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major revision needed
Much of this article, at this time, is seriously in need of revision. There are misconceptions, mistakes of fact, and general inadequacy. I haven't time to do the revision as I type this, but have added it to my plans. Watch this space, I suppose...
In the meantime, beware. This article will get you into serious confusion.
ww (4 Aug 03)
- It took me a while (I forgot it was 'on my list', actually), but those watching this space can finally relax. Quite a lot of moving around, headings, corrections, rephrasing, ...
- Comments?
- ww 18:05, 7 Apr 2004 (UTC)
out with dict def
I am deleting the dictionary definition of the word Ultra from this article. It is nothing more than a dictionary entry and I see little hope of it becoming anything more. The text of what I deleted is shown below. I also removed a large section discussing sigint in the Pacific, that better belongs in an article on Purple or Magic. -SimonP (18 Dec 02)
Difinition:
Ultra- is a prefix used to denote something above or higher.
It is derived from the Latin word ultra ("beyond", "farther", "over and above").
It is also used for indicating superiority or higher quality.
Examples include "ultrasound" and "ultraviolet".
misc stuff not actually Ultra
Pacific Stuff (already to be found in the article on Purple): well before Pearl Harbor. [Actually, the Japanese Purple machine ('alphabetic typewriter B') was an outgrowth of an earlier Japanese design the SIS called Red and was not an outgrowth of the Enigma or similar rotor machines; it treated vowels differently than consonants and used no rotors -- it used stepping switches instead. One of the reasons it was cryptanalytically vulnerable was that the key scheduling was poorly done]. Resultant revelations of Japanese plans led to U.S. naval victories in the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, crushing the offensive power of the Japanese fleet, and enabled American flyers to find and shoot down the plane carrying Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, the Japanese commander in the Pacific in April 1943. [Actually all of these things resulted from American (and possibly British, though this is less clear) breaks into the Imperial Navy's chief high level system, called by the Americans JN-25. It was regularly changed throughout the War, but after Pearl Harbor, the Americans were able to more or less keep up. Purple carried only diplomatic information -- very valuable, of course -- but carried no military tactical information at all.]
- Actually, although a group of six letters was handled differently from the other twenty, IIRC they weren't the vowels: which letters where in which group was selected with a plugboard. (I have no idea why the did it this way - because the group of 6 was only scrambled through a single level of stepping switches, whereas the group of 20 was done through 3, it represented a vulnerability.) Noel (talk) 21:20, 31 Dec 2004 (UTC)
on terms (M4, Triton, Shark...)
The Germans used several names for their (various non-commercial) Enigma machines. The one that sticks in my memory is the Navy's which was 'M' in some variants. 'M4' was, as I recall, the name of the 3.5 (or 4, depending on viewpoint) rotor machine adopted by the Navy well into the War. Bletchley Park used different names for assorted Enigma networks. Thus, the Navy in the Atlantic may have been talking back and forth (using the M4 machine), and BP might call that network 'Shark'. While the Navy in the Med (using the SAME machine, mind, though with different traffic patterns and different key schedules) might be called Porpoise by BP. Thus, it is necessary to keep clearly in mind the difference between a network (determined by who talks to whom and is therefore using the same keys) and the machine used to implement that network. Some recent edits have been going round and round on this somewhat slippery ground. ww 19:46, 13 Sep 2004 (UTC)
- Yep, we need to be careful. Before 1 February 1942, the Shark network used M3, the 3 rotor machine. The M4 was also used by other networks, e.g., Seahorse. — Matt 22:49, 13 Sep 2004 (UTC)
Page move??
On Wikipedia:Votes for deletion/Ultra-, someone wants this article renamed. Any opinions?? 66.245.111.194 20:29, 5 Oct 2004 (UTC)
Overlap
There's considerable overlap between the Breaking the code section and the article Cryptanalysis of the Enigma. This would be okay, if the section were briefened to a summary. Can anyone take this on? Derrick Coetzee 05:01, 13 Oct 2004 (UTC)
- Now that I look, there's a considerable amount of overlap in other sections as well. According to the header at the top of Cryptanalysis of the Enigma, this article should focus primarily on how the information was used, which seems like a pretty good idea. If someone feels having a large overlap is important, either merge these articles or create a template which is placed in both; this allows updates to be made in one place (otherwise, the updater may not even be aware redundancy exists.) Derrick Coetzee 05:58, 13 Oct 2004 (UTC)
- Thanks for the comments, and yeah, I think most of the overlap can be cut out; entire books have been written on ULTRA that spend about a paragraph explaining what the Enigma was and even less space explaining how the information was produced! For background, until a few months ago, we had just two articles: Enigma machine and ULTRA. Both articles attempted to give the entire story of (1) the machine, (2) the cryptanalysis and (3) the intelligence produced. I spent some time relocating the intelligence and cryptanalysis parts of Enigma machine into Ultra and Cryptanalysis of the Enigma respectively, but I haven't got round to working on the latter two articles yet. — Matt 09:35, 13 Oct 2004 (UTC)
- Now, that I've noticed this, I'm going to speak up for the Average Reader. Both these articles (Enigma and Ultra) were, it seems to me, mostly introductions or articles of first resort at the time Matt mentions. As such, the AR will be most helped in my view with something that doesn't require much chasing of pointers to specialized articles in order to get a first level overview. Such an article will, it seems to me, necessarily be less than maximally sparing of duplication of content. I was satisfied with the degree of overlap that Matt mentions, at least after a series of extensive edits I did. This is, I think, a policy which differs from that of some others, in this instance Matt. We have had similar differences at other articles in crypto corner. I have mostly been unwilling to do more than disagree, but the same disagreement seems to return from time to time. I don't think that the article style we now frequently have in the crypto corner, thus
- topic
- subtopic
- main article somewhere else
- comments
- subtopic
- main article somewhere else
- comments
- etc etc
- is felicitous. The AR, who is not a cryptiac, nor a devotee of maximal economy of words across many related articles, is not best served this way. The standard to which we should be rallying is instead, maximum intelligibility for AR. Admittedly, this is not so clearly a standard in favor of duplication of content that some excess words cannot be trimmed. It is, though, a significantly different criterion of judgement about potentially trimmable alleged excess.
- Comments? ww 19:59, 17 Feb 2005 (UTC)
- I think the suggestion here is not a topic-subtopic structure, but a division between intelligence and codebreaking. The general rule is simply to stay "on topic", and one can write and read quite successfully about ULTRA intelligence without needing to know anything at all about the techniques used to break Enigma (or the mechanics of the Enigma machine). This division is a very natural one -- it started during the War in the division of duties between Hut 3 and Hut 6, or between Hut 4 and Hut 8. This separation is not going to cause any confusion for your Average Reader (although it may make for a less entertaining story, but Wikipedia is a reference work). The only "crossover" that I would think necessary is when various problems in the codebreaking caused an intelligence blackout (such as the introduction of the four-wheel Naval Enigma on Shark). Having multiple articles which all tell the whole story of "How Enigma came to be broken" is quite undesirable. — Matt Crypto 20:16, 17 Feb 2005 (UTC)
- Comments? ww 19:59, 17 Feb 2005 (UTC)
ULTRA and FISH, etc
The term "Ultra" also covered material gathered from the decryption of FISH ciphered material, not just Enigma, right? (Not to mention various other Italian and German codes and ciphers?) I ask because the current article talks almost exclusively about Enigma.
I do know that later in the war the US and UK standardized on "Ultra" as a term for all SIGINT material (West, SIGINT Secrets, pp. 238). Budiansky gives (Battle of Wits, pp. 254-255) a memo from Travis which says ULTRA is to be used as a term for all "special intelligence"; Budiansky says the latter term referred to all "high-grade and machine ciphers".
However, West also contains a quotation from Peter Calvocoressi that "Ultra was the name given by us to intelligence we derived from breaking Enigma" (pp. 22). So I gather that the enlargement of the coverage of the term was a later wartime development.
- It may even have been a UK edict, as nearly as I can make out. Certainly the term MAGIC for another source of SIGINT material continued in use in the US. ww 20:12, 17 Feb 2005 (UTC)
In particular, Ultra covered the TUNNY and STURGEON systems (Lorenz SZ 40/42 and Geheimfernschreiber respectively), I gather. (Although it was mostly TUNNY that the attention of GCHQ was focussed on, with the Colossus, etc.)
So presumably either i) this article needs to cover those other systems as well, or ii) we should rename the current contents of article to something which refers specifically to the intelligence gained from break of the Enigma, and do a new "Ultra" article which covers all the systems?
Another issue is that later in the war, attacks on Enigma (particularly the Naval Enigma) were very much a joint US-UK effort, and of course technically, later in the war the term Ultra covered the Magic material as well! So technically an article on Ultra should cover all Allied cryptanalytically-derived intelligence.
However, I think it makes sense to keep separate the campaigns against the German (+Italian?) communication systems, and Japanese systems into two separate articles; the two are logically fairly separate, and putting them in one would create an unwieldy beast.
Still, it would be nice to have an article titled Allied SIGINT in World War II (with alternative titles Allied cryptanalytic intelligence in World War II, etc) which gives a brief overview of the whole field, and references all the appropriate lesser articles.
And no, I don't have time to do it! Sorry, too much else to do here...
What I will do for now is rework the intro section to add brief references to at least TUNNY and STURGEON, and mention the importance of TUNNY: West says (pp. 228) that "it was to be GCHQ's most valued source", and Budiansky described (pp. 315) its output as "priceless". Noel (talk) 22:38, 16 Dec 2004 (UTC)
- I removed this sentence from the intro:
- The corresponding name used by the Americans for analogous intelligence from Japanese decrypts in WWII was Magic
- because, as far as I can make out, MAGIC was only applied to PURPLE decrypts, and is not really analagous to Ultra (which covered a multitude of sources). E.g. Lewin, American Magic (pp. 14) "the machine that came to be called Purple. All information gathered from this source was known then, and throughout the war, as Magic." I've looked through a large number of references, and can't find any use of Magic for anything except Purple decrypts. Noel (talk) 02:39, 17 Dec 2004 (UTC)
PS: I've just noticed that Edward J. Drea, MacArthur's ULTRA (pp. xi, pp. 240 footnote #2) gives a lot more detail on the usage spread. He gives 13 May 1940 as the first British use of Ultra (by the RN, per Beesly, Very Special Intelligence); US usage started in Europe and the Med, but there was no uniform naming system in the Pacific, and it did not gain currency there until March 1944.
He also notes (pp. xi) that MAGIC applied to the diplomatic decrypts. Noel (talk) 02:50, 17 Dec 2004 (UTC)
- I would caution that West's evaluation of 'most valuable' is one made from a considerable distance in time, though of course by a well informed observer. I suspect in any case that what he had in mind was the very high level strategic insight the Fish cypher decrypts were supposed to have made available. I would suggest that Enigma decrypts, as applied to N Africa and the Atlantic (when things were very much in doubt) were valued indeed. Later on, when the Germans were on the run in N Europe and things in less ultimate doubt perhaps less critical? As for May 1940 first use, that seems to me about right, and would apply to most likely Luftwaffe or Wehrmacht as Naval Enigma was rather more resistant and took longer to begin to produce usable results.
As for the scope of reference/inclusion for MAGIC, I would note that JIN cyphers and JIA cyphers began to produce useful material before Midway (June 1942) and continued to do so throughout the war in increasing quantity. Thus Pacific SIGINT material covered rather more than merely the diplomatic PURPLE, and the British / Dutch / Australians contributed to more than a little of that, perhaps especially JIN intercepts. ww 20:12, 17 Feb 2005 (UTC)
Illustrations
How about an illustration or two for this article — e.g. an Allied aircraft approaching a German ship on the Mediterranean, or a submarine torpedoing an Allied merchant ship? Logologist 10:06, 17 Feb 2005 (UTC)
- Good idea. I just had a quick look to see if Wikipedia had anything we could use on other pages (like Second Battle of the Atlantic, or U-boat), but I didn't turn up anything. — Matt Crypto 10:19, 17 Feb 2005 (UTC)
'Strategic implications' section problems
The recent addition of this section seems to me to present some difficulties. As it stands now, it is largely rhetorical questions intended to show the importance of Ultra. While I more or less agree about the intended importance, I have some difficulty with the format / structure. We're supposed to be reporting facts here (as much as we can manage anyway) and our joint opinion is not such. We should change this section to report contemporary opinion (eg Churchill to the King) or later scholarly judgement. Even if the same result is achieved, a highlight of Ultra's importance.
Comment? ww 20:17, 17 Feb 2005 (UTC)
- I agree. While the occasional rhetorical question spices up the text, I think it should be used sparingly. I don't think that fixing it would be terribly hard, though; replace "Might Japan have opened a second front against the Soviets?" with "Historian Bob suggested that Japan might have opened a second front against the Soviets (Bob, 1997)". — Matt Crypto 20:30, 17 Feb 2005 (UTC)
Was ULTRA a military 'operation'
Sorry to be pedantic, but .....
Is there a definition, in this main topic's context, of 'operation'? I had supposed that the term would be more limited and thus exclude ULTRA (though not questioning ULTRA's importance). If not what else can be added? PLUTO?
some recent edits
A recent ambitious pruning and tweaking of this article has generally improved it I think. However, they have also resulted in wholesale replacement of such terms as cryptanalysts and code-breakers with cryptologists, and so on. While the term is used (mostly in military crypto circles in the US), its use should not displace so zealously for equally servicable words which, incidentally, have existing extensive WP articles. Non crypto informed readers chasing cross references are likely to be confused. Since we can expect few such readers we are necessarily writing for the mostly crypto innocent. It would be better I think to retain some use of the now replaced terms if only to suggest that there are aeveral possible choices for those who business it is to break codes/cyphers used by the enemy.
Comments? ww 03:59, 19 September 2005 (UTC)
- Precisely my point. How can such proliferation and sloppy use of terminology fail but to confuse novices? To speak of "code-breaking" when one means "cipher-breaking," as is often the case, is unconscionable oversimplification that borders on contempt for the intelligent layman. A comparison may be drawn to the blanket use of "cancer," whether one is speaking in fact of a cancer or of a different kind of neoplasm. (All cancers are neoplasms, but not all neoplasms are cancers.)
- "Cryptanalyst" is, with all respect, a piece of pompous crypto-bureaucratic jargon that was coined by that shameless self-promoter, William Friedman. logologist 08:06, 19 September 2005 (UTC)
- Logologist -- it's clear you're on some sort of vendetta against words like "cryptanalyst" and "codebreaking". You are very welcome to campaign to change the usage of these words within the field, but please don't try to impose it on Wikipedia articles until you after you succeed. It is not appropriate to drop the jargon and idiom of the field simply because we don't like it. — Matt Crypto 23:31, 19 September 2005 (UTC)
- L, Mostly what Matt said. However, I would observe that, however barbaric Friedman's neologism might be to some ears (it offends me obscurely because it does not roll trippingly off the tongue), it has become universally accepted in the stead of such as code-breaking. As such, the word (regardless of its spelling or exact pronunciation) has entered the language. Recall that English for some reason welcomes new words whther from other languages or deliberately invented. I don't know why, nor am I aware of anyone who credibly claims to, so I think we all, including WP, will have to cope. ww 05:44, 2 October 2005 (UTC)
Wartime consequences
I have just added some other arguments to this section but I did this not because I expect the changes to last but because (although it is fun) I don't think this type of speculation is appropriate for Wikipedia.
As Winston Churchill, "The terrible Ifs accumulate." So I would like to replace the speculation with:
An exhibit in 2003 on "Secret War" at the Imperial War Museum, in London, quoted British Prime Minister Winston Churchill telling King George VI: "It was thanks to Ultra that we won the war." Churchill's greatest fear, even after Hitler had suspended Operation Sealion and invaded the Soviet Union, was that the German submarine wolf packs would succeed in strangling sea-locked Britain. He would later write, in Their Finest Hour (1949): "The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril." A major factor that averted Britain's defeat in the Battle of the Atlantic was her regained mastery of Naval-Enigma decryption.
- Cut this paragrah and section at this point. (Note the change from "The major factor" to "A major factor")
- Then I would like to see paragraphs on other areas of the war:
- Air war (Stratigic bombing). How did enigma help?
- Land war. Why did Allied commanders not win thier battles hands down given that they could see the other players hands? Why was the Battle of the Bulge such a suprise? Why did Allied commanders time and again ignore Ultra, like Monty (who should have known better) and the lack of interest in intellegence before Operation Market Garden. Or was there no Ultra for Market Garden, if so why not?
I do not know enough about the subject so I would appreciate it if someone else would answer the questions. But what should not be done is to pile up two or more ifs, so that the section is turned into unsourced speculation. (No matter how much fun it is!) Philip Baird Shearer 21:52, 20 September 2005 (UTC)
- PBS, I like your initials (US joke, others may disregard). I'll take a brief whack at some of your queries.
- Air war: UK and US bomber commands must have had, I presume, some information on presence and state of readiness of various German attack units. Since 8th Air Force especially had appalling loss rates, it might suggest that the knowledge made no difference. On the other hand, losses might have been even higher without it. I'm aware of no credible studies on the point. (Graduate students, rev up your word processors!) On other aspects of the Air War (in particular V1 buzz bombs) Engima supplied considerable hints and suggestions as to where and how organized were the launch sites. Not definitive but helpful.
- When reading up to contribute to the article on the "Bombing of Dresden", I came across a snippet that said that Bomber Harris, C-in-C of "RAF Bomber Command" was not privileged to direct use of ULTRA he was given some information gleaned from ENIGMA but not where it had come from. This directly effected his attitude to the effectiveness of the post D-Day 1944 directive (order) to go after Oil because he did not know that it was high level German sources which was being used to say just how much it was hurting them, so he tended to see it as a highlevel command "panacca" (his word) to bomb specific oil and munitions targets, and as a distraction from the real task of making the rubble bounce in every large German city. Source: Page 202, "Dresden:Tuesday 13 February 1945" by Fredrick Taylor. --Philip Baird Shearer 09:42, 2 October 2005 (UTC)
- Land war: Kasserine Pass. Eisenhower's staff ignored such warning as it got via Ultra, and Torch got plastered. Invasion of Crete -- almost entire German battle plan was in local UK hands well before it started. Part of the reason less use was made than otherwise is probably that Ultra distribution was in its early days, and the mumbo-jumbo about it all left the UK commander in considerable doubt about its reliability. And he was not permitted to mention the information to anyone, including his planning staff. Battle of the Bulge. Allied commanders seem to have ignored Ultra this time as the Germans were clearly beaten and it was only a matter of time. Monty. A special case, with an ego as wide as all outdoors. He is said to have bragged publicly just before El Alamein that he had been informed as to what the Jerries had for breakfast. His behavior later on the N edge of the Normandy breakout was, it seems, largely devoted to bragging and pressuring (Eisenhower, UK politicians, anyone else) to give him full command, or independent command, or anyway more. The Arnhem disaster may be Eisenhower's biggest blunder, for it let Monty waste troops and time to very little effect. John Keegan's Intelligence in Warfare has an interesting study on the Crete business and some comments on the Battle of the Atlantic. He is less willing to see as much value in intelligence as most, but he has had a career-long stance that force at the point of application is key overall, so it would be a surprise to see any other. His grasp of cryptography is a little hazy, so beware on that point. ww 06:01, 2 October 2005 (UTC)
- On Crete it was a much a tactical victory as anything, neither men not Allied command had trained on how to deal with airborne assult. Although Nathan Bedford Forrest maxim of the "first with the mostest" would have been a good start! BTW it is a myth that Hitler never allowed another airbourn assult. One was planned for the "Battle of the Bulge" but was aborted due to lack of fuel. Philip Baird Shearer
- Land war: Kasserine Pass. Eisenhower's staff ignored such warning as it got via Ultra, and Torch got plastered. Invasion of Crete -- almost entire German battle plan was in local UK hands well before it started. Part of the reason less use was made than otherwise is probably that Ultra distribution was in its early days, and the mumbo-jumbo about it all left the UK commander in considerable doubt about its reliability. And he was not permitted to mention the information to anyone, including his planning staff. Battle of the Bulge. Allied commanders seem to have ignored Ultra this time as the Germans were clearly beaten and it was only a matter of time. Monty. A special case, with an ego as wide as all outdoors. He is said to have bragged publicly just before El Alamein that he had been informed as to what the Jerries had for breakfast. His behavior later on the N edge of the Normandy breakout was, it seems, largely devoted to bragging and pressuring (Eisenhower, UK politicians, anyone else) to give him full command, or independent command, or anyway more. The Arnhem disaster may be Eisenhower's biggest blunder, for it let Monty waste troops and time to very little effect. John Keegan's Intelligence in Warfare has an interesting study on the Crete business and some comments on the Battle of the Atlantic. He is less willing to see as much value in intelligence as most, but he has had a career-long stance that force at the point of application is key overall, so it would be a surprise to see any other. His grasp of cryptography is a little hazy, so beware on that point. ww 06:01, 2 October 2005 (UTC)
It is information like this, with sources, that I think needs adding to this section of the article not the "if if" which were there before. But as it is not my area of expertise I think someone else should add it. Philip Baird Shearer 09:42, 2 October 2005 (UTC)
- PBS, The Bomber Harris tidbit is about the only thing I'm aware of about knowledge of Ultra by commanders in the air war. I'd love to hear what Curtis Lemay thought of it all, if he was informed. A man with his own Strangelovian vision; consider his advice at high levels during the Cuban Missile Crisis. I agree it and similar stuff ought to added somehow to the article, but have no time to do it myself. May I suggest that you do so? You know, be bold! If you get something off kilter, someone will eventually correct that claim, section, paragraph. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Ww (talk • contribs) 01:59, 3 October 2005 (UTC)
Another thought on this theme. The strategic bombing of cities by the Allies, particularly towards the end of the war was as an attack on German communications. Until the 1970s this was always taken to be on the physical networks of road, rail, and water ways. However it is now clear that in part it was to destroy the telephone network forcing the Germans to use wireless more, which could of course be intercepted and decoded. This tends not to be emphasised in books on the bombing campaign because, at Bomber Command planning level, it was not known how critical the destruction of the telephone system was, but it ought to be mentioned in this article Philip Baird Shearer 12:28, 30 October 2005 (UTC)
Ultra and M4
The article implies that the adoption of the M4 by the U-Boat arm in Feb 1942 caused no problems for Allied codebreakers, as they had luckily detected a transmission error in Dec 1941. I understood that the adoption of the M4 did cause major problems, and that regular reading of traffic encrypted on M4 was not achieved for nearly a year, one of the key events being the capture of Enigma documentation from U559 in the eastern Med at the end of Oct 1942.
Maybe I'm wrong? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 81.174.208.64 (talk • contribs) 21:47, 5 February 2006 (UTC)
- No, you're right, and the article does give the wrong impression. Shark wasn't being read from February 1942 to mid December 1942 as a result of the introduction of M4. I'll try and read up on this, but I believe it's the case that, while codebooks captured from U-559 were very helpful, it was another factor which finally helped BP get back into Shark, which was that the Germans were using three-rotor settings for short signals (the fourth rotor being set in the "emulate M3" mode). — Matt Crypto 21:00, 5 February 2006 (UTC)
staff at PC Bruno
It's my memory that Bertrand put together PC Bruno including the Polish folk who had gottne out of Poland before the Nazis caught them, and that they and the French cooperated on such things as Enigma intercepts. None of the Poles went to Bletchley (British caution apparently) and PC Bruno and BP ooperated on the at least the Enigma work. There is the oft-repeated tale of using Enigma to encrypt work schedules and such between the two sites. Since Rejewski is said to have been surprised about British Enigma work at BP, I deduce that he was not one of the people talking directly with BP from PC Bruno, implying both that there were other personnel working on Enigma (French most likely), and that when Turing came over to talk about things, he must have been careful not to be quite forthcoming with the Poles he met about quite where he was from and what he (BP) were proposing to do. That's why I changed it to 'major assistance' since others would appear to have been involved. Is there any reason to believe the French et al didn't also work on Enigma at PC Bruno etc? ww 08:12, 16 February 2006 (UTC)