The security vulnerability may affect millions of Apple, Linux and Windows computers, as well as any computers manufactured before 2019, and some after that.<ref name="WRD-20200510" /><ref name="FRBS-20200511" /><ref name="TSY-2020" /> However, this impact is restricted mainly due to how precise a bad actor would be to execute the attack. Physical access to a machine with a vulnerable Thunderbolt controller is necessary, as well as a writable ROM chip for the Thunderbolt controller's firmware. Since ROM chips can come in a BGA format, this isn't always possible. Additionally, part of Thunderspy, specifically the portion involving re-writing of the firmware of the controller, requires the device to be in sleep, or at least in some sort of powered-on state to be effective. As some business machines feature intrusion detection features that cause the machine to power down the moment the back cover is removed, this attack is almost impossible on secured systems.
== Mitigation ==
The researchersResearchers claim there is no easy software solution, and may only be mitigated by disabling the Thunderbolt port altogether.<ref name="WRD-20200510" /> However, the impacts of this attack (reading kernel level memory without the machine needing to be powered off) are largely mitigated by anti-intrusion features provided by many business machines. Enabling such features would restrict this attacks effectiveness substancially.
