Utente:Olonia/Sandbox
| Battaglia di El Mechili parte della seconda guerra mondiale | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Data | 24 gennaio 1941 | ||
| Luogo | El Mechili, Libia | ||
| Esito | Vittoria britannica | ||
| Schieramenti | |||
| Comandanti | |||
| Effettivi | |||
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| Perdite | |||
| Voci di battaglie presenti su Wikipedia | |||
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Template:Campagnabox operazione Compass
La battaglia di El Mechili fu uno scontro armato avvenuto nella località libica di El Mechili, in Cirenaica, tra le forze dell'Impero britannico e quelle italiane il 24 gennaio 1941, durante l'operazione degli Alleati denominata Compass.
Le unità britanniche appartenevano alla 7ª Divisione Corazzata mentre quelle italiane alla 10ª Armata.
Background
After the fall of Bardia (5 January 1941) and Tobruk (22 January 1941), the Commonwealth command aimed at completely destroying the remainder of the Italian Tenth Army, which was retreating from Cyrenaica. The 6th Australian Infantry Division headed towards Derna, advancing along the Via Balbia, while the 7th Armoured Division was sent in the backcountry, along the “trigh Capuzzo” road, towards Mechili and Fort Capuzzo.
The 6th Australian Division was temporarily halted at Derna by the Sabratha Division reinforced by a Libyan paratrooper battalion and riserve units, while the 7th Armoured Division approached Mechili, a crossroads of strategic importance; its fall would have allowed the British forces to outflank the retreating Tenth Army and encircle it.
The Italian forces tasked with defending Mechili consisted of the Babini Armoured Group, the Piana Motorized Group and the Bignami Column. The Babini Group included 138 officers, 2,200 men (which included the 10th Bersaglieri Regiment), 57 M13/40 medium tanks, 25 Fiat L3 tankettes, six armoured cars, eight 75/27 mm guns, eight 100/17 mm guns, eight 47/32 mm guns, sixteen machine guns (twelve Fiat 1935 and four 12,7 mm machine guns), seven Solothurn anti-tank rifles, six mortars, 30 flamethrowers, 90 light trucks, 160 heavy trucks and 180 motorcycles. The Piana Group was composed of 121 officers, 2,241 men, twelve 105/28 mm guns, twenty-four 75/27 mm guns, twelve 65/17 mm guns, sixteen Fiat 35 machine guns, eighteen 45 mm mortars, ten flamethrowers, 115 light trucks, 83 heavy trucks and 120 motorcycles. The Bignami Column was composed of the XXV anx XXVII Bersaglieri Motorized Battalions, a group of twelve 75/27 mm guns detached from the Bologna Division, and the VI and XXI Tank Battalions, with 37 M13/40 tanks each. Of this force, however, both the Piana Group and the Bignami Column were kept in reserve; only the Babini Group would be involved in the actual battle.
Battle
The vanguard of the 7th Armoured Division was the 4th Armoured Brigade, with the 3th Hussars Regiment (equipped with 25 Mk VI light tanks and nine Cruiser tank s), the 7th Hussars Regiment (26 Mk VI and one Cruiser) and the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment (six Mk VI and 21 Cruisers, of which three Mk I, seven Mk II and eleven Mk III).
Gli scontri avvennero in due fasi , tra il 24 e 25 gennaio 1941 , ma non è semplice descrivere con precisione ciò che avvenne a causa della divergenza delle varie fonti.
Quello che appare chiaro è che in una prima fase i MkVI britannici , carri leggeri armati di mitragliatrici da 12.7mm , vennero a trovarsi sotto l'attacco dei carri M13 subendo alcune perdite , la maggioranza delle fonti afferma almeno 5 carri britannici distrutti. In seguito a questa inaspettata controffensiva italiana , i carri leggeri si ritirano.
Nella seconda fase gli inglesi tornarono alla carica portando in prima linea anche altri mezzi , come i 2pdr portéé e alcuni 25pdr per supportare i carri Cruiser , armati di un cannone 2pdr , in grado di perforare la corazza dei nostri. In questo secondo scontro le fonti divergono molto.
Versione 1. Gli inglesi persero 1 Cruiser A10 ed un altro MkVI oltre a molti altri danneggiati , addirittura si pensa a 20/25 mezzi colpiti. In seguito a questo scontro , gli inglesi decidono di ritirarsi nuovamente , inseguiti dagli italiani che però cadono in una trappola simile a quella subita durante il vittorioso scontro di Sidi Azeiz del 5 agosto 1940, dove ad aspettare i carri italiani c'erano i 2pdr portéé ed i 25 pdr, perdendo 4-6 M13 e sembra che altri 1 o 2 fossero stati catturati. Allontanandosi , le forze italiane avevano perso il contatto radio con la base e quindi tornarono indietro.
Quello che è certo , dati alla mano , è che il giorno 26 gennaio 1941 il SIM segnala circa 150 mezzi corazzati inglesi in arrivo su El Mechili [avvalorando la versione 1, poichè sembra che El Mechili sia ancora in mano italiana] , quindi il Gen Tellera ordinò di abbandonare le posizioni e di ripiegare , ritenendo che la Brigata non potesse farcela contro tutti quei mezzi nemici, di fatto aprendo le porte della Cirenaica agli inglesi , che si avvidero di questo ripiegamento grazie alla ricognizione aerea.
Quello che balza agli occhi è che lo scontro di El Mechili fu sostenuto dalla sola Brigata Corazzata Babini , mentre gli altri due raggruppamenti furono tenuti in riserva e , di fatto , inoperosi. La critica che il gen Montanari muove al Maresciallo Graziani è quella di non aver riunito queste forze per lanciarle contro la 7^ div. corazzata che in quel momento disponeva di 50 cruiser e 95 MkVI ,distruggendo separatamente le due brigate corazzate.
Le possibilità di fermare l'attacco inglese c'erano tutte
1. 24/1/1941, Derna-Mechili tract Although small numbers of M13/40s were present at both Bardia and Tobruk, no tank battles were reported. The first tank battle of the M13/40 occurred along the Derna-Mechili tract. A squadron of Mk.VI light tanks stumbled into a group of M13/40s and retreated under-fire. Six Mk VIs were knocked out and the pursuing M13/40s fell into an awaiting ambush. In the ensuing battle, a single A9 cruiser tank was knocked out , while nine M13/40s were destroyed.[1] Outcome/Losses...................9 M13/40s / 7 British tanks (6 lights and 1 cruiser)
Near Mechili, the British forces ran into about 50 M13/40 Italian tanks; in the following engagement, nine Italian and seven British tanks were destroyed.[4]
The 7th Armoured Division reached Mechili on 23 January, but Italian armoured forces slowed their advance; Italian attacks destroyed some British light tanks of the vanguard, but the British forces re-organized and attacked the Italians, sheltering near a slope, inflicting heavy losses on them. Despite this, the Italians were not yet defeated, but wrong intelligence, which grossly overestimated the size of the British force, led Marshal Rodolfo Graziani to order his force sto retreat. The 7th Division thus entered Mechili unopposed on 27 January.
References
- ^ (FR) La Guerre du Desert (I) Tobrouk, p. 37.
- ^ Mario Montanari, Le operazioni in Africa Settentrionale Vol. I - Sidi el Barrani.
- ^ a b (EN) Battles 1941, su desertrats.org.uk. URL consultato il 26 febbraio 2014.
- ^ (EN) Mechili & Derna Fall, su 113 SQUADRON. URL consultato il 27 febbraio 2014.
Bibliography
Mario Montanari, Le operazioni in Africa Settentrionale Vol. I Sidi el Barrani (giugno 1940-Febbraio 1941), Italian Army Historical Branch, Rome, 2009.
[[Categoria:Guerra nel 1941]] [[Categoria:Campagna del Nordafrica|Mechili]] [[Categoria:Battaglie della seconda guerra mondiale che coinvolgono l'Italia]] [[Categoria:Battaglie della seconda guerra mondiale che coinvolgono il Regno Unito|Mechili]]
totale forze italiane: 129 x M13 , 25 x L3 , fanteria circa 5000 uomini , 36 x 20/65 , 8 x 47/32 , 12 x 65/17 , 44 x 75/27 , 8 x 100/17 , 12 x 105/28
The area east of the Jebel Akhdar mountains around Derna, was garrisoned by XX Corps (Lieutenant-General Annibale Bergonzoli) with the 60th Infantry Division Sabratha and the Babini Group, which had already lost some of its tanks in Tobruk. The III Medium Battalion and the V Medium Battalion had establishments of 55 × M13/40 tanks, which should have amounted to at least 120 × M13s in the group but82 had recently been landed at Benghazi.[10] The new tanks needed ten days to be made battleworthy and a three-day journey to reachMechili but in the crisis, tanks had been rushed forward, driving on their tracks, due to a lack of tank transporters, which reduced the serviceability of the vehicles. A defensive position was established by the 60th Infantry Division Sabratha on a line from Derna, along Wadi Derna, with the Babini Group concentrating at El Ghezze Scebib, south of Mechili and Giovanni Berta and Chaulan, to guard the flank and rear of the infantry.[11][12]
On 22 January, the British advanced towards Derna with the 19th Australian Brigade and sent another Australian brigade to reinforce the4th Armoured Brigade of the 7th Armoured Division, south of the Jebel Akhdar, for an advance on Mechili.[11][12] Next day, the 10th Army commander, General Giuseppe Telleraordered a counter-attack against the British as they approached Mechili, to avoid an envelopment of XX Corps from the south but communication within the Babini Group was slow, because only the tanks of senior commanders had wireless. Next day, 10–15 M13/40s of the Babini Group attacked the 7th Hussars of the 4th Armoured Brigade, which was heading west to cut the Derna–Mechili track north of Mechili. The Italians fired on the move, hit several tanks and pursued as the British swiftly retired, calling for help from the 2nd RTR, which ignored the signals through complacency. By 11:00 a.m., the British had lost several light tanks and a cruiser tank, one cruiser had a jammed gun and the third was retiring at speed, after taking fifty rounds to knock out two M13s. Eventually the 2nd RTR was alerted, caught the Italian tanks while sky-lined on a ridge and knocked out seven M13s by 11:30 a.m., for the loss of the cruiser and six light tanks.[13][14]
Tellera intended to use the Babini Group to harass the southern flank of the British, to cover a withdrawal from Mechili but Graziani ordered him to wait on events. By the evening, a report had arrived from Babini that the group was down from 50–60 tanks and that their performance had been disappointing, along with alarmist tales of 150 British tanks advancing round the southern flank. Graziani then ordered Tellera to disengage the Babini Group by next morning. Some tanks of the group had been held back at Benghazi and work had began on a defensive position at Sirte, 440 miles (710 km) to the south.[15] On 25 January in the north, the 2/11th Australian Battalion engaged the 60th Infantry Division Sabratha and the 10th Bersaglieri of the Babini Group at Derna airfield, making slow progress against determined resistance. Italian bombers and fighters flew sorties against the 2/11th Australian Battalion, as it attacked the airfield and high ground at Siret el Chreiba. The 10th Bersaglieri swept the flat ground with field artillery and machine-guns, stopping the Australian advance 3,000 yards (2,700 m) short of the objective.[16]
The 4th Armoured Brigade was ordered to encircle Mechili and cut the western and north-western exits, while the 7th Armoured Brigade cut the road from Mechili to Slonta but the Babini Group had retreated from Mechili during the night. The group retreated south of Slonta to Bir Melez and Antelat, covering 140 miles (220 km) through sandstorms and air attacks, pursued by the 4th Armoured Brigade until it had to stop on 28 January due to lack of fuel, exhaustion and camel tracks turning to deep mud in the rains.[1][12] On 26 January, Graziani ordered Tellera to continue the defence of Derna and to use the Babini Group to stop an advance westwards from Mechili–Derna. Tellera requested more tanks but this was refused, until the defences of Derna began to collapse the next day. During the day, the 2/4th Australian Battalion in the Derna–Giovanni Berta area, attacked and cut the Derna–Mechili road and a company crossed Wadi Derna during the night. On the northern edge of the wadi, a bold counter-attack with artillery support was made across open ground by the 10th Bersaglieri of the Babini Group, which with reports in the morning that the group was attacking round the southern flank, deterred the Australians from continuing the advance on Derna, which cost 40 Bersaglieri killed and 56 captured.[17]
During 27 January, Australian attempts to attack were met by massed artillery-fire, against which the Australian artillery were rationed to ten rounds per-gun-per-day; the 2/4th Australian Battalion repulsed another battalion-strength counter-attack.[18] A column of Bren carriers of the 6th Australian Cavalry Regiment was sent south to reconnoitre the area where the Italian tanks had been reported and was ambushed by a party of the Babini Group with concealed anti-tank guns and machine guns; four Australians were killed and three taken prisoner. The 11th Hussars found a gap at Chaulan south of Wadi Derna, which threatened the Babini Group and the defenders in Derna with encirclement and Bergonzoli ordered a retirement. The Italians disengaged on the night of 28/29 January before the garrison could be trapped and Babini Group rearguards cratered roads, planted mines and booby-traps and managed to conduct several skilful ambushes, which slowed the British pursuit.[19]