Unity of science

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The unity of science is a thesis in philosophy of science that says that all the sciences form a unified whole. The variants of the thesis can be classified as ontological (giving a unified account of the structure of reality) and/or as epistemic/pragmatic (giving a unified account of how the activities and products of science work).[1] There are also philosophers who emphasize the disunity of science, which does not necessarily imply that there could be no unity in some sense but does emphasize pluralism in the ontology and/or practice of science.[1]

Early versions of the unity of science thesis can be found in ancient Greek philosophers such as Aristotle,[2][3] and in the later history of Western philosophy.[2] For example, in the first half of the 20th century the thesis was associated with the unity of science movement led by Otto Neurath,[4] and in the second half of the century the thesis was advocated by Ludwig von Bertalanffy in "General System Theory: A New Approach to Unity of Science" (1951)[4][5] and by Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam in "Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis" (1958).[2][6] It has been opposed by, for example, Jerry Fodor in "Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)" (1974),[2][7] by Paul Feyerabend in Against Method (1975) and later works,[2][8] by John Dupré in "The Disunity of Science" (1983) and The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (1993),[2][9] by Nancy Cartwright in The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science (1999) and other works,[2][10] and by Evelyn Fox Keller in Making Sense of Life: Explaining Biological Development with Models, Metaphors, and Machines (2002) and other works.[11]

Jean Piaget suggested, in his 1918 book Recherche[12] and later works, that the unity of science can be considered in terms of a circle of the sciences, where logic is the foundation for mathematics, which is the foundation for mechanics and physics, and physics is the foundation for chemistry, which is the foundation for biology, which is the foundation for sociology, the moral sciences, psychology, and the theory of knowledge, and the theory of knowledge forms a basis for logic, completing the circle,[13] without implying that any science could be reduced to any other.[14] More recently, multilevel complex systems are considered to be transdisciplinary[15] objects of study.[2][16]

Criticism

The allure of a unified scientific framework, built upon the bedrock of reductionism, falters when confronted with the intractable complexities of non-linear systems. While the reductionist ideal promises to dissect reality into its fundamental components, revealing the underlying unity of logic, math, physics, chemistry, and biology, it stumbles against the phenomenon of emergence. Here, properties arise from intricate interactions, defying simple decomposition and rendering the "whole" demonstrably more than the sum of its parts. This exposes a critical deficiency: reductionism, while powerful, cannot fully account for the emergent behaviors that define much of the natural world. Equally insufficient is wholism, which, while acknowledging the significance of the whole, provides no concrete mechanisms for understanding its genesis. Consequently, the pursuit of a singular "theory of everything" risks oversimplification, demanding instead a more nuanced approach that acknowledges the inherent limitations of both reductionism and wholism, and embraces the insights offered by complexity science to navigate the intricate tapestry of reality.[17][18]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ a b Tahko 2021, p. 4.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h Cat 2017.
  3. ^ Wilson 2000.
  4. ^ a b Symons, Pombo & Torres 2011.
  5. ^ Bertalanffy 1951.
  6. ^ Oppenheim & Putnam 1958.
  7. ^ Fodor 1974.
  8. ^ Feyerabend 1993; Feyerabend 2011.
  9. ^ Dupré 1983; Dupré 1993.
  10. ^ Cartwright 1999.
  11. ^ Ludwig & Ruphy 2021; Keller 2002.
  12. ^ Piaget 1918.
  13. ^ Braun & Baribeau 1984.
  14. ^ Kitchener 1981.
  15. ^ Nicolescu 2002, p. 1: "The term transdisciplinary first appeared three decades ago in the works of such varied scholars as Jean Piaget, Edgar Morin, and Erich Jantsch."
  16. ^ Bunge 2003, pp. 4, 250.
  17. ^ Kesić, Srdjan (27 June 2015). "Systems biology, emergence and antireductionism". Saudi Journal of Biological Sciences. doi:10.1016/j.sjbs.2015.06.015.
  18. ^ O’Connor, Timothy (2021). "Emergent Properties". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.

References

Further reading