Talk:Utilitarianism

Opposed as being contrary to common sense

Utilitarianism has been opposed for leading to a number of conclusions contrary to common sense morality. For example, if one was given the choice of saving one's child or two strangers, utilitarianism suggests saving the strangers instead of one's child, since two people will have more total future happiness than one. This seems contrary to common sense, especially to the feelings on duty towards those who they are close that humans have.

I find this a curious example (quite apart from the prose lapse in the last sentence). Yes, the result is counter to "common sense", but if common sense were sufficient, we wouldn't need ethics! I would be deeply suspicious of any system of ethics that came to the opposite conclusion. Can anyone name a philosopher who has made this particular argument against utilitarianism? -- Tim Goodwin

I would argue that the position that I should treat my child's life as equal in value to a stranger is plain silly, for several reasons:

1) Any philosophical position that tries to go counter to millions of years of evolution is simply a non-starter.

2) Valuing all humans equally, regardless of their relationship to me, would make it difficult, if not impossible to focus my efforts, and maintain any kind of normal human relationships.

3) I would rather my family did not become strict utilitarians.

Was it St. Thomas Aquinas who suggested that rather than being responsible for everyone, it makes more sense for us to be responsible for a small number of people, and being responsoble for one's family is as good as random selection? -- Michael Voytinsky

Are your proposing a change to the article, or do you just want to chat about philosophy? Markalexander100 22:40, 13 Apr 2004 (UTC)

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So, suppose that some situation allows Jill to either lie, deceive, or be honest. Suppose further that lying would yield the most utility of the three possible acts. Suppose further still that Jill's adhering to the policy of honesty would yield more utility than her adhering to any other available policy. Then act utilitarianism would recommend lying and rule utilitarianism would recommend being honest.

Hmm... Not necessarily. Rules can be more complicated than just, "Thou shalt not lie"... A rule could specify circumstances in which it was all right to lie, and circumstances in which it wasn't. As one makes the rules more complex, they could take more of the possible consequences into account, and so (I think) rule utilitarianism would tend to act utilitarianism in the limit of complexity of rules... Does that make sense? But of course as the complexity of the rules increased, people's ability to understand and follow them would decrease, so a rule utilitarianist might argue that there has to be a trade-off, and that rule utilitarianism is better because (a) it approximates act utilitarianism (an unattainable ideal, because no-one can predict the consequences of every action) and (b) is actually humanly attainable (because people can forumlate rules). What? You mean Wikipedia is not a philosophy discussion forum? ;) -- Oliver P. 15:35 Mar 28, 2003 (UTC)

If is is assumed that "Jill's adhering to the policy of honesty would yield more utility than her adhering to any other available policy", then the article's statement is correct. Markalexander100 05:03, 22 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Relation to liberalism

Utilitarianism, as developed by philosophers like John Stuart Mill, is a source of inspiration for liberal thought. In that way it is related to liberalism. Gangulf 13:51, 24 Jul 2004 (UTC)

I see. Sorry about the revert from before - it just looked very random to me. Raistlinjones 16:18, Jul 24, 2004 (UTC)

Opposite

Under See also it is claimed that Kantianism is the opposite of utilitarianism. I beg to differ. There are three "classic" theoretical frameworks utilitarianism, deontology (which kantianism is a part of) and virtue ethics. The two first mentioned both focus on actions while the last focus on how one should be as a person. So couldn't one claim that virtue ethics is the opposite of utilitarianism? I'm not making that claim just pointing out it seems fairly arbitrary to call kantianism the opposite of utilitarianism.

It is by the way also claimed on the bottom of the page that utilitarianism could be compatible with kantianism, it's alleged opposite... // Doldis of the swedish wikipedia ;-)

Yes, indeed, I have read the works of that guy also who claims kantian moral and utilitarianism are two sides of the same coin. --Lussmu 19:59, 8 Aug 2004 (UTC)

"Kantian Consequentialism"? I've heard of that, and it makes sense to me. Lucidish 05:43, 12 Aug 2004 (UTC)

It's the title of a book from the 1990s by David Cummiskey. Sorry I don't have time to write more. 19 Dec 2004

Satisficing and Optimific Utilitarianisms

I don't have the time or expertise at present to write up a little bit on satisficing and optimific utilitarianisms, but I just wanted to drop a note in case anyone wanted to do that. Lucidish 05:43, 12 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Criticisms

What about the criticism that utilitarianism doesn't protect the interests of minority groups? I'd add it, but I really wouldn't be able to say much about it. Would anyone be willing to add any counter arguments by utilitarians to the criticisms? sars 16:53, Jan 23, 2005 (UTC)

Rule utilitarianism might place a moral imperitive to protect minority groups if it recognised that in the majority of cases attacking a minority was bad. A strict rule-utilitarian would then still recognise the rule even when it involved a much-maligned minority where an attack may increase overall utility. Act-utilitarianism doesn't really provide any protection of that kind harsheh 31st Jan 2005

Someone needs to bring up the criticisms with respect to punishment and promising, as well as Richard G. Henson's arguments in his "Utilitarianism and the Wrongness of Killing"

Hedonic Calculus

I can see the Hedonic calculus in the text when I go to edit, under "History of Utilitarianism" but it's not appearing in the article?! - sars 17:38, Feb 1, 2005 (UTC)

There is a good which is greater then all other goods. Good is a state that exists outside of good action. The state of good is a state inwhich all that have the capibility of choice mantian that capibility and that is the greatest good. so i think it is choice which is the greatest good that right to choose good or the other not actual good

There is a good which is greater then all other goods. Good is a state that exists outside of good action. The state of good is a state inwhich all that have the capibility of choice mantian that capibility and that is the greatest good. [e-mail]

this good would be balanced with virtues as well, so you do your best to allow one to be comfortable to make choices and hope they do the same for others

this theory does not allow of anything that causes some one to force uncomfortablilty on another

such as fighting for freedom the goal of this could is world good or a connected feeling of good

its not done, it will be soon i will post the rest

any concerns or any plugs you want to make into the theory i would be more then happy to talk to you

[e-mail]

Someone needs to bring up the criticisms with respect to punishment and promising, as well as Richard G. Henson's arguments in his "Utilitarianism and the Wrongness of Killing"

Negative Utilitarianism

"However, advocates of the Utilitarian principle (including Mill) were quick to suggest that the ultimate aim of negative utilitarianism would be to engender the quickest and least painful method of killing the entirety of humanity, as this ultimately would effectively minimise pain."

Where does Mill say this? I would guess that it would be in Utilitarianism, but I have not read that. LavosBacons

Recent edits

Ultramarine, I really appreciate all the hard work you have put into this article, and the article on the Categorical Imperative. I made a slight edit, adding back three lines to this article, to guide interested readers to a fuller discussion of an interesting topic, but I made no changes to your work. RK 01:46, Apr 29, 2005 (UTC)

Mill the father of rule utilitarianism?

John Stuart Mill wrote a famous (and short) book called Utilitarianism. While Bentham can be considered the father of act utilitarianism, Mill is often considered the father of rule utilitarianism.

By whom is Mill so considered and on what grounds? My understanding is that the distinction between act and rule utilitarianism postdates both Bentham and Mill; this seems at best anachronistic without a further explanation of who made the claim and on what grounds.

Mill, for his part, defines what he believes in Utilitarianism in terms of the direct judgment of actions in light of the Greatest Happiness Principle:

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. (Ch. 2 ¶2)

The closest that he comes to advocating rule utilitarianism as opposed to act utilitarianism, as far as I can tell, is in Ch. 2 ¶¶23-24. For example, he suggests that it is almost always wrong to lie, even if momentary gains can be achieved, because sustaining the principle of honesty is more productive of happiness than whatever the benefits of any individual lie could be:

Thus, it would often be expedient, for the purpose of getting over some momentary embarrassment, or attaining some object immediately useful to ourselves or others, to tell a lie. But inasmuch as the cultivation in ourselves of a sensitive feeling on the subject of veracity, is one of the most useful, and the enfeeblement of that feeling one of the most hurtful, things to which our conduct can be instrumental; and inasmuch as any, even unintentional, deviation from truth, does that much towards weakening the trustworthiness of human assertion, which is not only the principal support of all present social well-being, but the insufficiency of which does more than any one thing that can be named to keep back civilisation, virtue, everything on which human happiness on the largest scale depends; we feel that the violation, for a present advantage, of a rule of such transcendent expediency, is not expedient, and that he who, for the sake of a convenience to himself or to some other individual, does what depends on him to deprive mankind of the good, and inflict upon them the evil, involved in the greater or less reliance which they can place in each other's word, acts the part of one of their worst enemies. (Ch. 2 ¶23)

But this passage actually provides absolutely no evidence at all either for or against the claim that Mill is a rule utilitarian. He makes it clear that he thinks that principled honesty is better than opportunistic lying in almost every case, but you can believe that whether you are a rule or an act utilitarian. Mill actually compares the effects of a keeping or betraying a rule here with the direct effects of an act, which is something that you're really not supposed to do in rule utilitarianism at the first place (since it requires you to directly appeal to the Greatest Happiness Principle to judge the rewards of not just a rule, but also a particular act of lying in a particular instance, in order to make the comparison). He also immediately goes on to claim that there are undeniable exceptions to the rule, and to claim that the question of where the exceptions are to be made ought to be answered by direct appeal to the Greatest Happiness Principle:

Yet that even this rule, sacred as it is, admits of possible exceptions, is acknowledged by all moralists; the chief of which is when the withholding of some fact (as of information from a malefactor, or of bad news from a person dangerously ill) would save an individual (especially an individual other than oneself) from great and unmerited evil, and when the withholding can only be effected by denial. But in order that the exception may not extend itself beyond the need, and may have the least possible effect in weakening reliance on veracity, it ought to be recognised, and, if possible, its limits defined; and if the principle of utility is good for anything, it must be good for weighing these conflicting utilities against one another, and marking out the region within which one or the other preponderates. (Ch. 2 ¶23)

Now, he could be claiming that the appeal to the Greatest Happiness Principle "for weighing these conflicting utilities against one another" is a matter of appealing to the Greatest Happiness Principle to judge further rules for when it is licit to make an exception to the virtue of honesty. The suggestion that "limits" should be "defined" and "the region within which one or the other preponderates" should be "mark[ed] out" suggests this reading. But given what has gone before, and what has gone after, and the fact that the distinction post-dates Mill's work anyway, the most likely reading is just that he isn't aware of, or isn't concerned with, the distinction at all.

He objects to those critics of utilitarianism who claim "that there is not time, previous to action, for calculating and weighing the effects of any line of conduct on the general happiness", by saying:

This is exactly as if any one were to say that it is impossible to guide our conduct by Christianity, because there is not time, on every occasion on which anything has to be done, to read through the Old and New Testaments. ... People talk as if the commencement of this course of experience had hitherto been put off, and as if, at the moment when some man feels tempted to meddle with the property or life of another, he had to begin considering for the first time whether murder and theft are injurious to human happiness. Even then I do not think that he would find the question very puzzling; but, at all events, the matter is now done to his hand. It is truly a whimsical supposition that, if mankind were agreed in considering utility to be the test of morality, they would remain without any agreement as to what is useful, and would take no measures for having their notions on the subject taught to the young, and enforced by law and opinion. There is no difficulty in proving any ethical standard whatever to work ill, if we suppose universal idiocy to be conjoined with it; but on any hypothesis short of that, mankind must by this time have acquired positive beliefs as to the effects of some actions on their happiness; and the beliefs which have thus come down are the rules of morality for the multitude, and for the philosopher until he has succeeded in finding better.

But again, this does not commit him to rule utilitarianism as against act utilitarianism; in (¶24) he makes it clear that his concern is epistemological rather than ethical:

But to consider the rules of morality as improvable, is one thing; to pass over the intermediate generalisations entirely, and endeavour to test each individual action directly by the first principle, is another. It is a strange notion that the acknowledgment of a first principle is inconsistent with the admission of secondary ones. To inform a traveller respecting the place of his ultimate destination, is not to forbid the use of landmarks and direction-posts on the way. The proposition that happiness is the end and aim of morality, does not mean that no road ought to be laid down to that goal, or that persons going thither should not be advised to take one direction rather than another. Men really ought to leave off talking a kind of nonsense on this subject, which they would neither talk nor listen to on other matters of practical concernment. ... Whatever we adopt as the fundamental principle of morality, we require subordinate principles to apply it by; the impossibility of doing without them, being common to all systems, can afford no argument against any one in particular; but gravely to argue as if no such secondary principles could be had, and as if mankind had remained till now, and always must remain, without drawing any general conclusions from the experience of human life, is as high a pitch, I think, as absurdity has ever reached in philosophical controversy. (Ch. 2 ¶24)

The issue at hand here doesn't have anything directly to do with the controversy between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism; the issue at hand is the usefulness of general rules in discovering what's good and applying the Greatest Happiness Principle. Mill nowhere states whether he means that what you in fact discover by means of these general rules, and what you apply the Greatest Happiness Principle to with their help, are (a) general principles of conduct, or (b) individual acts.

The point of all this is not to claim that Mill is an act utilitarian rather than a rule utilitarian. Rather, what I want to know is what grounds there are for saying that he's a rule utilitarian rather than an act utilitarian. If rule utilitarians have claimed his arguments as influential, then we ought to mention them by name, since they are at the most imposing a distinction made after Mill was dead and claiming that if you make his position more precise than he in fact made it, you might have some good arguments for their preferred side of the distinction. If we're going to indulge in anachronism it should be acknowledged anachronism. If, on the other hand, there aren't later writers to mention by name, then I can't see any grounds for making the claim at all, and the sentence just ought to be struck from the article.

—Radgeek 06:10, 20 Jun 2005 (UTC)

We can certainly change the statement. I just vaguely remember seeing in one philosophical encyclopedias that some consider him the be the father and other do not. But that is not very strong evidence. :) Ultramarine 18:14, 21 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Good/Happiness

Latest comment: 20 years ago6 comments3 people in discussion

Happiness is but one standard for utility that utilitarians could adopt. "Good" is a generic term for desirable or beneficial consequences used more commonly in moral philosophy. Since not all utilitarians are interested in eudaimonism, I feel it is misleading to say that all utilitarianism is only using happiness as a yardstick. I will present academic references that the "good" is in fact the standard term for desirable consequences (contrasted with the "right") upon request. --Malathion 7 July 2005 08:57 (UTC)

Happiness is what Bentham and Mill used. You seem to be confusing Utilitarianism with Consequentialism. Eudaimonism is term often used when refering to Aristotle and Virtue ethics. Ultramarine 7 July 2005 10:07 (UTC)

Bentham and Mill are not the be-all-end-all of utilitaranism. Please reference your claim that all utilitarians define utility as happiness. --Malathion 7 July 2005 10:09 (UTC)

It is rather up to you to prove that this is not the case, since I have already shown that the fathers of utilitarianism meant happiness. Ultramarine 7 July 2005 10:46 (UTC)

Very well. From plato.stanford.edu:

"Many consequentialists deny that all values can be reduced to any single ground, such as pleasure or desire satisfaction, so they instead adopt a pluralistic theory of value. Moore's ideal utilitarianism, for example, takes into account the values of beauty and truth (or knowledge) in addition to pleasure (Moore 1903, 83-85, 194). Other consequentialists add the intrinsic values of friendship or love, freedom or ability, life, virtue, and so on.

If the recognized values all concern individual welfare, then the theory of value can be called welfarist (Sen 1979). When a welfarist theory of value is combined with the other elements of classic utilitarianism, the resulting theory can be called welfarist consequentialism.

One non-welfarist theory of value is perfectionism, which claims that certain states make a person's life good without necessarily being good for the person in any way that increases that person's welfare (Hurka 1993, esp. 17). If this theory of value is combined with other elements of classic utilitarianism, the resulting theory can be called perfectionist consequentialism or, in deference to its Aristotelian roots, eudaemonistic consequentialism.

Similarly, some consequentialists hold that an act is right if and only if it maximizes some function of both happiness and capabilities (Sen 1985). Disabilities are then seen as bad regardless of whether they are accompanied by pain or loss of pleasure.

Or one could hold that an act is right if it maximizes respect for (or minimizes violations of) certain specified moral rights. Such theories are sometimes described as a utilitarianism of rights. Even if happiness and other values count in addition to rights, the disvalue of rights violations could be lexically ranked prior to any other kind of loss or harm (cf. Rawls 1971, 42). Such a lexical ranking within a consequentialist moral theory would yield the result that nobody is ever justified in violating rights for the sake of happiness or any value other than rights, although it would still allow some rights violations in order to avoid or prevent other rights violations."

--Malathion 7 July 2005 11:02 (UTC)

Refers to consequentialism, not utilitariansim. Also from Stanford:

"The paradigm case of consequentialism is utilitarianism, whose classic proponents were Jeremy Bentham (1789), John Stuart Mill (1861), and Henry Sidgwick (1907). Classic utilitarians held hedonistic act consequentialism. Act consequentialism is the claim that an act is morally right if and only if that act maximizes the good, that is, if and only if the total amount of good for all minus the total amount of bad for all is greater than this net amount for any incompatible act available to the agent on that occasion. (Cf. Moore 1912, chs. 1-2.) Hedonism then claims that pleasure is the only intrinsic good and that pain is the only intrinsic bad. Together these claims imply that an act is morally right if and only if that act causes "the greatest happiness for the greatest number," as the common slogan says."

"This array of alternatives raises the question of which moral theories count as consequentialist (as opposed to deontological), and why. In actual usage, the term ’consequentialism‘ seems to be used as a family resemblance term to refer to any descendant of classic utilitarianism that remains close enough to its ancestor in the important respects. Of course, different philosophers see different respects as the important ones. Hence, there is no agreement on which theories count as consequentialist under this definition.". Ultramarine 7 July 2005 11:07 (UTC)

The entry on utilitarianism says "See consequentialism." They are covered in the same article and the author uses the terms almost interchangably. Thanks for reasserting what we already knew (that Bentham and Mill were eudamonistic consequentialists), but I don't think you've given a reason to ignore to the myriad of utilitarianism variants the article lists. --Malathion 7 July 2005 11:15 (UTC)

Again, the article is about consequentialism and utilitarianism is mentioned as a subset. There is no support for your claim that utilitarianism refers to "good" instead of "happiness". However, we can certainly add that there is some confusion about the definitions of utilitarianism and consequentialism even among philosophers. Ultramarine 7 July 2005 11:23 (UTC)

For a reference to the "good" please see John Rawls A Theory of Justice Chapter 5, Classical Utilitarianism: "The two main concepts of ethics are those of the right and the good... Teleological theories differ, pretty clearly, according to how the conception of the good is specifed. If it is taken as the realization of human excellence in various form of culture, we have what may be called perfectionism. This notion is found in Aristotle and Nietzche, among others. If the good is defined as pleasure, we have hedonism; if as happiness, eudaimonism, and so on."

I don't think it is fair to say that the presence of several competing variants of utilitarianism constitutes "confusion". These people know what they are talking about. --Malathion 8 July 2005 04:12 (UTC)

The correct definition is not what one particular philosopher happens to think but what is accepted by most. Stanford clearly states that there is no consensus on what consequentialism exactly is. On the other hand, classic utilitarianism is exactly defined. Ultramarine 8 July 2005 04:29 (UTC)

Thanks for reaffriming what Rawls said in the above quotation (that there is no agreement). This article is not on classical utilitarianism. If this is so difficult to grasp I think it would be best to simply remove the statement all together since it doesn't add much anyway. --Malathion 8 July 2005 04:29 (UTC)

You have not managed to show that utilitarianism defintely refer to anything else than what the classic utilitarianism thought, namely happiness.

Encylcopedia Britanica "Utilitarianism in normative ethics, a tradition stemming from the late 18th- and 19th-century English philosophersand economists Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill that an action is right if it tends to promote happiness and wrong if it tends to produce the reverse of happiness—not just the happiness of the performer of the action but also that of everyone affected by it."

MS Encarta: "Utilitarianism (Latin utilis, “useful”), in ethics, the doctrine that what is useful is good, and consequently, that the ethical value of conduct is determined by the utility of its results. The term utilitarianism is more specifically applied to the proposition that the supreme objective of moral action is the achievement of the greatest happiness for the greatest number."

Merriam-Webster:"a doctrine that the useful is the good and that the determining consideration of right conduct should be the usefulness of its consequences; specifically : a theory that the aim of action should be the largest possible balance of pleasure over pain or the greatest happiness of the greatest number" Ultramarine 8 July 2005 04:39 (UTC)

Also, this article seems excessively friendly to utilitarianism, in particular by giving the last word to the utilitarians in every debate. --Malathion 7 July 2005 08:57 (UTC)

Please add more relevant critical argument. Please also note that the same can be said for the other articles on ethical and moral systems, for example that they are usually totally useless for solving more complex and ambiguous real world situations where different absolute inviolable rules collide. Ultramarine 7 July 2005 10:55 (UTC)

Malathion asked for my opinion, so I shall give it for what it's worth. Utilitarianism is indeed a subset of consequentialism, as Ultramarine suggests, and they are not synonymous. Utilitarianism, however, does most often promote a theory of the good, and that is the desired consequence of our acts; however, while it has often been construed as such, the good need not only be happiness or pleasure, as Bentham or Mill suggest. For example, so-called negative utilitarianism would seek to minimize suffering; the absence of suffering, however, does not necessarily entail happiness or pleasure. These are not opposites, for some would derive pleasure from suffering, and, when we are not suffering we are not necessarily experiencing pleasure or happiness. The esteemed Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Vol. 8) states, "Utilitarianism can most generally be described as the doctrine which states that the rightness or wrongness of actions is determined by the goodness and badness of their consequences. This general definition can be made more precise in various ways, according to which we get various species of utilitarianism." The piece then goes on to define the various forms, most of which are hedonic, though not all of them are (e.g., negative utilitarianism, ideal utilitarianism a la Rashdall and others).

Of course, G.E. Moore (in direct response to Mill's conception), among many other philosophers, would argue that saying that the good is equivalent or synonymous with pleasure or happiness is to commit the Naturalistic fallacy. Moore himself subscribed to a species of ideal utilitariainsm with his theory of organic unities, and I certainly would not characterize this as consiting of a hedonic principle.

In any case, I would be more inclined to say that utilitariainsm propounds a theory of the good, and that it purports that our acts ought to maximize those consequences that are deemed to be good for the greatest number, and that this is often construed as consisting of soem state of happiness or pleasure, or as in the case of Sidgwick, consequneces that comport with some principle of beneficence, though some utilitarian theories might seek to produce other consequneces or theories of the good.

Finally, I must say, the article as it stands today does not compare well to the venerable Encyclopedia of Philosophy or even to Stanford's newer on-line version. It really needs a good deal of work. You will please pardon me, however, if I refrain from participating any further, here, for it is not among my present interests. All the best. icut4u

Since philosophers can not agree on what consequentialism is, there can hardly be any agreement on exactly what utilitarianism is. This simply reflects the intermixed historical development of utilitarianism and consequentialism. Mainstream sources like EB or MW do include happiness. But we can certainly state the ambiguity clearer. Ultramarine 8 July 2005 10:39 (UTC)

Two points concerning consequentialism and utilitarianism.

First, it is seriously misleading to describe G. E. Moore as an "ideal utilitarian." This is, as far as I know, a name that was imposed on him by others; in any case, in Principia Ethica he does not describe his position as "utilitarian" at all; in fact, he holds that utilitarianism is decisively refuted by his arguments against hedonism (see Chapter II, and especially § 64). The term comes from Rashdall's Theory of Good and Evil (1907); imposing it on Moore's work of four years prior, in which Moore explicitly distinguishes his position from utilitarianism without qualification, is a serious anachronism.

Second, for reference, here is how John Stuart Mill defines utilitarianism:

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.

—Mill, [Utilitarianism Chapter 2 ("What Utilitarianism Is") ¶2

Now, you might object as Malathion did that Mill (or Bentham) is not the be-all end-all of utilitarianism. That's true, but since he did invent the word as it is used today, it does seem to me that his opinion ought to carry some weight.

There are three main classes of references which have been cited above. The first are those in which ambiguities in Mill's definition are made more precise (by, for example, pointing out that the minimizing of suffering and the maximizing of pleasure are not necessarily the same thing, and taking one or the other as the chief good); the second are those (mainly cited by Malathion) in which "utilitarianism" is not actually mentioned at all, but rather "consequentialism" or "teleological theories" (which cut no ice at all, since it is agreed that consequentialism and teleological theories can include non-hedonistic accounts of value); the third is the specific case of Rashdall's (not Moore's) "ideal utilitarianism." The first don't actually challenge the claim that utilitarianism entails a hedonistic theory of value; they just point out that there are different possible hedonistic theories. The second cut no ice at all in the debate. The third case is worth mentioning in the article, but it's not at all clear that the general gloss of what utilitarianism is should be qualified in order to fit it. Rashdall's usage is peculiar, in direct conflict with the meaning given to the term by its coiners, and it has mostly been eclipsed by Anscombe's term "consequentialism". (Thomas Jefferson and some other deists had a peculiar understanding of "Christianity" under which they counted themselves as "Christians" even though they denied that Jesus had any unique role in salvation and repudiated all the parts of the New Testament that claimed that Christ performed miracles. This may be a view worth noting in a general overview of Christianity; it's not a view worth altering or qualifying the general definition of "Christianity" in order to accomodate.)

Utilitarianism should be defined specifically in terms of happiness and unhappiness or pleasure and pain. In fact, the current definition of the utilitarian ethical standard ("quantitative maximisation of some good for society or humanity") is hopeless even as a definition of consequentialism (any ethical theory holds that "some good for society or humanity" ought to be maximized; Kant--for example--just says that the only good "for society or humanity" is an autonomous will). What say let's change this. Radgeek 06:12, 8 August 2005 (UTC)Reply

Since philosophers can not agree on what consequentialism is, there can hardly be any agreement on exactly what utilitarianism is. I think this is the root of the problem. I don't think there is really any disagreement about what utilitarianism is. The real issue is that there are many varieties of it. You can't simply pick one variety, such as the eudaimonistic or hedonistic examples you cited, and say "this is utilitarianism" without violating WP:NPOV. You'd be silencing too many voices, and too many utilitarians who have a different conception of the good.

Also, I think your characterization of Kant as a maximizer of good is severely misplaced. Kant explicitly stated that consequences are morally neutral and utterly irrelevant to moral deliberation in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. --malathion ^talk 06:24, 8 August 2005 (UTC)Reply

Of course Kant argues that consequences are irrelevant to moral deliberation. This does not mean that Kantian ethics do not hold that the good should be maximized; it does mean that Kant holds that a good will and only a good will is good as an end in itself. "Maximizing good" doesn't entail that the maximizing actions are valuable only as means; that is why it is not even a good definition of "consequentialism" (which, at a minimum, must hold that actions are justified only by the goodness of their further consequences, and thus only as means).

You claim above that philosophical debate concerning the precise meaning of "consequentialism" rules out any agreement on the precise meaning of "utilitarianism." I'm not sure this is true, since the word "utilitarianism" is older than the word "consequentialism," and a definition of "utilitarianism" that requires the word "consequentialism" could therefore be accused of anachronism. But I'm even less sure that it's relevant. Difficulties with defining "consequentialism" only affect this debate if they somehow touch on which sorts of accounts of value can count as utilitarian (not just consequentialist) accounts of value. Could you give an example of a disagreement amongst authoritative sources that's relevant to this question?

You also claim that by giving the general definition of utilitarianism explicitly in terms of happiness and unhappiness, or pleasure and pain (as Mill did, when he coined the term "utilitarianism"), would be "silencing too many voices, and too many utilitarians who have a different conception of the good." Could you give an example of which philosophers, precisely, would be "silenced" by such a definition? How many people are we talking about, what is their position within the tradition? How many of them actually identify themselves as "utilitarians"? (Moore, for one, has been cited, but he does not consider himself a "utilitarian" at all.) If we are talking about a peculiar usage with a fairly limited reach (Rashdall's "ideal utilitarianism," for example), I can see good reasons to discuss it downstream in the article (which we currently do not do), but why should we eviscerate the general gloss (as we currently do) in order to accomodate an idiosyncratic usage that is in direct conflict with the original definition?

—Radgeek 06:51, 8 August 2005 (UTC)Reply

I agree with Radgeek's general position; but I read Moore differently. He holds "Good actions are those which maximize total pleasure" (but as a theorem, not a definition) and is therefore classed by others as a utilitarian. But he did not regard this as a practical test, for no-one has long enough experience to apply it. Hence his final position, of the wisdom of tradition and the goodness of purely retributive punishment. Septentrionalis 17:28, 8 August 2005 (UTC)Reply

Moore does not hold that good actions are those which maximize total pleasure. He holds that right actions are those which under the circumstances would produce the greatest possible amount of intrinsic goodness. He also holds that many things other than pleasure (among them knowledge, compassion, friendship, and aesthetic beauty) are good for their own sake, independent of any affect they may or may not have on total pleasure or pain. He argues directly against the view that pleasure and pain are the only things good or evil in themselves in Chapter III of Principia Ethica. (If the issue were only epistemological, as you seem to be portraying it, it would be appropriate to call him a utilitarian; he would just be a utilitarian who believes that we must use something other than the hedonic calculus as our external criterion of good actions. But it is not merely epistemological; Moore rejects hedonism (and thus, on his own view of the matter, utilitarianism) not only as a means of discovering the good but also as an account of what the good is. —Radgeek 03:41, 9 August 2005 (UTC)Reply

It's been a while, but I recall him as being (briefly) closer to utilitarianism than that; I understand Principia Ethica to be an effort to produce a Grand System, which makes other systems intelligible, however mistaken, as its partial realizations. But this is thoroughly off-topic in any case; reply to me personally if you like. Septentrionalis 17:54, 9 August 2005 (UTC)Reply

Rule Utilitarianism

Further criticism to Utilitarianism

Latest comment: 19 years ago1 comment1 person in discussion

I've added another criticism, along with the utilitarian response offered by William Shaw, to the list of criticisms. This one is in regards to the fact that the only right action(s) in utilitarianism is the one which creates the most good. Therefore actions which still greatly increase the greater good would be judged as morally wrong by Utilitarianism if there was another option that would increase the good even more. The criticism as it appears in the article may need to be cleaned up a little, I'm tired and wasn't able to express it as clearly as I'd like to. The Way 04:58, 31 August 2005 (UTC)

I've tinkered with some of the wording, and I took out "However, such a response to this criticism makes the meaning of right and wrong questionable", since it seems to be editorial commentary. (As a utilitarian I'd propose that U distinguishes best and not-best rather than good or bad, which does indeed make the meaning of right and wrong questionable, but I'm not eminent enough to cite). Mark¹ 05:10, 31 August 2005 (UTC)Reply

Omelas

Latest comment: 19 years ago1 comment1 person in discussion

While published, repeatedly, as fiction, The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas can also be read as an essay presenting an elaborate hypothetical. The subtitle credits a sentence from William James; her introductory note also quotes and credits Dostoyevsky; these may be worth adding. I retain the description, because what confuses Ultramarine may also confuse other readers. Septentrionalis 15:57, 28 September 2005 (UTC)Reply