Wikipedia

Sino-Indian War

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Traing (talk | contribs) at 07:31, 16 April 2007 (→1967 Sino-Indian skirmishes: wrong dates presented). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

The Sino-Indian War (Hindi: भारत-चीन युद्ध Bhārat-Chīn Yuddha; Simplified Chinese: 中印边境战争; Traditional Chinese: 中印邊境戰爭; pinyin: Zhōng-Yìn Biānjìng Zhànzhēng), also known as the Sino-Indian Border Conflict, began on 10 October 1962 and was a conflict between the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the Military of India. The cause of the war was a dispute over the Himalayan border in Arunachal Pradesh (which is called South Tibet in China) between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of India. The first heavy fighting of the war was triggered by a Chinese attack on an Indian patrol north of the McMahon Line.[5] Another battlefield was Aksai Chin, which was claimed to be strategic for the PRC, as it enabled a western connection (China National Highway G219) between the Chinese-administered territories of Tibet and Xinjiang. The war ended when the Chinese unilaterally declared a ceasefire on 20 November 1962, to go into effect at 00:00 21 November 1962, after capturing both disputed areas.

Sino-Indian War

The Sino-Indian War occurred between the two Asian giants, China and India.
DateOctober 10 — November 21, 1962[1]
Location
Northeast Frontier Agency and Aksai Chin
Result China holds Aksai Chin and withdraws from the North East Frontier Agency
Belligerents
People's Republic of China India
Commanders and leaders
Zhang Guohua[2] B.M. Kaul
Strength
80,000[3][4]
Casualties and losses
Never released[5]
none captured[6][7][8]		 Killed 1,383
Captured 3,968
Missing 1,696[5]

The Sino-Indian War is one of the largest military conflicts fought at such a high altitude and an example of mountain warfare, with combat taking place at over 4267 metres, or 14,000 feet.[5] Another high-altitude conflict was the Kargil War of 1999. This presented numerous logistical problems for the participating militaries. The conflict led to numerous changes in the Indian military to prepare it for similar conflicts in the future. It also placed pressure on Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru who was blamed for not anticipating Chinese invasion.

Location

The war occurred in the North East Frontier Agency region and the Aksai Chin region. The battles were at extremely high altitudes of the Himalayas and some of the battles involved numerous mountainous maneuvors. These particular regions were chosen for invasion mainly because of the border disputes and the Tibetan influence over the region. After the first unexpected Chinese offensive, they could hold numerous high mountainous regions which would be difficult to recapture. attack to dislodge the enemy and reclaim high ground in a mountain warfare would require a far higher ratio of attackers to defenders, which is further exacerbated by the high altitude and freezing temperatures.

Background

Main articles: Sino-Indian relations and McMahon Line

Origins of the border dispute

Sovereignty over two separated pieces of territory was contested during the Sino-Indian War. One is Aksai Chin is located either in the Indian province of Kashmir or the Chinese province of Xinjiang (East Turkestan) in the west. It is a virtually uninhabited high-altitude wasteland crossed by the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway. The other disputed area lies to the east is referred to as Arunachal Pradesh by India and South Tibet by China. It is a sparsely inhabited area with numerous local tribes.

The Johnson Line

One of the earliest treaties regarding the boundaries in the western sector was issued in 1842. The Sikh Confederacy of the Punjab region in India had annexed Ladakh into the state of Jammu in 1834. In 1841, they invaded Tibet with an army. Chinese forces defeated the Sikh army and in turn entered Ladakh and besieged Leh. After being checked by the Sikh forces, the Chinese and the Sikhs signed a treaty in September 1942, which stipulated no transgressions or interference in the other country's frontiers.[9] The British defeat of the Sikhs in 1846 resulted in transfer of sovereignty over Ladakh to the British, and British commissioners attempted to meet with Chinese officials to discuss the the border they now shared. However, both sides were apparently sufficiently satisfied that a traditional border was recognized and defined by natural delements, and the border was not demarcated.[9] The boundaries at the two extremities, Pangong Lake and Karakoram Pass, were well-defined, but the Aksai Chin area in between lay undefined.[7]

W. H. Johnson, a civil servant with the Survey of India proposed the "Johnson Line" (also known as the "Johnson-Ardagh Line") in 1865, which puts Aksai Chin in Kashmir.[10] This line was never presented to the Chinese[10]. Johnson presented this line to the Maharaja of Kashmir, who then claimed the 18,000 square kilometres contained within.[10] The British government had some doubts on the validity of the Johnson Line[5][10] and Johnson was censured[11], but the Chinese had already Shahidulla in 1890 before the issue was decided[10]. By 1892, China had erected boundary markets at Karakoram Pass.[5]

At this time, Britain and China were allies and Britain was principally concerned that Aksai Chin not fall into Russian hands.[10] When China showed an interest in Aksai Chin, Britain proposed a revised boundary, called the MacCartney-Macdonald Line, which puts most of Aksai Chin in Chinese territory.[10]. This border, which set the border along the Karakoram Mountains, was proposed and supported by British officials for a number of reasons. The Karakoram Mountains formed a natural boundary, which would set the British borders up to the Indus River watershed while leaving the Tarim River watershed in Chinese control, and Chinese control of this tract would present a further obstacle to Russian advance in Central Asia.[11] In 1899, the British presented this line to the Chinese, who raised no objection to it.[10] This line is approximately the same as the current Line of Actual Control.[10] Both lines were used on British maps of India.[10]

In 1911, the Xinhai Revolution resulted in the collapse of central power in China, and by the end of World War I, the British officially used the Johnson Line, although they took no steps to establish outposts or assert actual control on the ground[5]. In 1927, the line was adjusted again as the government of British Indian abandoned the Johnson line in favor of a line along the Karakoram range further south.[5] However, the maps were not updated and still showed the Johnson Line[5].

When British officials learned of Soviet officials surveying the Aksai Chin for Sheng Shicai, warlord of Xinjiang in 1940-1941, they again advocated the Johnson Line.[10] At this point the British had still made no attempts to establish outposts or control over the Aksai Chin, nor was the issue ever discussed with the governments of China or Tibet, and the boundary remained undemarcated at India's independence[5][10]. Upon independence in 1947, the government of India used the Johnson Line as its official boundary in the west, which included the Aksai Chin[5]

In July 1, 1954 Prime Minister Nehru wrote a memo directing that the maps of India be revised to show definite boundaries on all frontiers. Up to this point, the boundary in the Aksai Chin sector, based on the Johnson Line, had been described as "undemarcated."[11]

During the 1950s, the People's Republic of China built a 1,200 km (750 mi) road connecting Xinjiang and western Tibet, of which 179 km (112 mi) ran south of the Johnson Line through the Aksai Chin region claimed by India.[10][5][12] Aksai Chin was easily accessible to the Chinese, but was more difficult for the Indians on the other side of the Karakorams to reach[7]. The Indians did not learn of the existence of the road until 1957, which was confirmed when the road was shown in Chinese maps published in 1958[2].

The Indian position, as stated by prime minister, Jawalharlal Nehru was that the Aksai Chin was "part of the Ladakh region of India for centuries" and that this northern border was a "firm and definite one which was not open to discussion with anybody".[7]

The Chinese minister, Zhou Enlai argued that the western border had never been deliminted, that the MacCartney-Macdonald Line, which left the Aksai Chin within Chinese borders was the only line ever proposed to a Chinese government, and that the Aksai Chin was already under Chinese jurisdiction, and that negotiations should take into account the status quo.[7]

The McMahon Line

In 1913-14, representatives of Britain, China, and Tibet attended a conference in Simla, India and drew up an agreement concerning Tibet's status and borders. The McMahon Line, a proposed boundary between Tibet and India for the eastern sector, was drawn by British negotiator Henry McMahon on a map attached to the agreement. All three representatives initialed the agreement, but Beijing immediately objected to the proposed Sino-Tibet boundary and repudiated the agreement. After approving a note which stated that China could not enjoy rights under the agreement unless she ratified it, the British and Tibetan negotiators signed the Simla Convention as a bilateral accord. Neville Maxwell states that McMahon had been instructed not to sign bilaterally with Tibetans if China refused, but he did so without the Chinese representative present and then kept the declaration secret.[13]

V.K. Singh argues that the basis of these boundaries, accepted by British India and Tibet, were that the historical boundaries of India were the Himalayas and the areas south of the Himalayas were traditionally Indian and associated with India.[14] The high watershed of the Himalayas was proposed as the border between India and it's northern neighbours.[14] India's government held the view that the Himalayas were the ancient boundaries of the Indian subcontinent and thus should be the modern boundaries of British India and later the Republic of India.[14]

Chinese boundary markers, including one set up by the newly created Chinese republic, stood near Walong until January 1914, when T. O'Callaghan, assistant administrator of NEFA's eastern sector, relocated them them north to locations closer to the McMahon Line (albeit still South of the Line)[5]. He then went to Rima, met with Tibetan officials, and saw no Chinese influence in the area.[5]

By signing the Simla Agreement with Tibet, the British had violated the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, in which both parties were not to negotiate with Tibet, "except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government", as well as the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, which bound the British government "not to annex Tibetan territory."[15] Because of doubts concerning the legal status of the accord, the British did not put the McMahon Line on their maps until 1937, nor did they publish the Simla Convention in the treaty record until 1938. Rejecting Tibet's 1913 declaration of independence, China argued that the Simla Convention and McMahon Line were illegal and that Tibetan government was merely a local government without treaty-making powers. In 1947, Tibet requested that India recognize Tibetan authority in the trading town of Tawang, south of the McMahon Line. Tibet did not object to any other portion of the McMahon line. In reply, the Indians asked Tibet to continue the relationship on the basis of the previous British Government.[13]

Tibetan officials continued to administer Tawang and refused to concede territory during negotiations in 1938[5]. The governor of Assam assserted that Tawang was "undoubtedly British" but noted that it was "controlled by Tibet, and none of its inhabitants have any idea that they are not Tibetan."[5] During World War II, with India's east threatened by Japanese troops and with the threat of Chinese expansionism, British troops secured Tawang for extra defense.[5]

China's claim on areas south of the McMahon Line, encompassed in the North East Frontier Agency, were based on traditional boundaries.[14] India believes that the boundaries China proposed in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh have no written basis and no documentation of acceptance by anyone apart from China.[14] China claims the territory on the basis that it was under Chinese imperial control in the past.[14] The last Qing emperor's 1912 edict of abdication authorized its succeeding republican government to form a union of "five peoples, namely, Manchus, Chinese, Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans together with their territory in its integrity"[16] However, V.K. Singh cites the presence of the Mauryan Empire and Chola Dynasty in regions India does not place a claim to but which were heavily influenced by Indian culture.[14]

Tibet controversy

Numerous changes occurred in the late 1940s. With the creation of the Republic of India and the separate Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1947, and the establishment of the People's Republic of China in China in 1949. After coming to power, the PRC announced that it's army would be occupying Tibet.[10] India sent a letter of protest to China proposing negotations on the Tibet issue.[10] The newly formed PRC was more active in posting troops to the Aksai Chin border than the newly formed Indian republic was. By 1951, China had extened numerous posts within Indian claimed territory in Aksai Chin.[10] The Indian government, on the other hand, concentrated it's military efforts on stopping Ladakh from being taken by Pakistani troops and did not establish itself in Aksai Chin.[14]

The Chinese Communists defeated the Tibetan army in a battle at Chamdo in 1950 and Lhasa recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet in 1951. The Indian army asserted control of Tawang at this time, overcoming some armed resistance and expelling its Tibetan administrators.[13][17] In 1954, the China and India concluded the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence under which India acknowledged Chinese sovereignty in Tibet. Indian negotiators presented a frontier map to the Chinese that included the McMahon Line and the Chinese side did not object. At this time, the Indian government under Prime Minister Nehru promoted the slogan Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (India and China are brothers).

In July 1, 1954 Nehru wrote a memo directing that the maps of India be revised to show definite boundaries on all frontiers. [11] The new maps also revised the boundary in the east to show the Himalayan hill crest as the boundary. In some places, this line is a few kilometers north of the McMahon Line.[18] Beginning in 1956, the CIA used Indian territory to recruit Tibetan guerrillas to fight Chinese troops, with a base in Kalimpong, India.[19] The Indian public was outraged when it learned in 1958 that China had built a road between Xinjiang and Tibet through Indian-claimed territory in Aksai Chin.

Tibet disagreements were a major reason for the Sino-Indian conflict.[2] According to John W. Garver, Nehru's policy on Tibet was to create a strong Sino-Indian partnership which would be catalyzed through agreement and compromise on Tibet.[2] Garver believes that Nehru's previous actions (befriending China on such issues as war in Korea, the PRC’s U.N. admission, the peace treaty with Japan and transfer of Taiwan to the PRC, Indochina, and decolonization and the Afro-Asian movement) had given Nehru a confidence that China would be ready to form an "Asian Axis" with India.[2] Much misunderstanding between the two nations led to diplomatic spats over Tibet, with Nehru's move to accommodate the Dalai Lama overshadowing his other actions and opinions on Tibet, including the opinion that an armed resistance movement in Tibet would be suicidal and counterproductive.[2] While China treated India's concerns with Tibet as expansionist, India's concerns were in fact sentimental and culturally-linked, as Buddhist Tibet had been under influence of Indian culture for many years.[2]

Top leader Mao Zedong was humiliated by the reception the Dalai Lama obtained in India when he fled there in March 1959.[2] The Tibet disagreements heightened in the Chinese media, with Mao himself asking Xinhua News Agency on 19 April to produce commentary on unknown Indian expansionists operating in Tibet.[2] Mao decided on April 25 to openly criticize Nehru for his Tibet policy:

"be sharp, don't fear to irritate him [Nehru], don't fear to cause him trouble. Nehru miscalculated the situation believing that China could not suppress the rebellion in Tibet and would have to beg India's help. -- Mao Zedong addressing a Politburo Standing Committee[2]

Tensions steadily increased between the two nations when Mao implied that the Lhasa rebellion in Tibet was caused by Indians.[2] On 6 May 1959, Mao published "The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy" where he accused Nehru of openly encouraging Tibetan rebels.[2] This publication was evident of China's perception of India has a threat to it's rule of Tibet, which became an underlying reason for triggering the Sino-Indian War.[2] India had become the imperialist enemy, with Nehru and his "big bourgeoisie" striving to "prevent China from exercising full sovereignty over its territory of Tibet" to form of a buffer zone.[2] On the same day, Zhou Enlai lashed out at Nehru's "class nature".[2]

"Nehru and people from the Indian upper class oppose reform in Tibet, even to the extent of saying that reform is impossible...[They want] Tibet to remain for a long time in a

backward state, becoming a 'buffer state' between China and India. This is their

guiding mentality, and also the center of the Sino-Indian conflict. -- Zhou Enlai[2]

In August 1959, the Chinese army took an Indian patrol prisoner at Longju, which falls north of the McMahon Line coordinates drawn on the Simla Treaty map (27°44’30’’N), but claimed by India to on the McMahon Line.[18][20][5][10] There was another bloody clash in October at Kongka Pass in Aksai Chin in which 9 Indian frontier policemen were killed.[10] Recognizing that it was not ready for war, the Indian Army assumed responsibility for the border and pulled back patrols from disputed areas.

On October 2, Nikita Khrushchev defending Nehru in a meeting with Mao.[2] The Soviet Union's siding with Nehru, as well as the United States' influence in the region, gave China the belief that it was surrounded by enemy forces.[2] On 16 October, General Lei Yingfu reported on Indian expansionism on the Thagla Ridge.[2] On 18 October, the Chinese government approved the PLA's plan of a "self-defensive counterattack" against India because of its actions in Tibet.[2]

However, Mao decided against further escalation because he feared (correctly) that India would retaliate by permitting the U.S. to station U-2 surveillance aircraft on its territory.[21] This would allow the CIA to photograph China's nuclear test site at Lop Nor in Xinjiang.[21] A few days after Kongka Pass, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai proposed that each side withdraw 20 kilometers from a "Line of Actual Control". He defined this line as "the so-called McMahon Line in the east and the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west".[11] Nehru responded with a proposal to turn the disputed area into a no man's land.[22]

Chinese studies of the 1990s still maintain that India was planning aggression in Tibet.[2] Most Chinese scholars agree that the root cause of the war was India's plan to seize Tibet and turn it into a protectorate or colony of India.[2] The official Chinese history of the war states that Nehru was planning to create a "great Indian empire".[2] It was also insisted that there were right wing nationalist forces that influenced Nehru to pursue the goal of controlling Tibet.[2] Zhao Weiwen, of the Chinese Ministry of State and Security, places emphasis on Nehru's "dark mentality".[2]

China's policy on Tibet did much to heighten the conflict and tensions between the two nations.[2] The perceptions of India as a capitalist expansionist body intent on the independence of Tibet to create a buffer zone between India proper and China was fundamentally erroneous.[2] The negative rhetoric led to what Zhou himself called the Sino-Indian conflict.[2] Because of these false fears, China treated the Indian Forward Policy of the 1960s, which India admits as a fundamental mistake,[14] as the beginning of Indian expansionism into Tibet.[2]

Events leading up to war

Negotiations fail

China's 1958 maps showed the large strip of land between Ladakh and Bhutan (the Aksai Chin) as Chinese.[14] In 1960, Zhou Enlai proposed that India drop its claim to Aksai Chin and China would withdraw its claims from NEFA.[2] According to John W. Garver, Zhou's propositions were unofficial and subtle.[2] Zhou consistently refused to accept the legitimacy of India's territorial claims; he proposed that the any negotiations had to take into account the the actual facts on the ground.[5] Zhou tried many times to get Nehru to accept conceding Aksai Chin, he visited India 4 times in 1960.[2] However, Nehru believed that China did not have a legitimate claim over both of those territories and was not ready to give away any one of them.[2] However, they had different opinions as to the legality of the Simla agreement which eventually led to the inability to reach a decision.[2] Nehru's adamance was seen within China as Indian opposition to Chinese rule in Tibet, as China needed the highway through Askai Chin to maintain an effective control over the Tibetan plateau.[2]

According to Neville Maxwell, Nehru wasn't ready to simply concede the territory and leave negotiations at that.[13] He was open to continued negotiations, but did not accept the idea of Indian troops withdrawing from their claimed regions. Nehru staed "We will negotiate and negotiate and negotiate to the bitter end. I absolutely reject the approach of stopping negotiations at any state."[13] Nehru stated He remained firm that there would be no boundary negotiations until Chinese troops withdrew from Aksai Chin and areas south of the British McMahon Line.[5][7] This was unacceptable to the Chinese, which never recognized the legal validity of the McMahon Line.[5][7] Nehru stated "We will never compromise on our boundaries, but we are prepared to consider minor adjustments to them and to talk to the other side about them." In light of these comments, the international community rallied behind Nehru in claiming that China was at fault in failing to conduct proper negotiations.[13] Maxwell argues that Nehru's words were ambiguous.[13]

According to the official Indian history:

“Nehru did not agree to barter away the Aksai Chin area, under illegal occupation of China, in return for China giving up its unreasonable claim to Indian territory south of the McMahon Line.”[2]

After the talks, India produced it's official reports on the talks and translated the Chinese report into English.[2] India believed it would improve a feeling of understanding between the nations.[2] China saw it as an unreasonable attempt by India to secure it's claim lines.[2] Nehru's adamance that China withdraw from Aksai Chin and thus abandon the highway was seen as further Indian attempts to undermine China's presence in Tibet.[2] According to John W. Garver, China reached the incorrect conclusion that Nehru was continuing his "grand plans in Tibet".[2]

The Forward Policy

At the beginning of 1961, Nehru appointed General B.M. Kaul army chief.[12] Kaul reorganized the general staff and removed the officers who had resisted the idea of patrolling in disputed areas, although Nehru still refused to increase military spending or otherwise prepare for war.[12] In the summer of 1961, China began patrolling along the McMahon Line. They entered parts of Indian administered regions and much angered the Indians in doing so.[5] The Chinese, however, did not believe they were intruding upon Indian territory.[5] In response the Indians launched a policy of creating outposts behind the Chinese troops so as to cut off their supplies and force their return to China.[5] According to the Home Minister in Delhi in February 4 1962:

"If the Chinese will not vacate the areas occupied by her, India will have to repeat what she did in Goa. She will certainly drive out the Chinese forces."[5]

This has been referred to as the "Forward Policy".[7][5][23][24][20][8] There were eventually 60 such outposts, including 43 north of the McMahon Line.[11][5]

Kaul was confident through previous diplomacy that the Chinese would not react with force.[7] According to the Indian Official History, Indian posts and Chinese posts were separated by a narrow stretch of land.[2] China had been steadily spreading into those lands and India reacted with the Forward Policy to demonstrate that those lands were not unoccupied.[2] He, of course, did not believe he was intruding on Chinese territory.[5] British author Neville Maxwell traces this confidence to Mullik, who was in regular contact with the CIA station chief in New Delhi.[12] Mullik may therefore have been aware of Mao's sensitivity concerning U-2 flights.

The initial reaction of the Chinese forces was to withdraw when Indian outposts advanced towards them.[2] However, this appeared to encourage the Indian forces to accelerate their Forward Policy even further.[2] In response, the Central Military Commission adopted a policy of "armed coexistence".[2] In response to Indian outposts encircling Chinese posistions, Chinese forces would build more outposts to counter-encircle these Indian posistions.[2] This pattern of encirclement and counter-encirclement resulted in an interlocking, chessboard-like deployment of Chinese and Indian forces.[2] Despite the leapfrogging encirclements by both sides, no hostile fire occurred from either side as troops from both sides were under orders to fire only in defense. On the situation, Mao Zedong commented,

Nehru wants to move forward and we won't let him. Originally, we tried to guard against this, but now it seems we cannot prevent it. If he wants to advance, we might as well adopt armed coexistence. You wave a gun, and I'll wave a gun. We'll stand face to face and can each practice our courage.[2].

Other developments

At a Communist Party conference in Beijing in January 1962, Chinese President Liu Shaoqi denounced the Great Leap Forward as responsible for widespread famine.[21] The overwhelming majority of delegates expressed agreement, but Defense Minister Lin Biao staunchly defended Mao.[21] A brief period of liberalization followed while Mao and Lin plotted a comeback.[21] Jung Chang writes that China began preparations for war with India in May or June.[21]

Epoch Times editorialist Ramkumar Srinivasan speculates that the real aim of China's decision for war with India was to overshadow the effects of the Great Leap Forward.[25] However, transcripts from the decision for war was not made by China's leaders until early October 6, 1962, and only then were war plans drawn by China's Central Military Commission.[2] Additionally, Roderik McFarquhar states, "In May-June 1962, the main concern in Beijing was over the threat of an invasion from Taiwan... Chinese leaders would have been reluctant to provoke hostilities in the Himalayas, which might have meant diverting military resources from the main danger point along the Fujian coast."[26]

The Indian military was not ready for any full-scale combat.[25] It has just annexed the Portuguese colony of Goa and was facing border disputes in Kashmir.[25] The Indian National Congress proposed non-violent means to solving India's problems at the time[25] and Indian military leaders who proposed that India should become ready for a full scale attack were ignored or dismissed.[5]

Early incidents

Various border conflicts and "military incidents" between India and China flared up throughout the summer and fall of 1962. According to Chinese sources, in June 1962, a minor skirmish broke out between the two sides, and the Chinese military suffered defeat with dozens of members of the People's Liberation Army killed and wounded. Units of the Indian and Chinese militaries maintained close contact throughout September 1962; however, hostile fire occurred only infrequently.

In May 2, 1962 the Directorate of Military Operations in India had suggested that the air force should be readied for use in NEFA and Ladakh.[27] The Air Force was considered a feasible way to repel the unbalanced ratio of Chinese troops to Indian troops.[27] The Chinese air force was assessed as only capable of limited strategic raids which could be countered by the Indian air force.[27]

In June, 1962, the Indian Intelligence Bureau received information about a Chinese military buildup along the border which could result in a war.[27] Information was also received that Pakistan was considering to attack simultaneously in the west.[27] Chinese airfields in Tibet and Yunnan were addressed as a threat to Indian cities, as the PLAAF could conduct heavy bombings through their use of Soviet aeroplanes.[27]

July 22, 1962 saw a change in the Forward Policy, according to the official Indian history of the war. While the Forward Policy was initially intended to prevent the Chinese from advancing into empty areas (by occupying them first), "it was now decided to push back the Chinese from posts they already occupied."[8] Whereas Indian troops were previously ordered to fire only in self-defense, all post commanders were now given discretion to open fire upon Chinese forces if threatened.[8]

In August, 1962, the Chinese military improved its combat readiness along the McMahon Line, particularly in the North East Frontier Agency, Tibet and Xinjiang. In Tibet, there were constructions of ammunition dumps and stockpiling of ammunition, weapons and gasoline, though there were no indications of a manpower buildup.[5] China's preparedness for war strongly contrasted with India's, which had largely neglected it's military throughout the 1950s.[5] Nehru believed that the Himalayas were a large enough defense against China, however, the Korean war had provided China with practice in mountain combat.[5] This neglect on behalf of India would decide numerous pivotal battles where logistical inadequacy and lack of leadership led to defeat after strong starts.[5]

Confrontation at Thag La

In June 1962, Indian forces had established an outpost at Dhola, on the southern slopes of Thag La Ridge, overlooking the village of Le in Tibet.[5][7]. Based on the treaty map of the 1914 Simla Convention, the McMahon Line lay at 27°44’30’’N[7][18]. However, Dhola post lay about one mile (1.6 km) north of the McMahon Line[7][5][28]. The Indian government maintained that the intention of the McMahon Line was to set the border along the highest ridges, and that the international border fell on the highest ridges of Thag La, about 3 to 4 miles (4.8 to 6.4 km) north of the line drawn by Henry McMahon on the treaty map.[7][18] Brigadier John Dalvi would later write of this claim: "The Chinese had raised a dispute about the exact alignment of the McMahon Line in the Thagla Ridge area. Therefore the Thagla-Dhola area was not strictly territory that 'we should have been convinced was ours' as directed by the Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, and someone is guilty of exceeding the limits prescribed by him."[20]

In August, China issued diplomatic protests which accused India of violating even the McMahon Line[5], and Chinese soldiers began occupying positions at the top of Thag La, north of Indian positions[2].

On September 8, 1962, a 60-strong PLA unit (which the Indian commander reported as 600)[5][7] descended from the heights and occupied positions which dominated one of the Indian posts at Dhola.[25] Neither side opened fire for 12 days.[2] Nehru had gone to London to attend a Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference and when told of the act, said to the media that the Indian Army had instructions to "free our territory".[25]

According to the official Indian history, a decision was made on September 9 to evict the Chinese from the southern part of the Thagla Ridge, by force, if necessary.[8] Two days later, it was decided that "all forward posts and patrols were given permission to fire on any armed Chinese who entered Indian territory".[8]

According to author Neville Maxwell, officers at the Indian Defense Ministry had expressed the concern that Indian maps showed Thag La as Chinese territory; they were told to ignore the maps[7]. However, Nehru's directives to Defense Minister V.K. Krishna Menon were unclear, and the response, code named Operation LEGHORN, got underway only slowly. As the Chinese numbers were exaggerated to 600 instead of about 50 or 60[5][7], the 9 Punjab battalion, numbering 400 riflemen, was sent to Dhola.[7][8]

By the time the Indian battalion reached the Thagla Ridge in the Chedong region on September 16, north of the McMahon Line,[5] Chinese units controlled both banks of the Namka Chu River. The day after, India's Chief of the Army Staff Kaul ordered his men to re-take the Thagla Ridge. According to the official Indian history, on September 20, Indian eastern command ordered all Indian posts and patrols to engage any Chinese patrols within range of their weapons.[8] On September 20, at one of the bridges on the river a firefight developed, killing nine Chinese and Indian soldiers. Skirmishes continued throughout September.[5]

On 3 October, Zhou Enlai visited Nehru in New Delhi, promising there would be no war between the nations and reiterating his wishes to solve the dispute diplomatically.[25]

On October 4, a special Border Command was created, under Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul,[5] tasked with evicting the Chinese from Dhola-Thagla[8] October 10 was the planned date for Operation Leghorn.[8] Because of the difficulties involved in directly assaulting and taking Thag La, Kaul made the decision instead to occupy nearby Yumtso La to the west, to position his troops behind and dominate the Chinese positions.[8]

Brigadier John Dalvi, tasked with taking Yumtso La, argued that he lacked necessary supplies and resources to take the pass.[5] On October 9th, Kaul and Brigadier Dalvi agreed to send a patrol of 50 soldiers to Tseng Jong, the approach to Yumtso La, to occupy the position and provide cover before the rest of the batallion would move forward for the occupation of Yumtso La.[8].[5][7]

On October 10, these 50 Indian troops were met by an emplaced Chinese position of some 1,000 soldiers.[5] The Chinese troops opened fire on the Indians believing that the Indians had intruded upon Chinese land. The Indians were surrounded by a Chinese positions which used mortar fire.[5] However, they managed to hold off the first Chinese assault, inflicting heavy casualties.[5] In the second assault, the Indians began their retreat, realising the situation was hopeless.[5] The Indian patrol suffered 25 casualties, with the Chinese suffering 33. The Chinese troops held their fire as the Indians retreated, and then buried the Indian dead with military honors, as witnessed by the retreating soldiers[5]. This was the first occurrence of heavy fighting in the war[5].

This attack had grave implications for India and Nehru tried to solve the issue, but by 18 October it was clear that the Chinese were preparing for an attack on India, with massive troop buildups on the border.[5]

File:62 war.jpg
An Indian soldier near the Chinese border on the cover of Life.

Preparations for War

Motives

One of the major factors leading up to China's eventual conflicts with India troops was India's stance on Tibet. There was "a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian efforts to undermine Chinese control of Tibet, Indian efforts which were perceived as having the objective of restoring the pre-1949 status quo ante of Tibet"[2] The other was "a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian aggression against Chinese territory along the border.[2] John W. Garver argues that the first perception was incorrect based on the state of the Indian military and polity in the 1960s, it was, nevertheless a major reason for China's going to war. However, he argues the second perception to be more justifiable.[2] Another factor which affected China's decision for war with India was a perceived need to stop a Soviet-US-India encirclement and isolation of China.[2] India's relations with the Soviet Union and United States were both strong at this time, but the Soviets were preoccupied by the Cuban Missile Crisis and would not interfere with the Sino-Indian War.[5]

Garver argues that one of the major factors leading to China's decision for war with India was a common tendency of humans "to attribute others behavior to interior motivations, while attributing their own behavior to situational factors."[2]. Studies from China published in the 1990s confirmed that the root cause for China going to war with India was the perceived aggression in Tibet, with the forward policy simply catalyzing the aggressive Chinese reaction.[2]

Neville Maxwell and Allen Whiting argue that the Chinese leadership believed they were defending territory they believed to be legitimately Chinese, and which was already under de facto Chinese occupation prior to Indian advances, and regarded the Forward Policy as an Indian attempt at creeping annexation.[2] Mao Zedong himself compared the Forward Policy to a strategic advance in Chinese chess:

Their [India's] continually pushing forward is like crossing the Chu Han boundary. What should we do? We can also set out a few pawns, on our side of the river. If they don't then cross over, that’s great. If they do cross, we'll eat them up [chess metaphor meaning to take the opponent's pieces]. Of course, we cannot blindly eat them. Lack of forbearance in small matters upsets great plans. We must pay attention to the situation.[2]

The motive for the Forward Policy was to cut off the supply routes for Chinese troops posted in NEFA and Aksai Chin.[5] According to the official Indian history, the forward policy was continued because of its initial success, as Chinese troops withdrew when they encountered areas already occupied by Indian troops.[8] The Forward Policy was having success in cutting out supply lines of Chinese troops who had advanced South of the McMahon Line. However, the Forward Policy rested on the assumption that Chinese forces "were not likely to use force against any of our posts, even if they were in a position to do so."[8] No serious reappraisal of this policy took place even when Chinese forced ceased withdrawing.[8]

By early 1962, the Chinese leadership began to fear that India's intentions were to launch a massive attack against Chinese troops, and that the Indian leadership wanted a war[5][2]. In 1961, the Indian army had been sent into Goa after Portugal refused to surrender the territory to India, reinforcing China's views of India being expansionistic, and in early 1962, the Indian Home Minister declared the intent to do the same with China:"If the Chinese will not vacate the areas occupied by her, India will have to repeat what she did in Goa. She will certainly drive out the Chinese forces."[5] By mid-1962, it was apparent to the Chinese leadership that negotiations had failed to make any progress, and the Forward Policy was increasingly perceived as a grave threat. Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi commented at one high-level meeting, "Nehru's forward policy is a knife. He wants to put it in our heart. We cannot close our eyes and await death."[2] The Chinese leadership believed that their restraint on the issue was being perceived by India as weakness, leading to continued provocations, and that a major counterblow was needed to stop perceived Indian aggression[2]

Xu Yan, prominent Chinese military historian and professor at the PLA's National Defense University, gives an account of the Chinese leadership's decision to go to war. By late September 1962, the Chinese leadership had begun to reconsider their policy of "armed coexistence", which had failed to address their concerns with the forward policy and Tibet, and consider a large, decisive strike.[2]

Epoch Times writer Ramkumar Srinivasan speculates that the real aim of the war was to create a distraction to cover the failures of the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s[25] It is suggested that Mao also wanted to propose Lin Bao with a decisive military defeat over India which would increase his popularity as well as that of the People's Liberation Army.[25]

Military planning

The Indian side was confident war would not be triggerred and made little preparations. India had only two divisions of troops in the region of the conflict.[29] In August 1962, Brigadier D.K. Palit claimed that a war with China in the near future could be ruled out.[29] Even in September 1962, when Indian troops were ordered to "expel the Chinese" from Thag La, Maj. General J.S. Dhillon expressed the opinion that "“experience in Ladakh had shown that a few rounds fired at the Chinese would cause them to run away."[2][8] Because of this, the Indian army was completely unprepared when the attack at Yumtso La occurred.[29][5]

On October 6, 1962, the Chinese leadership convened. Lin Biao reported that PLA intelligence units had determined that Indian units might assault Chinese positions at Thag La on October 10 (Operation Leghorn). The Chinese leadership and the Central Military Council decided upon war to launch a large-scale attack to punish perceived military aggression from India.[2] In Beijing, a larger meeting of Chinese military was convened in order to order to plan for the coming conflict[2]

The Mao and the Chinese leadership issued a directive laying out the objectives for the war. A main assault would be launched in the eastern sector, which would be coordinated with a smaller assault in the western sector. All Indian troops within China's claimed territories in the eastern sector would be expelled, and the war would be ended with a unilateral Chinese ceasefire and withdrawal to prewar positions, followed by a return to the negotiating table.[2]

Diplomatically, Mao acknowledged possible diplomatic isolation as the Soviet Union, the United States, the Republic of China and other "misinformed countries" would oppose China's actions. India led the Non-Aligned Movement, Nehru enjoyed international prestige, and China, with a larger military would be portrayed as an aggressor. However, he said that a well-fought war "will guarantee at least thirty years of peace" with India, and determined the benefits to offset the costs[2]

On October 8, additional veteran and high-quality divisions were ordered to prepare to move into Tibet from the Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions.[2]

Marshal Liu Bocheng headed a group to determine the strategy for the war. He concluded that the opposing Indian troops were among India's best, and to achieve victory would require deploying crack troops and relying on force concentration to achieve decisive victory. On October 16th, this war plan was approved, and on the 18th, the final approval was given by the Politburo for a "self defensive counter-attack", scheduled for October 20.[2]

Chinese offensive

On October 20, 1962, the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched two attacks, 1000 kilometers apart, in the Chip Chap valley in Ladakh and the Namka Chu river. Some skirmishes also took place in Sikkim, which India claimed as a protectorate, at the Nathula Pass. After four days of fierce fighting, the Chinese succeeded in securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory.

On the Namka Chu front, Indian forces expected Chinese forces to cross via one of five bridges and thus defended those crossings. Fearful of flanking attacks, Indian troops also occupied positions at Tsang Le, which were inside Bhutan; Indian forces were told to ignore the line and international boundary. However, Chinese forces avoided the crossings by fording the river. Quickly seizing Indian positions and cutting off telephone lines, they were able to take control of Tsangdhar and Hathung La and were in a position to cut off escape and possible resupply for the Indian forces. However, Chinese forces ignored Tsang Le, which was inside Bhutanese territory. Indian forces withdrew back towards Tawang.[5]

On the Aksai Chin front, the Chinese forces launched attacks in the Chip Chap Valley, Galwan Valley, and Pangong Lake, and overrunning small outposts and garrisons stationed on the frontier. After realizing the magnitude of the attack, Indian Western Command withdrew many of the isolated outposts to the southeast. Daulet Beg Oldi was also evacuated, but it was south of the Chinese claim line and was not approached by Chinese forces.[5]

 
The disputed areas in the western sector
 
The disputed areas in the eastern sector

On October 22 the PLA launched a mortar attack on Walong, on the McMahon line.[30] 400 troops proceeded to launch fire on the Assam rifles and Sikh regiment stationed there. After a day of constant fire, the PLA retreated, having suffered 200 casualties with the Indians suffering only 9.[30] Over the coming months, the Chinese made probing attacks but suffered 5 times the number of casualties as the Indians.[30]

Later on October 24, 120 officers and jawans of the Ahir Charlie Company of the 13 Kumaon Regiment were airlifted from Hyderabad to the Chushul sector.[31] They were deployed on the Rezang La Ridge to defend the highest air strip in the world located at 16,000 feet - in ambiguous territory - from impending Chinese takeover.[31] They were led by Major Shaitan Singh and were a small force called on to defend a stategically located air strip. Their actions in the battle against Chinese troops were appreciated by India as some of largest occurrences of bravery and valour in the war.[31] Despite being outnumbered they managed to inflict very heavy casualties (official figures were not released) and Shaitan Singh was awarded the Param Vir Chakra (India's highest military decoration) for his actions.[31]

Indian forces were hampered by their significant inferiority in numbers and lack of combat readiness. The Indian deployment covered a large area and Indian units required an airlift for more supplies. The Indian jawans were not effectively ready for such mountain conflict. Nonetheless, they generally fought bravely and professionally in the early phase of the war until their commanders were replaced on government orders.

Lull in the fighting

By October 24th, the PLA had entered territory previously administered by India to give the PRC a diplomatically strong position over India. The majority of Chinese forces had advanced sixteen kilometres south of the border.[5] Four days of fighting were followed a three-week lull. Zhou ordered the troops to stop advancing as he attempted to negotiate with Nehru. The Indian forces had retreated into more heavily fortified positions around Se La and Bombdi La which would be difficult to assault.[5] Zhou sent Nehru a letter, proposing

  1. A negotiated settlement of the boundary
  2. That both sides disengage and withdraw twenty kilometers from present lines of actual control
  3. A Chinese withdrawal north in NEFA
  4. That China and India not cross lines of pre-sent control in Aksai Chin.[5]

Nehru's October 27 reply expressed interest in the restoration of peace and friendly relations and suggested a return to the "boundary prior to 8 September 1962".[5] He was categorically concerned about a mutual twenty kilometer withdrawal after "40 or 60 kilometers of blatant military aggression".[5] Thus he wanted the withdrawal to be more safe and to stop the possibility of a repeat offensive. Zhou's November 4th reply repeated his 1950s offer to return to the McMahon Line in NEFA and the Chinese traditionally claimed MacDonald Line in Aksai Chin.[5] Facing Chinese forces maintaining themselves on Indian soil and trying to avoid political pressure, the Indian parliament announced a national emergency and passed a resolution which stated their intent to "drive out the aggressors from the sacred soil of India". The United States and the United Kingdom supported India's response, however the Soviet Union was preoccupied with the Cuban Missile Crisis and did not offer the support it had provided in previous years.[5] With the backing of other great powers, a November 14 letter by Nehru to Zhou once again rejected his proposal.[5]

Neither side declared war, used their air force, or fully broke off diplomatic relations; however, the conflict is commonly referred to as a war. This war coincided with the Cuban Missile Crisis and was viewed by the western nations at the time as another act of aggression by the Communist bloc.[32][5] The Chinese side, although in a militarily advantageous position, thus had strong strategic reasons to contain and conclude the conflict as quickly as possible.[citation needed]

Continuation of war

After Zhou received Nehru's letter of defiance, the war restarted. The fighting resumed on the eastern theater on November 14th (Nehru's birthday), with an Indian offensive launched from the defensive position of Se La. The Indian aim was to recapture a strategic mountain held by the Chinese. Initial fighting was successful, however the exhausted Indians stopped just 50 meters away from the crest.[5] In the night, during a break in the fighting, the Chinese launched a counteroffensive which followed the retreating Indians and penetrated their defensive positions.[5] Faced with no possibility of retreat, many Indians fought to the death and India suffered many casualties in this battle.[5] The Chinese resumed attacks on Aksai Chin and NEFA hours after the Walong battle.[5]

File:Sino-Indian War.png
The land in dispute

On the eastern theater, PLA forces attacked Indian forces near Se La and Bomdi La on November 17th, defended by the Indian 4th Division. Instead of attacking by road as expected, PLA forces forces approached via a mountain trail, and their attack cut off a main road and isolated 10,000 Indian troops. Nonetheless, the remaining division of Indians which coudl maintain a battle at the Bailey Trail fought for three hours and inflicted heavy Chinese casualties.[5] However, the orderly retreat was cut down into chaos and none of the Indians were seen until three weeks later.[5]

Chinese attacks at Se La were less successful, between dawn and midafternoon, the Chinese launched five assaults on Se La. However, the Indian battalion stationed there managed to use the height to their advantaged and repelled each of the five assaults.[5] However, the Chinese decided to instead attack vulnerable Thembang, which was a supply route to Se La.[5] The Indian forces were ordered to fight for as long as they see possible, as a retreat would be cut off by the Chinese.[5] The PLA forces in then ambushed 4th Division, which had no commander.[5]

On the western theater, PLA forces launched a heavy infantry attack on November 18th near Chushul. Continued fighting resulted in the repelling of the PLA forces, who were forced to then retreat from the frontal positions they had gained.[5] Five hours after the initial failure, PLA troops circled the Indians and managed to attack them from behind, resulting in quick defeat of the Indian forces.[5] Both sides suffered heavy casualties, with bodies being found in the ice, frozen with weapons in hand.[5] This signalled the end of the war in Aksai Chin as China had reached their claim line, many Indian troops were ordered to withdraw from the area China claimed so as to limit on the casualties of the war.[5]

The Chinese government claims the PLA penetrated close to the outskirts of Tezpur, Assam, a major frontier town nearly fifty kilometers from the Assam-North-East Frontier Agency border. On the evening of November 19, Nehru, made an appeal to the United States for armed aid, including airstrikes, if Chinese forces continued to advance, and air cover, in case of raids by the Chinese air force. With the Chinese outnumbering every Indian division and facing the idea of a bombing on Indian towns, the United States Navy sent an aircraft carrier to the Bay of Bengal due to reach there in late November.[5]

Ceasefire

File:Kashmir region-map 2004.jpg
The revised map of North-Western India following the Sino-Indian War, notice the now Chinese-administered Aksai Chin region.

Due either to logistical problems (according to official Indian accounts) or for political reasons, the PLA did not advance farther, and on November 19 it declared a unilateral cease-fire. Zhou Enlai declared a unilateral ceasefire to start on midnight, November 21. Zhou's ceasefire declaration stated,

Beginning from November 21, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will cease fire along the entire Sino-Indian border. Beginning from December 1st, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometers behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on November 7th, 1959. In the eastern sector, although the Chinese frontier guards have so far been fighting on Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line, they are prepared to withdraw from their present positions to the north of the illegal McMahon Line, and to withdraw twenty kilometers back from that line. In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw twenty kilometers from the line of actual control.

Zhou had first given the ceasefire announcement to Indian charge d'affaires on November 19, (before India's request for United States air support) but New Delhi did not receive it until 24 hours later.[5] The aircraft carrier was ordered back after the ceasefire and thus American intervention on India's side in the war was avoided.[5] Retreating Indian troops, who hadn't come into contact with anyone knowing of the ceasefire, and Chinese troops in NEFA and Aksai Chin, were involved in some minor battles[5] but for the most part the ceasefire signalled an end to the fighting. The United States Air Force flew in supplies to India in November 1962, but neither side wished to continue hostilities.

China kept the territory which they had affirmed total control of in Aksai Chin but returned all the territory captured from the North East Frontier Agency[5]. This boundary was the Line of Actual Control which Zhou had earlier proposed to Nehru.[5] According to VK Singh, China kept territory past their 1960 claim line.[14] Aksai Chin comprised 32% of territory fought over during the war.[5] China since withdrew its claim from part of NEFA (Assam).[33][34] Over the following months, vehicles and prisoners of war were returned by China unconditionally as a show of goodwill.[5] There was no prisoner exchange as no Chinese troops had been taken prisoner by India.[13]

Toward the end of the war India increased her support for Tibetan refugees and revolutionaries, some of them having settled in India, as they were fighting the same common enemy in the region. The Nehru administration ordered the raising of an elite Indian-trained "Tibetan Armed Force" composed of Tibetan refugees.[35] The CIA had already begun operations in bringing about change in Tibet.[2]

World opinion

The Chinese military action has been viewed by the United States as part of the PRC's policy making of using aggressive wars to settle its border disputes and to distract from its internal issues.[36]. According to James Calvin from the United States Marine Corps, western nations at the time viewed China as an aggressor during the China-India border war, and the war was part of a monolithic communist objective for a world dictatorship of the proletariat.[5] This was further triggered by Mao Zedong's views that: "The way to world conquest lies through Havana, Accra, and Calcutta."[5] Calvin believes that Chinese actions show a "pattern of conservative aims and limited objectives, rather than expansionism" and blames this particular conflict from India's provocations towards China.[5] However, Calvin also expresses that China, in the past, has been adamant to gain control over regions to which it has a "traditional claim", which triggerred the dispute over NEFA and Aksai Chin and indeed Tibet.[5]

The Kennedy administration was disturbed by what they considered blatant Chinese communist aggression against India. In a May 1963 NSC meeting, contingency planning on the part of the United States in the event of another Chinese attack on India was discussed. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor advised the president to use nuclear weapons should the Americans intervene in such a situation. Kennedy insisted that Washington defend India as it would any ally, saying, "We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India"[37] The Johnson Administration considered and then rejected giving nuclear weapons technology to the Indians.

Since then, the Chinese government have tried to reduce the negative light in which they were perceived as a communist aggressor. As for the causes of the war, Chinese Premier Zhou told President Nixon that China did not try and expel Indian troops from south of the McMahon line and that three open warning telegrams were sent to Nehru before the war. However, Indian patrols south of the McMahon line were expelled and suffered casualties in the Chinese attack.[38] Zhou also told Nixon that Chairman Mao ordered the troops to return to show good faith.[39] The Indian government maintains that the Chinese military could not advance further south due to logistical problems and the cut-off of resource supplies.

In 1972, Neville Maxwell an Austrilian journalist and historian, wrote a controversial book which was highly critical of Indian Government; titled "India's China War"; which was banned in India.[40] After reading the Maxwell book President Richard Nixon later adopted a more friendly attitude to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in relation to the war, which also related to China's economic rise.[41]

While Western nations did not view China favourable for this war,[5] Pakistan, which has a turbulent relationship with India after the Indian partition, improved it's relations with China after the war.[42] Mohammed Ali, External Affairs Minister of Pakistan, declared that massive Western aid to India in the Sino-Indian dispute would be considered an unfriendly act towards Pakistan. The following year, China and Pakistan peacefully settled disputes on their shared border, and negotiated the China-Pakistan Border Treaty in 1963, as well as trade, commercial, and barter treaties.[42] The border treaty largely set the border along the MacCartney-Macdonald Line[11] Because of India's failure against China, Pakistan triggered the Second Kashmir War with India.[5] In the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Pakistan expected China to provide military support, but it was left alone as India successfully conquered East Pakistan and founded the new nation-state of Bangladesh.[43]

Aftermath

China

According to the PLA's official military history, the war achieved China's policy objectives of defeating the Indian forces and securing peaceful borders in the western sector, as China retained de facto control of the Aksai Chin. After the war, India abandoned the Forward Policy, and the de facto borders stabilized along the Line of Actual Control.

The war was followed by a campaign praising the army called "learn from the People's Liberation Army." The campaign helped promote War Minister Lin Biao, Mao's favoured successor at the time.[25] Epoch Times writer Ramkumar Srinivasan speculates that the real aim of the war was to create a distraction to cover the failures of the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s[25] In relation to this, everything went to plan, with the tragedies of the Great Leap Forward overshadowed by a military victory.[25]

While the democratic process in India has allowed more scrutiny on the events leading to the war[citation needed], on the other hand, published scholarship in China is still expected to explain and justify, not to criticize, the decisions of the Chinese Communist Party, at least on such sensitive matters as war.[2] Chinese publications on the war themselves do not mention specific dates or events and use generalized terms.[2] The first book-length analysis of the war from China which was allowed to be sold was published in 1993.[2]

India

Indians reacted with an unprecedented surge of patriotism. Memorials were erected for many of the Indian troops who died while outnumbered in the war. The memorials say of the soldiers:

"How can a man die better than facing fearful odds
For the ashes of his fathers and the temples of his gods"[44]

The main lesson India learned was that India must strengthen its defences and stand on its own feet to be of consequence in the world. India could no longer blindly follow Nehru's trusting polemics of "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai" and non-violent peace. Because of India's inability to sense danger, Prime Minister Nehru faced harsh accusations from government officials, as he was the one who promoted good relations with China.[13] Indians in general became highly skeptical of China and it's military.[2] Indians view the war as a betrayal of India's attempts for long-standing peace with China.[2] The war also put an end to Nehru's earlier hopes that India and China would form a strong Asian Axis to counteract the increasing influence of the Cold War superpowers.[2]

The unpreparedness of the army was blamed on Defense Minister Menon, who retracted his government post to allow for someone who might modernize India's military further. India's policy of weaponisation via indigenous sources and self-sufficiency was thus cemented. Sensing a weakened army, Pakistan initiated the Second Kashmir War with India in 1965, however India was more decisive and strong in this war and cemented victory.[45] Two years later in 1967, there was a short border skirmish (dubbed "Chola Incident" by India) between PLA troops and Indian troops, which went more favourably for India.[46]

The Indian government commissioned an investigation, resulting in the classified Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report on the causes of the war and the reasons for failure. India's performance in high-altitude combat in 1962 led to an overhaul of the Indian Army in terms of doctrine, training, organization and equipment. By 1964, India's military manpower had doubled.[5] This was evidently successful, as India achieved military gains over Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1965, 1971 and 1999 and now maintains the third largest military in the world. After Indians began scrutinizing the reasons for their military being heavily outnumbered, Indian Defense Minister Menon resigned. Prime Minister Nehru also faced harsh accusations from government officials and members of the military.

India's military became increasingly well-trained and potent.[2] In the 1960s and 70s, India allied with Soviet Russia to encircle China.[2] The continued military modernisation in India led to a change in the military equation between the two countries, where India were earlier far outnumbered and lacked experience.[2] According to John W. Garver, the Indian military and Indian-trained Tibetan Armed Forces pose a modern threat to Tibet which would likely not be present had China not opted for war against India.[2]

1967 Sino-Indian skirmishes

Main articles: Chola incident and Naxalbari

In 1967, two skirmishes between the two sides occurred in Sikkim. The first one was dubbed the "Nathu La incident", the other the "Chola incident". Prior to these incidents had been the Naxalbari uprising in India by the Communist Naxalites and Maoists.[47]

On September 11 1967, troops of the 18th Rajput Regiment were protecting an Engineering Company that was fencing the North Shoulder of Nathula, when Chinese troops opened fire on them. There was firing between the Rajputs and Chinese for the next five days. 61 casualties (22 killed and the rest wounded) were the suffered by the Rajputs. Major Harbhajan Singh of the Rajput Regiment was awarded a MVC (posthumous) and Naib Subedar Pandey a VrC (posthumous) for their gallant actions.[48][49][50]

In the second, on October 1 1967, a group of Indian Gurkha Rifles soldiers noticed Chinese troops surrounding a sentry post near a boulder in Sikkim. After a heated argument over the control of a boulder, a Chinese soldier bayoneted an Indian sentry, triggering the start of a short-range knife and fire-fight.[51] The Chinese troops signaled a ceasefire after 3 hours of fighting, but later scaled Point 1450 to establish themselves there.[51] The Indians outflanked them the next day to regain Point 1450 and the Chinese retreated back across the disputed LAC.[51] The short skirmish did not escalate into a conflict after diplomacy between the two countries solved the issue.[51]

Diplomatic process

In 1984, squads of Indian soldiers began actively patrolling the dispute area and set up an observation post for the summer in Sumdorong Cha Valley, which is north of the McMahon Line as drawn on the Simla Treaty map[18][52][53][54][55]. The Indian team left the area before the winter.[18] In the winter of 1986, the Chinese deployed their troops to the Sumdorong Chu before the Indian team could arrive in the summer and built a Helipad at Wandung.[56] The New Delhi government reacted swiftly and the Chinese withdrew before any conflict could arise[18]

In 1993 and 1996, the two sides signed the Sino-Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquility Accords, an agreement to maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LoAC). Ten meetings of a Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (SIJWG) and five of an expert group have taken place to determine where the LoAC lies, but little progress has occurred. Recently, during the visit of Chinese Prime Minister to India, China recognised the territory of Sikkim and Assam[33] as belonging to India, while India during the visit of its PM, Atal Behari Vajpayee to China, recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as an autonomous part of China.[57][33][34]

India still has concerns over China's military modernisation.[29] In addition to this, China's military aid to Pakistan as well as it's proliferation of nuclear technology is a matter of concern to the Indian public[29], which fought another war with Pakistan in 1999.

On July 6, 2006, the historic silk road passing through this territory was reopened. On November 20, 2006 Indian politicians from Arunachal Pradesh appealed to parliament to take a harder stance on the PRC following a military buildup on the border similar to that in 1962.[34] Since 2004, Chinese military forces have increased patrolling of the Chumar region, which is not even claimed by China.[33] The process of peace is disconnected on both sides and China remains fairly unilateral in their thinking.[33] China has taken more steps towards border domination in recent years and China is in a more advantageous military positions at this point.[33]

Notes

  1. ^ Calvin. War was never declared and thus the beginning of the conflict is a matter of dispute. According to James Barnard Calvin's Timeline, the first heavy fighting occurred on October 10. Calvin's chapter detailing the Border War also begins on October 10.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba bb bc bd be bf bg bh bi bj bk bl bm bn bo bp bq br bs bt bu bv bw bx by bz ca cb cc cd China's Decision for War with India in 1962 by John W. Garver
  3. ^ H.A.S.C. by United States. Congress. House Committee on Armed Services - 1999, pp62
  4. ^ War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tibet by Eric S. Margolis, pp 234
  5. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba bb bc bd be bf bg bh bi bj bk bl bm bn bo bp bq br bs bt bu bv bw bx by bz ca cb cc cd ce cf cg ch ci cj ck cl cm cn co cp cq Calvin, James Barnard (1984). "The China-India Border War". Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Retrieved 2006-06-14. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  6. ^ Both Maxwell and the official Indian history indicate that Indian forces took no Chinese prisoners during the conflict
  7. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r Cite error: The named reference Neville Maxwell was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  8. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p History of the Conflict with China, 1962. P.B. Sinha, A.A. Athale, with S.N. Prasad, chief editor, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992.
  9. ^ a b The Sino-Indian Border Disputes, by Alfred P. Rubin, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Jan., 1960), pp. 96-125.
  10. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r Mohan Guruswamy, Mohan, "The Great India-China Game", Rediff, June 23, 2003.
  11. ^ a b c d e f g A.G. Noorani, "Fact of History", India's National Magazine, September 30, 2003.
  12. ^ a b c d Maxwell, Neville (2001). "Henderson Brooks Report: An Introduction". stratmag.com. Retrieved 2006-08-18. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  13. ^ a b c d e f g h i Maxwell, Neville, India's China War, New York, Pantheon, 1970.
  14. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k VK Singh resolving the boundary dispute
  15. ^ "The McMahon Line 1911-45: The British Legacy",by Karunakar Gupta, The China Quarterly, No. 47. (Jul. - Sep., 1971), pp. 521-545. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0305-7410%28197107%2F09%290%3A47%3C521%3ATML1TB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I
  16. ^ Qing Dynasty Edict of Abdication, translated by Bertram Lenox Putnam Weale, The Fight For The Republic in China, London: Hurst & Blackett, Ltd. Paternoster House, E.C. 1918. - Emphasis added, "Muslims" rendered as "Mohammedans" in original translation
  17. ^ Maxwell, Neville (September 9, 2006). "Settlements and Disputes: China's Approach to Territorial Issues" (PDF). Economic and Political Weekly. 41 (36): 3876. Retrieved September 29, 2006.
  18. ^ a b c d e f g A.G. Noorani, "Perseverance in peace process", India's National Magazine, August 29, 2003.
  19. ^ Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, "The CIA's Secret War in Tibet", University Press of Kansas, 2002, pp. 96-97
  20. ^ a b c India's Forward Policy, Review author[s]: A. G. Noorani, The China Quarterly © 1970 School of Oriental and African Studies
  21. ^ a b c d e f Chang, Jung and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (2006), pp. 568, 579.
  22. ^ "The Shade of the Big Banyan" Time, Dec. 14, 1959.
  23. ^ Gregory Clark, "Remembering a War - The 1962 India-China Conflict", Rediff, [1] [2]
  24. ^ Hindustan Times
  25. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Epoch Times: 1962 Sino-Indian war
  26. ^ Noorani, A.G., Fresh Insights into the 1962 War. Frontline. December 5-18, 1998, quoted from Roderick, McFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution. Vol. 3, The Coming of the Cataclysm 1961-1966. Oxford University Press.
  27. ^ a b c d e f CIA Journals 1962 India-China War and Kargil 1999: Restrictions on Air Power by R. Sukumaran
  28. ^ "Line of Defense", by Manoj Joshi , Times of India, October 21, 2000
  29. ^ a b c d e Swaminathan South Asia Analysis Group Lessons of 1962: A stock taking after 40 years.
  30. ^ a b c The Battle of Walong
  31. ^ a b c d Battle of Rezang La
  32. ^ Goldman, Jerry (1997). "The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 18-29 1962". hpol.org. Retrieved 2006-08-18. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  33. ^ a b c d e f Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
  34. ^ a b c India soft on Arunachal Pradesh
  35. ^ Chushi Gangdruk "Chushi Gangdruk: History", ChushiGangdruk.Org
  36. ^ Abstract of "Fighting to Make a Point: Policy-Making by Aggressive War on the Chinese Borders" by Jr Pettis Roy C. - National War College
  37. ^ [3] - Taipei Times, [4] Indian American Center for Political Awareness
  38. ^ "China", "Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, Pg:722", October 1971–February 1972 (Declassified)
  39. ^ "China", "Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, Pg:723", October 1971–February 1972 (Declassified)
  40. ^ McCarthyism's Indian rebirth
  41. ^ "China", ”Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, Pg:721”, October 1971–February 1972 (Declassified)
  42. ^ a b Dobell, W. M. (1964). "Ramifications of the China-Pakistan Border Treaty". Pacific Affairs. 37 (3): 283–295. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |laydate=, |laysource=, |quotes=, |laysummary=, and |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  43. ^ The Men Behind Yahya in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 by Stephen R. Shalom, professor of Political Science
  44. ^ Sino-Indian War Dedication
  45. ^ Remembering a War by Swaran Singh - Rediff, October 28, 2002
  46. ^ The Chola Incident
  47. ^ Remembering Naxalbari Day
  48. ^ [5]
  49. ^ [6]
  50. ^ [7]
  51. ^ a b c d The Chola Incident
  52. ^ The Economist, May 23, 1987. The Sumdorong Cha valley "seemed to lie to the north of the McMahon line; but is south of the highest ridge in the area, and the McMahon line is meant to follow the highest points".
  53. ^ "Sino-Indian Border Dispute Reconsidered", Neville Maxwell, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 15, April 10-16, 1999.
  54. ^ Gopal Ji Malaviya in "Indian and Chinese Foreign Policies in Perspective", edited by Surjit Man Singh, 1998, Radiant Publishers, N.Delhi.
  55. ^ The Militarization of Mother India, Ravi Rikhye, 1990, Chanakya Pub. N.Delhi.
  56. ^ India's Land of the Rising Sun Deccan Herald
  57. ^ BBC

Further reading

  • The China-India Border War, 1988 by James Barnard Calvin[1]
  • Alastair Lamb, The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries, 1964,[2]
  • Neville Maxwell's India's China War[3]
  • Gunnar Myrdal. Asian Drama; An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. New York: Random House, 1968
  • History of the Conflict with China, 1962. P.B. Sinha, A.A. Athale, with S.N. Prasad, chief editor, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992. - Official Indian history of the Sino-Indian War.
  • 中印边疆自卫反击作战史/Zhong yin bianjiang ziwei fanji zuozhanshi (History of the Sino-India Border Self Defensive War), Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1994. - Official People's Liberation Army history of the Sino-Indian war.

Template:ChineseText Template:IndicText

  1. ^ Calvin, James Barnard (1984). "The China-India Border War". GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved 2006-06-14. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  2. ^ Lamb, Alastair (1964). The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries. L. Oxford University Press.
  3. ^ Maxwell, Neville, India's China War, New York, Pantheon, 1970.
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sino-Indian_War&oldid=123191943"