Reconstructive memory: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 20:36, 16 October 2019

Revision as of 12:26, 10 February 2020

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Memory is never a literal recount of past experiences. Rather, it is dependent on the constructive processes present at the time of [[Encoding (memory)|encoding]] that are subject to potential errors and distortions. Essentially, the constructive memory process functions by encoding the patterns of physical characteristics that are perceived by the individual, as well as the interpretive conceptual and semantic functions that act in response to the incoming information.<ref>Schacter DL. 1989. Memory. In Foundations

of Cognitive Science, ed. MI Posner, pp.

683–725. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press</ref> By utilizing multiple interdependent cognitive processes there is never a single ___location in the brain where a given complete [[memory trace]] of an experience is stored.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Squire | first1 = LR. | year = 1992. [http://whoville.ucsd.edu/PDFs/188_Squire_PsychRev_1992.pdf| title = Memory and the hippocampus: a synthesis from findings with rats, monkeys, and humans] | url = http://whoville.ucsd.edu/PDFs/188_Squire_PsychRev_1992.pdf | format = PDF | journal = Psychol. Rev. | volume = 99: | issue = | pages = 195–231 }}</ref> In this manner, the various features of the experience must be joined together to form a coherent representation of the episode and if this binding process fails it can result in source memory failure, where later attempted retrieval of the episode results in fragmented recollection and an inability to consolidate the information into a cohesive narrative of a past experience.

195–231</ref> In this manner, the various features of the experience must be joined together to form a coherent representation of the episode and if this binding process fails it can result in source memory failure, where later attempted retrieval of the episode results in fragmented recollection and an inability to consolidate the information into a cohesive narrative of a past experience.

During the recall of Episodic memory, the information that a person remembers is usually limited in scope, ultimately giving an incomplete recollection of an event. By employing reconstructive processes, individuals supplement other aspects of available personal knowledge into the gaps found in episodic memory in order to provide a fuller and more coherent version, albeit one that is often distorted.

Many errors can occur when attempting to retrieve a specific episode. First, the retrieval cues used to initiate the search for a specific episode may be too similar to other experiential memories and the retrieval process may fail if the individual is unable to form a specific description of the unique characteristics of the given memory they would like to retrieve.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Burgess | first1 = PW, | last2 = Shallice | first2 = T. | year = 1996. | title = Confabulation and the control of recollection | url = | journal = Memory | volume = 4 | issue = | pages = 359–411 }}</ref> When there is little available distinctive information for a given episode there will be more overlap across multiple episodes, leading the individual to recall only the general similarities common to these memories. Ultimately proper recall for a desired target memory fails due to the interference of non-target memories that are activated because of their similarity.

and the control of recollection. Memory 4:359–411</ref> When there is little available distinctive information for a given episode there will be more overlap across multiple episodes, leading the individual to recall only the general similarities common to these memories. Ultimately proper recall for a desired target memory fails due to the interference of non-target memories that are activated because of their similarity.

Secondly, a large number of errors that occur during memory reconstruction are caused by faults in the criterion-setting and decision making processes used to direct attention towards retrieving a specific target memory. When there are lapses in recall of aspects of an episodic memory, the individual tends to supplement other aspects of knowledge that are unrelated to the actual episode in order to form a more cohesive and well-rounded reconstruction of the memory, regardless of whether or not the individual is aware of such supplemental processing. This process is known as [[confabulation]]. All of the supplemental processes occurring during the course of reconstruction rely on the use of schema, information networks that organize and store abstract knowledge in the brain.

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====Cross-race effect====

Reconstructing the face of another race requires the use of schemas that may not be as developed and refined as those of the same race.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Pezdek | first1 = K. | last2 = Blandon-Gitlin | first2 = I. | last3 = Moore | first3 = C. | year = 2003 | title = Children's Face Recognition Memory: More Evidence for the Cross-Race Effect | url = http://infantlab.fiu.edu/Articles/Pedzke%20et%20al%202003.pdf | journal = Journal of Applied Psychology | volume = 88 | issue = 4| pages = 760–763 | doi=10.1037/0021-9010.88.4.760| citeseerx = 10.1.1.365.6517 | pmid = 12940414 }}</ref> The [[cross-race effect]] is the tendency that people have to distinguish among other of their race than of other races. Although the exact cause of the effect is unknown, there are two main theories that are supported. The perceptual expertise hypothesis postulates that because most people are raised and are more likely to associate with others of the same race, they develop an expertise in identifying the faces of that race. The other main theory is the in-group advantage. It has been shown in the lab that people are better at discriminating the emotions of in-group members than those of out-groups.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Elfenbein | first1 = H. A. | last2 = Ambady | first2 = N. | year = 2003 | title = When familiarity breeds accuracy: Cultural exposure and facial emotion recognition | url = | journal = Journal of Personality and Social Psychology | volume = 85 | issue = 2| pages = 276–290 | doi=10.1037/0022-3514.85.2.276| citeseerx = 10.1.1.200.1256 }}</ref>

====Leading questions====