Causal theory of reference: Difference between revisions

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== Criticism of the theory ==

[[Gareth Evans (philosopher)|Gareth Evans]] argued that the causal theory, or at least certain common and over-simple variants of it, have the consequence that, however remote or obscure the causal connection between someone's use of a proper name and the object it originally referred to, they still refer to that object when they use the name. (Imagine a name briefly overheard in a train or café.) The theory effectively ignores context and makes reference into a magic trick. Evans describes it as a "[[photograph]]" theory of reference.<ref>{{citationCite neededjournal|reasonlast=Evans'|first=Gareth|last2=Altham|first2=J. argumentE. andJ.|date=1973|title=The quoteCausal areTheory hereinof unsourced-no indicationNames|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4106912|journal=Proceedings of wherethe heAristotelian arguedSociety, thisSupplementary Volumes|datevolume=April 201647|pages=187–225|issn=0309-7013}}</ref>

The links between different users of the name are particularly obscure. Each user must somehow pass the name on to the next, and must somehow "mean" the right individual as they do so (suppose "Socrates" is the name of a pet [[aardvark]]). Kripke himself notes the difficulty, [[John Searle]] makes much of it.{{Citation needed|reason=Reliable source needed for the whole sentence|date=September 2015}}