume = 3 | issue = 1 |isbn=978-0-470-69270-7 }}</ref> Turner and Reynolds also argue that such commentary unreasonably discounts the motivational concerns that are articulated in self-categorization theory.<ref name="Turner & Reynolds (2001)"/> For example, the motivation to maintain positive self categories and the motivation to achieve ingroup consensus.<ref name="Turner (1985)"/>
==References==
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