Sandbox stuff
Peirce proposes several typologies and definitions of the signs (which he also at times called "representamens"). More than 76 definitions of what a sign is have been collected throughout Peirce's work. Some canonical typologies can nonetheless be observed, one crucial one being the distinction between "icons", "indices" and "symbols" (CP 2.228, CP 2.229 and CP 5.473). The icon-index-symbol typology is chronologically the first but structurally the second of three that fit together as a trio of three-valued parameters in regular scheme of nine kinds of sign. (The three "parameters" (not Peirce's term) are not independent of one another, and the result is a system of ten classes of sign, which are shown further down in this section.) The three typologies are:
I. Sign as distinguished by sign's own phenomenological category (set forth in 1903, 1904, etc.) -- 1. qualisign, 2. sinsign, 3. legisign (more famous as "tone, token, type").
II. Sign as distinguished by phenomenological category of its way of denoting the object (set forth in 1867 and many timer in the years after) -- 1. icon, 2. index, 3. symbol.
III. Sign as distinguished by phenomenological category of its interpretively represented way of denoting the object (set forth in 1892, 1902, etc.) -- 1. rheme, 2. dicisign, 3. delome (better known as "term, proposition, argument").
Note that these conceptions are specific to Peirce's theory of signs and are not exactly equivalent to general uses of the notions of "icon", "symbol", "index", "tone", "token", "type", "term", "proposition", or "argument",
I. Qualisign, sinsign, legisign (a.k.a. tone, token, type)
This is the typology of the sign as distinguished by sign's own phenomenological category (set forth in 1903, 1904, etc.).
1. QUALISIGN (a.k.a. TONE a.k.a. POTISIGN) = a quality (of feeling), a possibility, a vagueness, a "First," standing as a sign.
2. SINSIGN (a.k.a. TOKEN a.k.a. ACTISIGN) = a reaction/resistance, an actual, a singular, a "Second," standing as a sign.
3. LEGISIGN (a.k.a. TYPE a.k.a. FAMISIGN) = a semiotic / logical relation, a (conditional) necessity, a norm or law or habit, a "Third," standing as a sign.
Note: "First," "Second," and "Third" are references to Peirce's standard three categories.
Note: a REPLICA OF a legisign is a sinsign (token, etc.) which embodies that legisign (type, etc.), The individual instance of the word "lion" is a sinsign (token, etc.) of a lion and is a replica of the general term "lion" which is a legisign (type, etc.) of a lion. Such a replica should not be called a sinsign or token OF the associated legisign or type. It's a replica of the legisign but still denotes a lion and, therefore, is a sinsign or token of a lion.
II. Icon, index, symbol
This is the typology of the sign as distinguished by phenomenological category of its way of denoting the object (set forth in 1867 and many times in later years). This typology emphasizes how the sign alternatively refers to its object (1) iconically, by virtue of the sign's relation to itself (or its ground), (2) indexically, by virtue of the sign's relation to its object, and (3) symbolically, by virtue of the sign's relation to its interpretant. A sign may compound these modes, e.g., roadside sign displaying a fork both (1) portrays and (2) indicates a rest stop, and (3) does so in keeping with some pronounced stylistic conventions which add something of a symbolic dimension.
1. ICON (a.k.a LIKENESS a.k.a. SEMBLANCE) = sign that denotes its object by virtue of a quality which is shared by them but which the icon has irrespectively of the object. The icon (e.g., a portrait or a diagram) resembles or imitates its object. The icon has, of itself, a certain character or aspect, one which the object also has (or is supposed to have) and which lets the icon be interpreted as a sign even if the object does not exist. The icon signifies essentially on the basis of its "ground." (Peirce defined the ground as the pure abstraction of a quality, and the sign's ground as the respect in which it resembles its object.)
2. INDEX (a.k.a. sign* a.k.a. SEME) = sign that denotes its object by virtue of an actual connection involving them, one that Peirce also calls a real relation between them in virtue of its being irrespective of interpretation. If that connection or relation is a resistance or reaction, a physical or causal connection, between an individual index and its (individual) object, then the index is a reagent (e.g. smoke coming from a building is a reagent index of fire). Hence, such an index refers to the object because that index is really affected or modified by the object, and thus may stand as a trace of the existence of the object. Peirce also usually held that an index does not have to be an actual individual but can be a general and, usually, he considered a designation to be an index, e.g., a pronoun, a proper name, etc., actually directing or compelling the mind's attention toward the object just as a reagent does. (In 1903 Peirce said that an index must be an actual individual and calls such designations "subindices or hyposemes," classing them among symbols; but in 1904 he returned to allowing indices to be generals and to classing designations as indices.) Peirce also distinguishes between genuine index, e.g., a reagent, which gives some information about its object via some subordinate iconicity, and a degenerate index, which only compels attention, e.g., every individual thing is a degenerate index of its own characteristics.
3. SYMBOL (a.k.a. general sign*) = sign that denotes its object solely by virtue of the fact that it will be interpreted to do so. The symbol does not depend on having any resemblance or actual connection to the denoted object but is fundamentally conventional, so that the signifying relationship must be learned and agreed upon (e.g. the word “cat”). A symbol thus denotes, primarily, by virtue of its interpretant. Its sign-action (semeiosis) is ruled by a convention, a more or less systematic set of associations that ensures its interpretation. For Peirce, every symbol is a general, and that which we call an actual individual symbol (e.g., on the page) is called by Peirce a replica OF the symbol or, more strictly, a replica OF a legisign (type, etc.) which is the symbol.
*Note: in "On a New List of Categories" (1867) Peirce gave the unqualified term "sign" as an alternate expression for "index," and gave "general sign" as an alternate expression for "symbol." At that time "representamen" was his preferred blanket term for any and every sign. Peirce eventually decided that the symbol is not the only "general" sign and that indices and icons can be general, too. The general sign, as such, he eventually called the "legisign" or "type."
III. Rheme, dicisign, delome (a.k.a. term, proposition, argument)
This is the typology of the sign as distinguished by phenomenological category of its interpretively represented way of denoting the object (set forth in 1892, 1902, etc.):
1. RHEME (a.k.a. TERM) = sign which represents its object in respect of quality and so, in its signified interpretant, is represented as iconic, though it actually may be icon, index, or symbol. A proposition with the subject places left blank is a rheme; but subject terms by themselves are also rhemes. A proposition, said Peirce, can be considered a zero-place rheme, a zero-place predicate.
2. DICISIGN (a.k.a. PROPOSITION a.k.a. DICENT SIGN) = sign which represents its object in respect of actual existence and so, in its signified interpretant, is represented as indexical, though it actually may be either index or symbol. A PHEME is a dicign actually asserted or asked (as a question) or commanded, etc. Peirce's concept of the proposition is based not only on the idea of a reasonably common element across translations but also on the idea of a proposition as something which may or may not be asserted, asked, commanded, etc. Peirce also generalized the idea of proposition to where he felt he should call it something else; a weathercock or a photograph would not usually be considered a proposition but is so in Peirce's terms, and so he coined the term "dicisign." A dicent symbol (a.k.a. symbolic dicisign) is a proposition in the more conventional sense.
3. DELOME (a.k.a. ARGUMENT) = sign which represents its object in respect of law or habit and so, in its signified interpretant, is represented as symbolic.
The three sign typologies together: ten classes of sign
The three typologies, labeled "I.", "II.", and "III.", are shown together in the table below. As parameters, they are not independent of one another. The slanting and vertical lines show the options for co-classification of a given sign. The result is ten classes of sign.
Words in parentheses in the table are alternate names for the same kinds of signs.
| Phenomenological category: Sign is distinguished by phenomenological category... | 1. QUALITY (OF FEELING), possibility, vagueness | OR | 2. REACTION, RESISTANCE, actuality, individuality | OR | 3. REPRE- SENTATION, ramification, (conditional) necessity, generality |
| I. ...of the SIGN ITSELF: | QUALISIGN (Tone, Potisign) | OR | SINSIGN (Token, Actisign) | OR | LEGISIGN (Type, Famisign) |
| AND |  | ||||
| II. ...of the sign's way of denoting its OBJECT: | ICON (Semblance) | OR | INDEX (Sign*, Seme) | OR | SYMBOL (General sign*) |
| AND | | ||||
| III. ...of the sign's INTERPRETIVELY REPRESENTED way of denoting its object: | RHEME (Term) | OR | DICISIGN (Proposition, Dicent sign) | OR | DELOME (Argument) |
*Note: As noted above, in "On a New List of Categories" (1867) Peirce gave the unqualified term "sign" as an alternate expression for "index," and gave "general sign" as an alternate expression for "symbol." At that time "representamen" was his blanket term for any and every sign.
| Sign's own phen. categ. | Rel. to object. | Rel. to interpre. | (Specificational redundancies in parentheses) | Examples | |
| I | Qualisign | Icon | Rheme | (Rhematic Iconic) Qualisign | A feeling of “red” |
| II. | Sinsign | Icon | Rheme | (Rhematic) Iconic Sinsign | An individual diagram |
| III. | Index | Rheme | Rhematic Indexical Sinsign | A spontaneous cry. | |
| IV. | Dicisign | Dicent (Indexical) Sinsign | A weathercock or photograph | ||
| V. | Legisign | Icon | Rheme | (Rhematic) Iconic Legisign | A diagram, apart from its factual individuality |
| VI. | Index | Rheme | Rhematic Indexical Legisign | A demonstrative pronoun | |
| VII. | Dicisign | Dicent Indexical Legisign | A street cry | ||
| VIII. | Symbol | Rheme | Rhematic Symbol (–ic Legisign) | A common noun | |
| IX. | Dicisign | Dicent Symbol (–ic Legisign) | A proposition (in the conventional sense) | ||
| X. | Argument | Argument (–ative Symbolic Legisign) | A syllogism |
| (I) | (V) | (VIII) | (X) | ||||
| (II) | (VI) | (IX) | |||||
| (III) | (VII) | ||||||
| (IV) | |||||||