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Alter: template type. Add: s2cid, isbn, pages, journal, author pars. 1-1. Removed parameters. Formatted dashes. Some additions/deletions were actually parameter name changes. Upgrade ISBN10 to ISBN13. | You can use this bot yourself. Report bugs here. | Suggested by AManWithNoPlan | All pages linked from cached copy of User:AManWithNoPlan/sandbox2 | via #UCB_webform_linked 2945/3332
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| url=https://www.usenix.org/conference/fast-05/tocttou-vulnerabilities-unix-style-file-systems-anatomical-study
| title=TOCTTOU Vulnerabilities in UNIX-Style File Systems: An Anatomical Study
| lastlast1=Wei
| firstfirst1=Jinpeng
| last2=Pu
| first2=Calton
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| url-status=dead
| archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20170213004928/http://www.employees.org/~satch/ssh/faq/TheWholeSSHFAQ.html
| archivedate=2017-02-13 }}</ref> They remain a problem in modern systems; as of 2019, a TOCTOU race condition in [[Docker (software)|Docker]] allows root access to the filesystem of the host platform.<ref>{{Cite weweb
| url=https://duo.com/decipher/docker-bug-allows-root-access-to-host-file-system
| title=Docker Bug Allows Root Access to Host File System
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| volume=14
| pages=303–314
| citeseerx=10.1.1.117.7757 }}</ref> and algorithmic complexity attacks.<ref>{{cite webjournal
| author1=Xiang Cai
| author2=Yuwei Gui
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| first3=Rob
| title=Exploiting Unix File-System Races via Algorithmic Complexity Attacks
| workjournal=Proceedings of the [[IEEE]] Symposium on Security and Privacy
| url=https://www3.cs.stonybrook.edu/~rob/papers/races2.pdf
| ___location=Berkeley, CA
| date=May 2009
| pages=27–41
| doi=10.1109/SP.2009.10
| isbn=978-0-7695-3633-0
| s2cid=6393789
}}</ref> In both cases, the attacker manipulates the OS state to control scheduling of the victim.