Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources: Difference between revisions
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The '''Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources''' ('''CAMPFIRE''') is a [[Zimbabwe]]an [[Natural resource management#Regional or Community Based NRM|community-based natural resource management]] program. It is one of the first programs to consider wildlife as renewable natural resources, while addressing the allocation of its ownership to indigenous peoples in and around conservation protected areas.{{sfn|Satchel|1996}}
== Background ==
CAMPFIRE was initiated in 1989 by the Zimbabwean government as a program to support community-led development and sustainable use of natural resources.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Frost|first=Bond|last2=Bond|first2=Ivan|date=2008|title=The CAMPFIRE Programme in Zimbabwe: Payment for Wildlife Services|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/222401703|journal=Ecological Economics|volume=65|issue=4|pages=776–87|via=Research Gate|doi=10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.09.018}}</ref> The 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act set the legal basis for CAMPFIRE by allowing communities and private landowners to use wildlife on their land, marking a substantial shift from colonial policy that made it illegal for local populations to utilize wildlife in any way.<ref name=":6">{{Cite journal|last=Vorlaufer|first=Karl|date=2002|title=CAMPFIRE-The Political Ecology of Poverty Alleviation, Wildlife Utilisation and Biodiversity Conservation in Zimbabwe|url=|journal=Erdunke|volume=56|pages=184–206|via=}}</ref>
Population pressures in Zimbabwe have led to people living in communal lands, much of which is arid and unsuitable for agricultural farming.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal|last=Murindagomo|first=Felix|date=1990|title=Zimbabwe: WINDFALL and CAMPFIRE|url=|journal=Living with Wildlife: Resource Management with Local Participation in Africa|volume=|pages=123–140|via=}}</ref> CAMPFIRE would allow individuals to earn income on these communal lands through sustainable use of the environment and wildlife.<ref name=":3" /> CAMPFIRE is managed through Rural District Councils (RDCs) who distribute contracts for safari hunting and tourism and allocate revenue to local wards.<ref name=":0" /> Poaching was to be suppressed by the people in these hunting areas.<ref>Ceballos, G.; Ehrlich, A. H.; Ehrlich, P. R. (2015). ''The Annihilation of Nature: Human Extinction of Birds and Mammals''. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 170 - 172. {{ISBN|1421417189}} - via open edition.</ref> While some endangered animals were killed, the program aimed at supporting these populations in the long run by managing hunting, decreasing illegal poaching, and strengthening the economic prospects of the community through environmental protection and revenue generation.
The US federal government has supported CAMPFIRE, principally through the United States Agency for International Development, or [[USAID]]. CAMPFIRE received $7.6 million initially and $20.5 million in 1994 from USAID.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Hasler|first=Richard|date=|title=An Overview of the Social, Ecological and Economic Achievements and Challenges of Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE programme|url=http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/7796IIED.pdf|journal=Evaluating Eden Series Discussion Paper No 3|volume=|pages=1–22|via=}}</ref> USAID did not renew its funding once their commitment ended in 2000.<ref name=":1" />
== Results ==
CAMPFIRE has been implemented widely across Zimbabwe, encompassing 36 of Zimbabwe's 57 districts.<ref name=":1" /> CAMPFIRE earns revenue through safari hunting, the sale of animal products, and tourism contracts.<ref name=":0" /> During 1989–2001, CAMPFIRE generated over US$20 million of transfers to the participating communities, with 89% of revenue being generated through safari hunting.<ref name=":0" /> Twelve of the 37 districts with authority to market wildlife produced 97% of all CAMPFIRE revenues, reflecting the variability in wildlife resources and local institutional arrangements.<ref name=":0" />
=== Benefits to Households ===
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Communities also receive indirect benefits through community projects, such as the construction of schools, clinics, grinding mills, or prospects for additional income through employment as a game monitor or a related job.<ref name=":4" /> Depending on wildlife population density, some wards have diversified their revenue streams. For instance, the Mahenye ward had no elephants or large wildlife immediately around its district and opened game-viewing lodges to generate revenue in place of hunting contracts.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|last=Balint|first=Peter|date=2009|title=CAMPFIRE During Zimbabwe's National Crisis: Local Impacts and Broader Implications for Community-Based Wildlife Management|journal=Society and Natural Resources|volume=21|issue=9|pages=783–796|doi=10.1080/08941920701681961}}</ref> Wards with higher per household revenue have encouraged immigration in order to increase population density in a way that would warrant the development of roads, schools, and other infrastructure suited for high population densities.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Murombedzi|first=James C.|date=1999|title=Devolution and Stewardship in Zimbabwe's Campfire Programme|url=http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.libproxy.berkeley.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=74753b83-a94d-42fd-840d-b2cf1d23f9d8%40sessionmgr4006|journal=Journal of International Development|volume=11|issue=2|pages=287–293|via=|doi=10.1002/(SICI)1099-1328(199903/04)11:2<287::AID-JID584>3.0.CO;2-M}}</ref>
=== Wildlife and Land Management ===
Environmental benefits have been witnessed since CAMPFIRE's inception; elephant numbers have increased, buffalo numbers are either stable or witnessing a slight decrease, and habitat loss has diminished, and in certain regions, even reversed.<ref name=":1" /> Between 1980 and 2000, wildlife management as a percent of total land in Zimbabwe increased by 21%.<ref name=":1" /> Because rural district councils have an incentive to maintain revenue streams, hunting laws are heavily enforced and instances of illegal poaching have decreased.<ref name=":5" />
As a result of CAMPFIRE, wildlife monitoring has increased but remains inconsistent and focused on large species, such as elephants.<ref name=":1" /> CAMPFIRE manages wildlife populations by maintaining a certain agreed upon hunting quota; the quotas take both species endangerment and sex ratios into account to maintain wildlife populations, since hunters tend to selectively hunt male animals for sport.<ref name=":6" /> CAMPFIRE has experimented with moving wildlife populations to different wards to benefit communities with lower populations and reduce wildlife competition within certain areas.<ref name=":6" />
Because benefits were clearly linked to wildlife, CAMPFIRE helped to develop positive attitudes surrounding animal conservation; in districts, celebrations around the opening of grinding mills and other community projects would be accompanied by performances with animal costumes.<ref name=":4" /> Villagers are more likely to report neighbors for illegal poaching activity.<ref name=":5" /> Surveys have found that public awareness campaigns funded by CAMPFIRE revenues have been effective in reducing harmful community behavior, such as indiscriminate tree cutting and damaging fishing techniques.
== Criticisms ==
The sustainability of protecting wildlife is contingent upon market demand for safaris, hunting, and other wildlife commodities.
Following Zimbabwe's economic downturn in the 2000s, CAMPFIRE experienced a greater degree of elite capture, with villagers reporting that council positions and CAMPFIRE-related employment opportunities being held by friends and family members of sitting councillors.<ref name=":5" /> RDCs have retained an increasing percentage of CAMPFIRE revenues and are criticized for being unresponsive to local concerns.<ref name=":3" /> In some areas, the communal projects are initiated but are not sustained, while the income from CAMPFIRE revenues is insufficient to substitute agricultural income.<ref name=":2" />
Villagers express concern that wildlife protection supersedes their own safety and livelihood strategies. Some wards have restricted immigration, settlement expansion, and the use of natural resources.<ref name=":0" /> Physical restrictions on land expansion bar villagers from accessing more fertile land.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Alexander|first=Jocelyn|date=2002|title=Wildlife and politics: CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe|url=|journal=Development and Change|volume=31|issue=3|pages=605–627|via=|doi=10.1111/1467-7660.00169}}</ref> Villagers have expressed that wildlife presents safety concerns for themselves, crops, and livestock.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal|last=Harrison|first=Elizabeth P.|date=2015|title=Impacts of natural resource management programmes on rural livelihoods in Zimbabwe - the ongoing legacies of CAMPFIRE|url=https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2015/Harrison_PSA2015_Paper_Livelihoods.pdf|journal=Pacific Sociological Association Conference|volume=|pages=1–31|via=}}</ref>
==See also==
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