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Daniel Case (talk | contribs) m →State v. Kirchoff: fmt |
Daniel Case (talk | contribs) m Disambiguated: burden of proof → burden of proof (law), non sequitur → non sequitur (fallacy); Unlinked: Fatal error |
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Morse accepted the Oregon Supreme Court's rule in ''Dixson'' that the open-fields doctrine did not apply where a landowner had, like Kirchoff, taken affirmative measures to control access to their land. He grounded this in state constitutional and statutory provisions that allowed public use of unposted land for many outdoor recreational activities and limited the liability of landowners for damages suffered by those they allowed, even implicitly, to engage in those activities on unposted land. "These provisions evidence the state's policy of providing the public with certain privileges and liberties not permitted under the common law", he wrote. "They evidence no intent, however, to limit the right of landowners to pursue their affairs free from unregulated intrusion by officials."<ref name="Kirchoff 994–96">''Kirchoff'', 994–96</ref>
Lastly, Morse said that while the Vermont Supreme Court was not completely discarding ''Katz'' as the basis for its personalty-rooted concept of privacy, it found some issues doing so. It was not comfortable with the concept of a reasonable expectation, since that could too easily change "with political winds and the perceived exigencies of the day ... The question is not what society is prepared to accept but what the constitution requires." This formulation, Morse believed, would better protect people's privacy expectations as technology advanced. Lastly he placed the [[burden of proof (law)|burden of proof]] on the state in cases where a search such as the one in the instant case, was challenged as unconstitutional, and held that under that standard this search had violated the state constitution.<ref name="Kirchoff 994–96" />
There were two other opinions. District Judge Lewis Springer, specially assigned to sit on the court for this case due to a vacant seat, concurred but said the majority opinion should have more thoroughly grounded its arguments in the state's constitutional history rather than the federal constitution.<ref name="Kirchoff 997–99">''Kirchoff'', 997–99</ref> [[Louis P. Peck]], in one of his last opinions before retirement, dissented at length, casting aspersions on the majority's motives in often plain language.<ref name="Kirchoff 999–1008">''Kirchoff'', 999–1008</ref>
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"I am sadly disappointed, and frustrated beyond comfort", by the majority opinion, Peck began. He likened it to a brief for the defendant in the case. "[I]t is, in my judgment, one of the most result-oriented opinions I have ever been exposed to. I am not prepared to countenance in silence the extreme and unwarranted judicial activism of which the opinion is an example."<ref name="Kirchoff 999–1008" />
Peck suggested that the majority's confusion over the meaning of "possessions" in the state constitution was "a calculated tactic rather than the result of interpretive incompetency ... Disregarding a word because it may have different meanings in different contexts constitutes an argument weak to the point of absurdity." By doing so, he charged, the majority had been able to substitute its own meaning. If that had not been the plan, "I am afraid that the majority's training in elementary logic, if any, failed to penetrate or make a lasting impression. The[ir] reasoning is a [[syllogism|syllogistic]] blunder and a ''[[non sequitur (fallacy)|non sequitur]]''."<ref name="Kirchoff 999–1008" />
There was no constitutional problem presented by the case, Peck said; the state's existing laws were enough protection for landowners.
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Stietz faced six felony charges over the incident. At trial in March 2014, the jury convicted him of two: intentionally pointing a firearm at a law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with a dangerous weapon. His pretrial motions for [[jury instruction]]s on [[Right of self-defense|self-defense]], trespass, and violation of his [[right to keep and bear arms]] were denied, as were his post-trial motions for acquittal or a new trial.<ref name="Stietz 823–24">''Stietz'', 823–24</ref>
In May Stietz was sentenced to a year in prison and probation. The day of sentence, he filed his appeal, arguing the denial of his jury intructions constituted
Stietz appealed to the [[Wisconsin Supreme Court]]. It accepted the case in late 2016 and heard oral arguments early the next year. In June 2017, by a 4–2 margin,{{efn|Justice [[Ann Walsh Bradley]] did not participate.<ref name="Stietz at 808">''Stietz'' at 808</ref>}} the court held that the trial court's denial of Stietz's requested self-defense instruction had deprived him of a factual credible argument that the jury could have believed and reversed and [[Remand (court procedure)|remanded]] the appeals court.<ref name="Stietz at 808" />
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