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Hungarian Revolution of 1956

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The Hungarian Revolution[3] of 1956 (October 23 — November 10) was a spontaneous nationwide revolt against the authoritarian communist government of Hungary and its Soviet imposed policies. It began as a student demonstration which attracted thousands as it marched through central Budapest to the Parliament building. A student delegation entering the Radio Building attempting to broadcast their demands was detained. When the delegation's release was demanded by the demonstrators outside, they were fired upon by the State Security Police (ÁVH) from within the building. The news spread quickly and disorder and violence erupted throughout the capital.

Hungarian Revolution of 1956
Part of the Cold War
File:Hungarians inspecting a tank.jpg
Hungarians inspecting a captured tank in Budapest
DateOctober 23, 1956 - November 10, 1956
Location
Hungary
Result Revolution failed
Belligerents
Soviet Union;
ÁVH (Hungarian State Security Police)		 Ad hoc local Hungarian militias
Commanders and leaders
Ivan Konev Various independent militia leaders
Strength
150,000 troops,
6,000 tanks		 Unknown number of militia and soldiers
Casualties and losses
722 killed,
1,251 wounded[1]		 2,500 killed[2] (plus 20,000 more killed or executed months afterwards)

The revolt spread quickly across Hungary, and the government fell. Thousands organized into militias, battling the State Security Police (ÁVH) and Soviet troops. Pro-Soviet communists and ÁVH members were often executed or imprisoned, as former prisoners were released and armed. Impromptu councils wrested municipal control from the communist party, and demanded political changes. The new government formally disbanded the ÁVH, declared its intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and pledged to re-establish free elections. By the end of October, fighting had almost stopped and a sense of normalcy began to return.

Although it had previously agreed to a ceasefire, the Politburo reversed itself and now moved to quash the revolution. On November 4, a large Soviet force invaded Budapest using artillery and air strikes, killing thousands of civilians. Organized resistance ceased by 10 November 1956, and mass arrests began. An estimated 200,000 Hungarians fled as refugees. By January 1957 the new Soviet-installed government had suppressed all public opposition. Soviet actions alienated many Western Marxists, yet strengthened Soviet control over Eastern Europe, cultivating the perception that communism was both irreversible and monolithic.

Public discussion about this revolution was suppressed in Hungary for over 30 years; many facts are still disputed and many personal animosities remain unresolved.

Prelude

After World War II, the Soviet military occupied Hungary and gradually replaced the freely-elected government with a communist dictatorship. Radical nationalization of the economy under the Soviet model produced economic stagnation, lower standards of living and a deep malaise.[4] Writers and journalists were the first to show open criticism, publishing critical articles in 1955.[5] University students had by 22 October resurrected the banned MEFESZ student union,[6] and staged a demonstration on 23 October which set off a chain of events leading directly to the revolution.

Postwar occupation

After World War II, Hungary fell under the Soviet sphere of influence and was occupied by the Red Army. The occupation forces achieved permanent status when the Soviet Union established its Southern Group of Forces in 1947.[7] By 1949 the Soviets had concluded a mutual assistance treaty with Hungary which granted the Soviet Union rights to a continued military presence, assuring ultimate political control.[8]

Hungary began the postwar period as a multiparty free democracy. Elections of 1945 produced a coalition government under Prime Minister Zoltán Tildy.[9] However, the Soviet-supported Hungarian Communist Party, which had polled only 17%, constantly wrested small concessions in a process named "salami tactics" which sliced away the elected government's influence.[10]

In 1945, Soviet Marshal Kliment Voroshilov forced the freely-elected Hungarian government to yield the Interior Ministry to the Hungarian Communist Party. Communist Interior Minister László Rajk established the Hungarian State Security Police, later known as the ÁVH, which brutally suppressed political opposition, especially from religious, nationalist and democratic groups. This brief period of multiparty democracy came to an end when the communists, renamed the MDP, stood its candidate list unopposed in 1949. The People's Republic of Hungary was declared.[11]

Political repression and economic decline

File:Nkm343.jpg
Mátyás Rákosi

Hungary became a communist state under the effective dictatorship of Mátyás Rákosi. The Security Police (ÁVH) began a series of purges in which dissidents were denounced as “Titoists” or “western agents”, and forced to confess in show trials.[12] Thousands of Hungarians were arrested, tortured, tried, and imprisoned in concentration camps or were executed, including ÁVH founder László Rajk.[12][13]

The Rákosi government thoroughly politicized Hungary's educational system in order to supplant the educated classes with a "toiling intelligentsia".[14] Russian language study and Communist indoctrination were made mandatory in schools and universities nationwide. Religious education was denounced and church leaders were replaced by those loyal to the government. In 1949 the leader of the Hungarian Catholic Church, József Cardinal Mindszenty, was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment for treason.[15] Under Rákosi, Hungary's government was arguably among the most repressive in Europe.[11][13]

The postwar Hungarian economy suffered from multiple challenges. Hungary agreed to pay war reparations approximating US$300 million, to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, and to support Soviet garrisons.[16] The Hungarian National Bank in 1946 estimated the cost of reparations as "between 19 and 22 per cent of the national income."[17] Moreover, Hungary's participation in the Soviet sponsored COMECON (Council Of Mutual Economic Assistance), prevented it from trading with the West or receiving Marshall Plan aid.[18] Though the economy had initially recovered after the war, it shrank under the Rákosi government. By 1952, disposable real incomes sank to two-thirds of their 1938 levels; whereas in 1949, this figure had been 90 per cent.[19] By 1953, post-war Hungarian manufacturing output fell to one-third of pre-war levels.[20] The Hungarian currency experienced substantial depreciation causing one of the highest documented rates of hyperinflation in history.[21] Manipulation of wage controls and different pricing systems for producers and consumers fueled discontent as foreign debt grew and the population experienced shortages.[4]

International events

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Stalin's body in Lenin's mausoleum

On March 5, 1953, Joseph Stalin died, ushering in a period of moderate liberalization in which most European communist parties developed a reformist wing. In Hungary, Imre Nagy, who had a reformist economic and political platform, replaced Mátyás Rákosi, "Stalin's Best Hungarian Disciple", as Prime Minister.[22] However, Rákosi remained General Secretary of the Party, enabling him to undermine most of Nagy's reforms and, by January 1955, have Nagy discredited and removed from office.[23]. After Khrushchev's "secret speech" of February 1956, in which he denounced Stalin and his protégés,[24] Rákosi was deposed as General Secretary of the Party and replaced by Ernő Gerő on July 18, 1956.[25]

On May 14, 1955, the Soviet Union created the Warsaw Pact, binding Hungary to the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe. Among the principles of this alliance were "respect for the independence and sovereignty of states" and "noninterference in their internal affairs".[26]

In 1955, the Austrian State Treaty and ensuing declaration of neutrality established Austria as demilitarized and neutral. This raised Hungarian hopes of also becoming neutral. In 1955 Nagy had in fact considered "...the possibility of Hungary adopting a neutral status on the Austrian pattern".[27] Austrian neutrality altered the calculus of cold war military planning as it geographically split the NATO Alliance from Geneva to Vienna, thus increasing Hungary's strategic importance to the Warsaw Pact.

In October 1956, the popular Polish reformist Władysław Gomułka was rehabilitated and made First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party. A workers' uprising in Poznań in June had been violently suppressed with scores of protesters killed and wounded by security police. Responding to popular demands, the Polish government granted broad powers to Gomułka to negotiate trade concessions and troop reductions with the Soviet government; after a few tense days of negotiations, the Soviet Presidium conceded.[28] This inspired Hungarian hopes for greater reforms and increased autonomy.[29] Support for Gomułka led to widespread pro-reform sentiment among Hungarian students, which directly precipitated events leading to the revolution.

Social unrest builds

Rákosi's resignation in July of 1956 emboldened students, writers and journalists to be more active and critical in politics. Students, assisted by the Writers’ Union, started a series of intellectual forums examining the problems facing Hungary. These forums, called Petõfi circles, became very popular, attracting thousands of participants.[30] In the middle of October, the reformer Imre Nagy was rehabilitated to full membership in the Hungarian Communist Party.

On 16 October 1956, university students in Szeged snubbed the official communist student union, the DISZ, by re-establishing the MEFESZ (Union of Hungarian University and Academy Students), a democratic student organization, previously banned under the Rákosi dictatorship.[6] Within days, the student bodies of Pécs, Miskolc, and Sopron followed suit. On 22 October, students of the Technical University in Budapest adopted a list of sixteen demands expressing their views on national policy.[31] The students heard that the Hungarian Writers’ Union was going to express solidarity with Poland on the following day by laying a wreath at the statue of General Bem, a hero of Hungary’s War of Independence of 1848-49, who was of Polish origin. The students decided to organize a parallel demonstration of sympathy.

Revolution

First shots

File:1956 Oct 23 Budapest Bem demonstration.jpg
Student demonstration under the Bem Statue on 23 October

On the afternoon of October 23, 1956, about 20,000 protesters convened next to the Bem statue. Péter Veres, President of the Writers’ Union, read a manifesto to the crowd,[32] the students read their proclamation, and the crowd then chanted the censored "National Song" (Nemzeti dal), the refrain of which states: "We vow, we vow, we will no longer remain slaves." Someone in the crowd cut out the communist coat of arms from the Hungarian Flag, leaving a distinctive hole and others quickly followed suit.[33] Afterwards, most of the crowd crossed the Danube to join demonstrators outside the Parliament Building. By 6 p.m. the crowd had swollen to more than 200,000 people;[34] the demonstration was impassioned, but peaceful.[35]

File:Hungarians atop stalin boots 1956.jpg
Revolutionaries atop the remains of the Stalin statue

At 8 p.m., First Secretary Ernő Gerő broadcast a speech condemning the writers' and students' demands, and dismissing the demonstrators as a reactionary mob.[36] Angered by Gerõ's hard line speech, some demonstrators decided to carry out one of these demands - the removal of Stalin's giant statue from central Budapest. by 9:30 p.m. the statue was down and protestors placed Hungarian flags in the boots atop the pedestal.[37]

At about the same time, a large crowd gathered at the Radio Budapest building, which was heavily guarded by the ÁVH. The flash point occurred as a delegation attempting to broadcast their demands was detained and the crowd grew increasingly unruly as rumors spread that the protestors had been shot. Tear gas was thrown from the upper windows and the ÁVH opened fire on the crowd, killing many.[38] The ÁVH tried to re-supply itself by hiding arms inside an ambulance, but the crowd detected the ruse and intercepted it. Hungarian soldiers sent to relieve the ÁVH hesitated and then tearing the red stars from their caps, sided with the crowd.[33][39] Provoked by the ÁVH attack, protesters reacted violently. Police cars were set ablaze, guns were seized from military depots and distributed to the masses and symbols of the communist regime were desecrated.[40]

Fighting spreads, government falls

File:Hungarian Free Radio.jpg
Hungarian Radio building (the banner reads "Free Hungarian Radio")

During the night of 23 October, Hungarian Communist Party Secretary Ernő Gerő requested Soviet military intervention "to suppress a demonstration that was reaching an ever greater and unprecedented scale."[28] By 2 am on October 24, under orders of the Soviet defense minister, Soviet tanks entered Budapest.[41]

On 24 October, Hungarians awoke to see Soviet tanks outside the Parliament building and Soviet soldiers guarding key bridges and crossroads. Armed revolutionaries quickly set up barricades to defend Budapest, and are reported to have already captured some Soviet tanks by mid-morning.[33] That day, Imre Nagy replaced András Hegedűs as Prime Minister.[42] On the radio, Nagy called for an end to violence and promised to initiate political reforms which had been shelved three years earlier. The population continued to arm itself as sporadic violence erupted. Armed protesters seized the radio building. At the offices of the Communist newspaper Szabad Nép unarmed demonstrators were fired upon by ÁVH guards who were then driven out as armed demonstrators arrived.[43] At this point, The revolutionaries' wrath focused on the ÁVH;[44] Soviet military units were not yet fully engaged, and there were many reports of some Soviet troops showing open sympathy for the demonstrators.[45]

On 25 October, a mass of protestors gathered in front of the Parliament Building as State Security Police (ÁVH) units began shooting into the crowd from the rooftops of neighboring buildings.[46] Some Soviet soldiers returned fire on the ÁVH, mistakenly believing that they were the targets of the shooting.[33][47] Supplied by arms taken from the ÁVH or given by Hungarian soldiers who joined the uprising, some in the crowd started shooting back.[33][48]

File:1956 hungary freedomfighter.jpg
Hungarian Revolutionary

Revolt became revolution as the Parliament massacre forced the collapse of the government.[49] Communist First Secretary Ernő Gerő and former Prime Minister András Hegedűs fled to the Soviet Union; Imre Nagy became Prime Minister and János Kádár First Secretary of the Communist Party.[50] Revolutionaries began an aggressive offensive against Soviet troops and the remnants of the ÁVH.

As the Hungarian resistance fought Soviet tanks using Molotov cocktails through the narrow streets of Budapest, revolutionary councils arose nationwide, assumed local governmental authority, and called for general strikes. Public Communist symbols such as red stars and Soviet war memorials were removed, and Communist books were burned. Spontaneous revolutionary militias arose, such as the 400-man group loosely led by József Dudás, which attacked or murdered Soviet sympathizers and ÁVH members.[51] Soviet units fought primarily in Budapest; elsewhere the countryside was largely quiet. Soviet commanders often negotiated local cease-fires with the revolutionaries.[52] In some regions, Soviet forces managed to quell revolutionary activity. In Budapest, the Soviets were eventually fought to a stand-still and hostilities began to wane. Hungarian general Béla Király, freed from a life sentence for political offenses and acting with the support of the Nagy government, sought to restore order by unifying elements of the police, army and insurgent groups into a National Guard.[53] A ceasefire was arranged on 28 October and by 30 October, most Soviet troops had withdrawn from Budapest to garrisons in the Hungarian countryside.[54]

Interlude

Hungarian political changes

File:Imre nagy1.jpg
Imre Nagy, head of the National Government formed on 27 October

The rapid spread of the uprising in the streets of Budapest and the abrupt fall of the Gerő-Hegedűs government left the new national leadership surprised, and at first disorganized in responding to the crisis. Nagy, known as a loyal Party intellectual and reformer and described as possessing "only modest political skills"[55], initially appealed to the public for calm and a return to the old order. Yet, as the only remaining Hungarian leader with credibility in both the eyes of the public and the Soviets, Nagy "at long last concluded that a popular uprising rather than a counter-revolution was taking place."[56] Calling the ongoing insurgency "a broad democratic mass movement" in a radio address on October 27, Nagy formed a government which included some non-communist ministers, and abolished both the ÁVH and the one-party system.[57][58] Because of its short tenure, the Nagy government could not clarify its policies, which were strongly influenced by popular opinion. Editorials stressed that Hungary should be a neutral, multiparty social democracy.[59] Many political prisoners were released, most notably József Cardinal Mindszenty. Political parties which were previously banned, such as the Independent Smallholders and the Social Democrats, reappeared to form a coalition government.

Local revolutionary councils formed throughout Hungary at the town and district levels, generally without involvement from the preoccupied national government in Budapest, and assumed various responsibilities of local government from the defunct communist party apparatus.[60] By 30 October, these councils had been officially sanctioned by the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party, and the Nagy government asked for their support as "autonomous, democratic local organs formed during the Revolution".[60] Likewise, workers' councils were established at industrial plants and mines, and many unpopular regulations such as production norms were eliminated. The workers' councils strove to manage the enterprise whilst protecting workers' interests; thus establishing a socialist economy free of rigid party control.[61] Local control by the councils was not always bloodless; in Debrecen, Gyor, Sopron, Mosonmagyaróvár and other cities, crowds of demonstrators were fired upon by the ÁVH, with many lives lost. The ÁVH were disarmed, often by force, in many cases assisted by the local police.[60]

Soviet perspective

On 24 October, the Politburo discussed the political upheavals in Poland and Hungary. A delegation in Budapest reported that the situation was not as dire as had been portrayed. Khrushchev stated that he believed that Party Secretary Ernő Gerő's request for intervention on 23 October indicated that the Hungarian Party still held the confidence of the Hungarian public. In addition, he saw the protests not as an ideological struggle, but as popular discontent over unresolved basic economic and social issues.[28]

Although it is widely believed that Hungary's declaration to exit the Warsaw Pact caused the Soviet military to crush the Revolution, minutes of the 31 October meeting of the Presidium of the Soviet Party indicate that this declaration was only one of several contributing factors.[62] Although a hard-line faction around Molotov was pushing for intervention, Khrushchev and Marshal Zhukov were initially opposed to intervention. After some debate, the Presidium at first decided not to remove the new Hungarian government.

Soon however, several key tendencies alarmed the Presidium and cemented the hard-line position:[63]

  • Simultaneous movements towards multiparty parliamentary democracy, and a democratic national council of workers, which could "lead towards a capitalist state." Both movements challenged the pre-eminence of the Soviet Communist Party in Eastern Europe and perhaps Soviet hegemony itself. For the majority of the Presidium, the instances of workers' control in Hungary were incompatible with their idea of socialism and needed to be stamped out. This policy of the Soviet Union was later explained by the Brezhnev Doctrine, which stated "When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries."
  • With the Western powers involved in the Suez Crisis, the Presidium was concerned with a perception of weakness by the Soviet Union in dealing with a regional uprising within the Eastern Bloc. Referring to France, Britain and the United States, Khrushchev reportedly stated "To Egypt, they will then add Hungary."[62]
  • Khrushchev stated that members of the Soviet party would not understand a failure to respond with force in Hungary. De-Stalinization had alienated the more conservative elements of the Party, who were alarmed at threats to Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. On June 17, 1953, workers in East Berlin staged an uprising, demanding the resignation of the government of the German Democratic Republic. This was quickly and violently put down with the help of the Soviet military, with 84 strikers killed and wounded and 700 arrested.[64] In June 1956, in Poznań, Poland, an anti-government workers' revolt was suppressed by the Polish security forces with 74 deaths. Additionally, by late October, unrest was noticed in some regional areas of the European Soviet Union: while this unrest was minor, it was intolerable.
  • Hungarian neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact represented a threat to the Soviet defensive and ideological buffer zone of satellite nations.[65] Soviet international relations in central Europe were not only dictated by a desire for empire, but by a fear of invasion from the West. These fears were deeply ingrained in Soviet foreign policy, reaching back to the Russian Civil War and the Polish-Soviet War in the 1920s. However, it was the Operation Barbarossa in 1941, when the Hungarian state was an ally during the German invasion of the Soviet Union, which cemented the Soviet concept of a necessary defensive buffer of allied states in central Europe.

With this combination of political and foreign policy considerations, the Presidium decided to break the de facto ceasefire and crush the Hungarian revolution. The plan was to declare a "Provisional Revolutionary Government" under János Kádár, who would appeal for Soviet assistance to restore order. According to witnesses, Kadar was in Moscow in early November[66] and he was in contact with the Soviet embassy while still a member of the Nagy government.[67] Delegations were sent to other Communist governments in Eastern Europe and China, and to Tito in Yugoslavia, seeking to avoid a regional conflict, and propaganda messages prepared for broadcast as soon as the second Soviet intervention had begun. To disguise these intentions, Soviet diplomats were to engage the Nagy government in talks discussing the withdrawal of Soviet forces.[62] On 31 October, Pravda announced "The Soviet Government is prepared to enter into the appropriate negotiations with the government of the Hungarian People's Republic and other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary".[68]

International reaction

Although the US Secretary of State recommended on 24 October that the United Nations Security Council convene to discuss the situation in Hungary, little immediate action was taken to introduce a resolution.[69] Engaged by the looming Suez crisis, Dulles declared on 27 October: "We do not look upon these nations as potential military allies." Responding to the plea by Nagy at the time of the second massive Soviet intervention on 4 November, the Security Council resolution critical of Soviet actions was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The General Assembly, by a vote of 50 in favor, 8 against and 15 abstentions, called on the Soviet Union to end its Hungarian intervention, but the newly constituted Kádár government rejected UN observers.[70]

U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower was aware of a detailed study of Hungarian resistance, which recommended against U.S. military intervention,[71] and of earlier policy discussions within the National Security Council which focused upon encouraging discontent in Soviet satellite nations only by economic policies and political rhetoric.[72][73] In a 1998 interview, Hungarian Ambassador Géza Jeszenszky was critical of Western inaction in 1956, citing the influence of the United Nations at that time and giving the example of UN intervention in Korea from 1950-53.[74]

During the uprising, the Radio Free Europe (RFE) Hungarian-language programs broadcast news of the political and military situation, as well as appealing to Hungarians to fight the Soviet forces, including tactical advice on resistance methods. After the Soviet suppression of the revolution, RFE was criticized for having misled the Hungarian people that NATO or United Nations would intervene if the citizens continued to resist.[75]

Soviet intervention

File:1956 hungarians flee.gif
Hungarians flee as the revolution is crushed

On 1 November, Imre Nagy received reports that Soviet forces had entered Hungary from the east and were moving towards Budapest.[76] Nagy sought and received assurances from Soviet ambassador Yuri Andropov that the Soviet Union would not invade, although Andropov knew otherwise. The Cabinet, with János Kádár in agreement, declared Hungary's neutrality, withdrew from the Warsaw Pact, and requested both the diplomatic corps in Budapest and the UN Secretary-General that the major powers should help to defend Hungary's neutrality.[77] Ambassador Andropov was asked to inform his government that Hungary would begin negotiations on the removal of Soviet forces immediately.[78][79]

On November 3, a Hungarian delegation led by the Minister of Defense Pál Maléter attended negotiations on Soviet withdrawal at the Soviet Military Command at Tököl, near Budapest. At around midnight that evening, General Ivan Serov, Chief of the Soviet Security Police (NKVD) ordered the arrest of the Hungarian delegation, and the next day, the Soviet army again attacked Budapest.

This second Soviet intervention, codenamed "Operation Whirlwind", was launched by Marshall Ivan Konev on November 1 by redeployment of Soviet troops.[80] Soviet divisions stationed in the country before 23 October were augmented by three army corps for a campaign to begin 4 November. The new Soviet troops, in order to insure loyalty, had been recruited from faraway Soviet Central Asia, and many did not speak European languages. Many believed they were being sent to Berlin to fight German fascists.[81]

File:Nagy Imre final appeal.jpg
Imre Nagy broadcasts final appeal

At 5:20 a.m. on November 4, Imre Nagy broadcast his final plea to the nation and the world, announcing that Soviet Forces were attacking Budapest and that the Government remained at its post.[82] The broadcaster, Radio Free Kossuth, stopped broadcasting at 8:07 a.m.[83] An emergency Cabinet meeting was held in the Parliament building, but was attended by only three Ministers. As Soviet troops surrounded and occupied the building, a negotiated evacuation ensued, leaving Minister of State István Bibó as the last representative of the Hungarian government remaining at post.[84] Awaiting arrest, he wrote a stirring proclamation to the nation and the world.

Shortly thereafter, in Szolnok, János Kádár proclaimed the "Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government". His statement declared "We must put an end to the excesses of the counter-revolutionary elements. The hour for action has sounded. We are going to defend the interest of the workers and peasants and the achievements of the people's democracy."[85] Later that Evening, Kádár called upon "the faithful fighters of the true cause of socialism" to come out of hiding and take up arms. However, Hungarian support did not materialize; the fighting did not take on the character of a civil war which divides a population, but rather that of a well-equipped foreign army conquering a nation.[86]

Operation Whirlwind, unlike the intervention of 23 October, did not rely on unsupported tank columns penetrating dense urban areas, but instead utilized a combined arms strategy of air strikes, artillery bombardments, and coordinated tank-infantry action by 17 divisions.[87] While the Hungarian Army put up an uncoordinated resistance, working class Hungarians bore the brunt of the fighting. Due to the strength of working class resistance, it was the industrial areas of Budapest which were primarily targeted by Soviet artillery and air strikes. These actions continued in an improvised manner until the last pockets of resistance called for a ceasefire on 10 November. Over 2,500 Hungarian rebels and 722 Soviet troops were killed and thousands more were wounded.[88][89]

Aftermath

Hungary

File:János Kádár.jpeg
János Kádár

Between 10 November and 19 December workers' councils negotiated directly with the occupying Soviets. While they achieved some prisoner releases, they did not achieve a Soviet withdrawal. Thousands of Hungarians were arrested, imprisoned and deported to the Soviet Union, many without evidence.[90] Approximately 200,000 Hungarians fled Hungary,[91] some 26,000 were put on trial by the Kádár government, and of those 13,000 were imprisoned.[citation needed] Although CIA documents report approximately 1,200 executions, former Hungarian Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky estimated 350 were executed.[74] Sporadic armed resistance and strikes by workers' councils continued until mid-1957, causing substantial economic disruption.

With most of Budapest under Soviet control by 8 November, Kádár became Prime Minister of the "Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government" and General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party. Few Hungarians rejoined the reorganized Party, its leadership having been purged under the supervision of the Soviet Presidium, led by Georgy Malenkov and Mikhail Suslov.[92] Although Party membership declined from 800,000 before the uprising to 100,000 by December 1956, Kádár steadily increased his control over Hungary and neutralized dissenters. The new government attempted to enlist support by espousing popular principles of Hungarian self-determination voiced during the uprising, but Soviet troops remained.[93] After 1956 the Soviet Union severely purged the Hungarian Army and reinstituted political indoctrination in the units that remained. In May 1957, the Soviet Union increased its troop levels in Hungary and by treaty Hungary accepted the Soviet presence on a permanent basis.[94]

File:1956 Hungarian Refugees in Austria.jpg
1956 Hungarian Refugees fleeing into Austria

The Red Cross and the Austrian Army established refugee camps in Traiskirchen and Graz.[91] Imre Nagy along with Georg Lukács, Géza Losonczy and László Rajk's widow, Júlia, took refuge in the Embassy of Yugoslavia as Soviet forces overran Budapest. Despite assurances of safe passage out of Hungary by the Soviets and the Kádár government, Nagy and his group were arrested when attempting to leave the embassy on 22 November and taken to Romania. Losonczy died while on a hunger strike in prison awaiting trial when his jailers "carelessly pushed a feeding tube down his windpipe."[95] The remainder of the group was returned to Budapest in 1958. Nagy was executed, along with Pál Maléter and Miklós Gimes, after secret trials in June 1958. Their bodies were placed in unmarked graves in the Municipal Cemetery outside Budapest.[96]

By 1963 most political prisoners from the 1956 Hungarian revolution had been released.[97] During the November 1956 Soviet assault on Budapest, Cardinal Mindszenty was granted political asylum at the United States embassy, where he lived for the next 15 years, refusing to leave Hungary unless the government reversed his 1949 conviction for treason. Due to poor health and a request from the Vatican, he finally left the embassy for Austria in September 1971.[98]

International

The events in Hungary reinforced the inability of the Western alliance to roll back Soviet domination during the height of the Cold War, fearing retaliation by Warsaw Pact forces along their borders. Soviet action had clearly shown that, regardless of national ambitions of the Warsaw Pact client nations, armed force would be used to maintain regimes that reflected Soviet-style communism. Heinrich von Brentano, Foreign Minister of West Germany, recommended that the people of Eastern Europe be discouraged from "taking dramatic action which might have disastrous consequences for themselves." NATO Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak called the Hungarian revolt "the collective suicide of a whole people".[99] These lessons were reinforced twelve years later when similar events unfolded in Czechoslovakia where an attempt at liberalization was ended by another invasion by Soviet-led forces. In this later example, First Secretary Alexander Dubcek had learned from the experience of the Hungarians and pleaded with his citizens not to resist.

In January 1957, United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, acting in response to UN General Assembly resolutions requesting investigation and observation of the events in Soviet-occupied Hungary, established the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary.[100] The Committee, with representatives from Australia, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay, conducted hearings in New York, Geneva, Rome, Vienna and London. Over five months, 111 refugees were interviewed including ministers, military commanders and other officials of the Nagy government, workers, revolutionary council members, factory managers and technicians, communists and non-communists, students, writers, teachers, medical personnel and Hungarian soldiers. Documents, newspapers, radio transcripts, photos, film footage and other records from Hungary were also reviewed, as well as written testimony of 200 other Hungarians.[101] The governments of Hungary and Romania refused the UN officials of the Committee entry, and the government of the Soviet Union did not respond to requests for information.[102] The 268-page Committee Report[103] was presented to the General Assembly on June 1957, documenting the course of the uprising and Soviet intervention, and concluding that the Kádár government and Soviet occupation were in violation of the human rights of the Hungarian people.[104] A General Assembly resolution was approved, deploring the repression of the Hungarian people and the Soviet occupation, but no other action was taken.[105]

File:Time Man of the year 1957Hunagarianfreedom fighter.jpg
The January 7, 1957 "Man of the Year" edition of Time magazine and accompanying article[106] recognized the Hungarian people.

At the Melbourne Olympics, the Soviet handling of the Hungarian uprising led to a boycott by Spain, the Netherlands and Switzerland.[107] A confrontation between Soviet and Hungarian teams occurred in the semi-final game of the water polo tournament; the play was extremely violent. The match was called off in the final minute to quell fighting amongst spectators. Some members of the Hungarian Olympic delegation defected after the games. The match became the subject of a Quentin Tarantino documentary called Freedom's Fury.[108]

The events in Hungary produced ideological fractures within the Communist parties of Western Europe. Within the Italian Communist Party (PCI) a split ensued: most ordinary members and the Party leadership, including Palmiro Togliatti and Giorgio Napolitano, regarded the Hungarian insurgents as counter-revolutionaries, as reported in l'Unità, the official PCI newspaper. However Giuseppe Di Vittorio, chief of the Communist trade union CGIL, repudiated the leadership position, as did the prominent party member Antonio Giolitti and many influential Communist intellectuals, who later were expelled or left the party. Pietro Nenni, the national secretary of the Italian Socialist Party, a close ally of the PCI, opposed the Soviet intervention as well. Napolitano, elected in 2006 as President of the Italian Republic, wrote in his 2005 political autobiography that he regretted his justification of Soviet action in Hungary, and that at the time he believed in Party unity and the international leadership of Soviet communism.[109] Within the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), dissent that began with the repudiation of Stalinism by John Saville and E.P. Thompson, influential historians and members of the Communist Party Historians Group, culminated in a loss of thousands of party members as events unfolded in Hungary. Peter Fryer, correspondent for the CPGB newspaper The Daily Worker, reported accurately on the violent suppression of the uprising, but his dispatches were heavily censored;[81] Fryer resigned from the paper upon his return, and was later expelled from the communist party. In France, moderate communists, such as historian Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie resigned, questioning the policy of supporting Soviet actions by the French Communist Party. The French philosopher and writer Albert Camus wrote an open letter criticizing the West's inaction.

Commemoration

 
1956 Revolution Flag flying before Parliament

In December 1991, the preamble of the treaties with the dismembered Soviet Union, under Mikhail Gorbachev, and Russia represented by Boris Yeltsin, apologized officially for the 1956 Soviet actions in Hungary. This apology was repeated by Yeltsin in 1992 during a speech to the Hungarian parliament.[74]

On 13 February, 2006, the US State Department commemorated the Fiftieth anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. US Secretary of State Rice commented on the contributions made by 1956 Hungarian refugees to the United States and other host countries, as well as the role of Hungary in providing refuge to East Germans during the 1989 protests against that communist government.[110]

After the fall of the communist regime, the Republic of Hungary was declared on 23 October 1989, the 33rd anniversary of the Revolution, and Imre Nagy's body was reburied with full honors.[96] Today, 23 October is a Hungarian national holiday.

References

  1. ^ Györkei, Jenõ (1999). Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 1956. New York: Central European University Press. p. 350. ISBN 963-9116-36-X. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  2. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter V footnote 8 Template:PDF
  3. ^ Alternate references are "Hungarian Revolt" and "Hungarian Uprising"; "Revolution" is used as it conforms to both English (see U.S. Department of State background on Hungary) and Hungarian conventions. Princeton's WordNet[1] distinguishes between Revolution and its alternates as a matter of either succeeding to overthrow a government ("revolution") or merely trying (alternates). The 1956 Hungarian event, evaluated strictly, may be seen as a true "revolution" in that the Hegedũs Government and ÁVH were indeed deposed, however the extent of success and failure is still debated.
  4. ^ a b Library of Congress: Country Studies: Hungary, Chapter 3 Economic Policy and Performance, 1945-85 Retrieved 27 August 2006
  5. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.A (Developments before 22 October 1956), paragraph 49 (p. 18) Template:PDF
  6. ^ a b Crampton, R. J. (2003). Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century–and After, p. 295. Routledge: London. ISBN 04-151-6422-2.
  7. ^ The Library of Congress: Country Studies; CIA World Factbook Retrieved 13 October 2006
  8. ^ In 1949 the ruling communist parties of the founding states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance were also linked internationally through the Cominform Library of Congress Country Studies Appendix B -- Germany (East)
  9. ^ Norton, Donald H. (2002). Essentials of European History: 1935 to the Present, p. 47. REA: Piscataway, New Jersey. ISBN 08-789-1711-X.
  10. ^ Kertesz, Stephen D. (1953). Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, Chapter VIII (Hungary, a Republic), p.139-52. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana. ISBN 0-8371-7540-2. {{cite book}}: External link in |title= (help) Retrieved 8 October 2006
  11. ^ a b UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.A (Developments before 22 October 1956), paragraph 47 (p. 18) Template:PDF
  12. ^ a b Tőkés, Rudolf L. (1998). Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Succession, p. 317. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. ISBN 05-215-7850-7
  13. ^ a b Gati, Charles (2006). Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0804756066. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help) (page 49. Gati describes "the most gruesome forms of psychological and physical torture...The reign of terror (by the Rákosi government) turned out to be harsher and more extensive than it was in any of the other Soviet satellites in Central and Eastern Europe." He further references a report prepared after the collapse of communism, the Fact Finding Commision Torvenytelen szocializmus (Lawless Socialism): "Between 1950 and early 1953, the courts dealt with 650,000 cases (of political crimes), of whom 387,000 or 4 percent of the population were found guilty. (Budapest, Zrinyi Kiado/Uj Magyarorszag, 1991, 154).
  14. ^ Template:Hu icon In February 1950, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party defined the supplantion of bourgeois leaders as its main goal. József Darvas, the Minister of Education and Religion from February 1950, wrote about secondary educational reforms in the pedagogical magazine Köznevelés (17 September 1950): "The conversion of different grammar schools to industrial technical institutes, agricultural technical institutes, economical vocational high schools and training-colleges for school teachers and kindergarten instructors tends to the success of the five year plan by supplying many of the needed technicians." On 30 October 1950, new guidelines were set for the colleges and universities: Marxism-Leninism should be the main subject in all classes, and studying the Russian language became mandatory. By the end of 1951, 107 new course books were issued, 61 of which were translations of texts used in Soviet universities. The number of students had to be increased by an additional 30,000 over the next five years. Kardos,József (2003). "Monograph" (PDF). Iskolakultúra. 6–7 (June-July 2003). University of Pécs: pp. 73-80. Retrieved 2006-10-09. {{cite journal}}: |pages= has extra text (help); External link in |last= (help)
  15. ^ Douglas, J. D. and Philip Comfort (eds.) (1992). Who's Who in Christian History, p. 478. Tyndale House: Carol Stream, Illinois. ISBN 08-423-1014-2
  16. ^ The Avalon Project at Yale Law School: Armistice Agreement with Hungary; January 20, 1945 Retrieved 27 August 2006
  17. ^ Kertesz, Stephen D. (1953). Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, Memorandum of the Hungarian National Bank on Reparations, Appendix Document 16. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana. ISBN 0-8371-7540-2. {{cite book}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help); External link in |title= (help) Retrieved 8 October 2006
  18. ^ Kertesz, Stephen D. (1953). Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, Chapter IX (Soviet Russia and Hungary's Economy), p. 158. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana. ISBN 0-8371-7540-2. {{cite book}}: External link in |title= (help) Retrieved 10 October 2006
  19. ^ Transformation of the Hungarian economyThe Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (2003), Accessed September 27, 2006
  20. ^ Kertesz, Stephen D. (1953). Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana. ISBN 0-8371-7540-2. {{cite book}}: External link in |title= (help) Retrieved 27 Aug 2006
  21. ^ Magyar Nemzeti Bank - English Site: History Retrieved 27 August 2006
  22. ^ János M. Rainer (Paper presented on October 4, 1997 at the workshop “European Archival Evidence. Stalin and the Cold War in Europe", Budapest, 1956 Institute). "Stalin and Rákosi, Stalin and Hungary, 1949-1953". Retrieved 2006-10-08. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  23. ^ Gati, Charles (2006). Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0804756066. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help) (page 64)
  24. ^ Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, First Secretary, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (February 24–25, 1956). "On the Personality Cult and its Consequences". Special report at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Retrieved 2006-08-27.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: date format (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  25. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.A (Developments before 22 October 1956), paragraph 48 (p. 18) Template:PDF
  26. ^ Halsall, Paul (Editor) (November 1998). "The Warsaw Pact, 1955; Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance" (HTML). Internet Modern History Sourcebook. Fordham University. Retrieved 2006-10-08. {{cite web}}: |first= has generic name (help); External link in |work= (help)
  27. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter VIII The Question Of The Presence And The Utilization Of The Soviet Armed Forces In The Light Of Hungary’s International Commitments , Section D. The demand for withdrawal of Soviet armed forces, para 339 (p. 105) Template:PDF
  28. ^ a b c "Notes from the Minutes of the CPSU CC Presidium Meeting with Satellite Leaders, October 24, 1956" (Template:PDF). The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, A History in Documents. George Washington University: The National Security Archive. November 4, 2002. Retrieved 2006-09-02.
  29. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.A, para 50 (p. 19) Template:PDF
  30. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter IX.B (The background of the uprising), para 384 (p. 123) Template:PDF
  31. ^ Internet Modern History Sourcebook: Resolution by students of the Building Industry Technological University: Sixteen Political, Economic, and Ideological Points, Budapest, October 22, 1956 Retrieved 27 August 2006
  32. ^ Hungarian Revolt, October 23 - November 4, 1956 (Richard Lettis and William I. Morris, editors): Appendices Proclamation of the Hungarian Writers' Union (23 October 1956) Retrieved 8 September 2006
  33. ^ a b c d e Heller, Andor (1957). No More Comrades. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. pp. pp. 9-84. ASIN B0007DOQP0. {{cite book}}: |pages= has extra text (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  34. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.A (Meetings and demonstrations), para 54 (p. 19) Template:PDF
  35. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.C (The First Shots), para 55 (p. 20) Template:PDF
  36. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.C (The First Shots), para 55 (p. 20) Template:PDF
  37. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.C (The First Shots), para 55 (p. 20) Template:PDF
  38. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.C (The First Shots), para 56 (p. 20) Template:PDF
  39. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.C (The First Shots), para 56 (p. 20) Template:PDF
  40. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.C (The First Shots), paragraphs 56-57 (p. 20) Template:PDF
  41. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.C, para 58 (p. 20) Template:PDF
  42. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter IV.C, para 225 (p. 71) Template:PDF
  43. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.C, para 57 (p. 20) Template:PDF
  44. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.N, para 89(ix) (p. 31) Template:PDF
  45. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter IV.B (Resistance of the Hungarian people) para 166 (p. 52) and XI.H (Further developments) para 480 (p 152) Template:PDF
  46. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter X.I, para 482 (p. 153) Template:PDF
  47. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.F, para 64 (p. 22) Template:PDF
  48. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter X.I, para 482 (p. 153) Template:PDF
  49. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.F, para 65 (p. 22) Template:PDF
  50. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter XII.B, para 565 (p. 174) Template:PDF
  51. ^ Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), KGB Chief Serov's report, 29 October 1956, (by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) Retrieved 8 October 2006
  52. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter IV.C, para 167 (p. 53) Template:PDF
  53. ^ Gati, Charles (2006). Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Cold War International History Project Series). Stanford University Press. ISBN 0804756066. (pp. 176-177)
  54. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.F (Political Developments) II.G (Mr. Nagy clarifies his position), paragraphs 67-70 (p. 23) Template:PDF
  55. ^ Gati, Charles (2006). Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0804756066. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help) (page 52)
  56. ^ Gati, Charles (2006). Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0804756066. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help) (page 173)
  57. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.F (Political developments), paragraph 66 (p. 22) Template:PDF
  58. ^ Zinner, Paul E. (1962). Revolution in Hungary. Books for Libraries Press. ISBN 0836968174.
  59. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary(1957) Chapter XII.D (Reassertion of Political Rights), paragraph 583 (p. 179) and footnote 26 (p. 183) Template:PDF
  60. ^ a b c UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter XI (Revolutionary and Workers' Councils), paragraph 485-560 (pp. 154-) Template:PDF
  61. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.E (Revolutionary and Workers' Councils), paragraph 63 (p. 22) Template:PDF
  62. ^ a b c "Working Notes and Attached Extract from the Minutes of the CPSU CC Presidium Meeting, October 31, 1956" (Template:PDF). The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, A History in Documents. George Washington University: The National Security Archive. November 4, 2002. Retrieved 2006-07-08.
  63. ^ Rainer, János M. (1996-11-01). "Decision in the Kremlin, 1956 -- the Malin Notes". Paper presented at Rutgers University. The Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Retrieved 2006-09-07. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  64. ^ Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Report from A. Grechko and Tarasov in Berlin to N.A. Bulganin, (by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) Retrieved 10 October 2006
  65. ^ Okváth, Imre (1999). "Hungary in the Warsaw Pact: The Initial Phase of Integration, 1957 - 1971". The Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Retrieved 2006-09-04. by permission of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich and the National Security Archive at the George Washington University on behalf of the PHP network
  66. ^ Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 3 November 1956, with Participation by J. Kádár, F. Münnich, and I. Horváth, (by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) Retrieved 8 October 2006
  67. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.J (Mr. Kádár forms a government), para 77-78 (p. 26-27) Template:PDF
  68. ^ "Overview". The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, A History in Documents. George Washington University: The National Security Archive. 1999. Retrieved 2006-09-04.
  69. ^ Csaba Békés (Hungarian Quarterly (Spring 2000)). "The Hungarian Question on the UN Agenda: Secret Negotiations by the Western Great Powers October 26th-November 4th 1956. (British Foreign Office Documents)". Retrieved 2006-10-08. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  70. ^ Hungarian Revolt, October 23 - November 4, 1956 (Richard Lettis and William I. Morris, editors): Appendices The Hungary Question in the United Nations Retrieved 3 September 2006
  71. ^ "Study Prepared for US Army Intelligence "Hungary, Resistance Activities and Potentials" (January 1956)" (Template:PDF). The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, A History in Documents. George Washington University: The National Security Archive. November 4, 2002. Retrieved 2006-09-03.
  72. ^ "Minutes of the 290th NSC Meeting (July 12, 1956)" (Template:PDF). The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, A History in Documents. George Washington University: The National Security Archive. November 4, 2002. Retrieved 2006-09-03.
  73. ^ Borhi, László (1999). "Containment, Rollback, Liberation or Inaction? The United States and Hungary in the 1950s". Journal of Cold War Studies. 1 (3): 67–108. Retrieved 2006-09-03.
  74. ^ a b c CNN: Géza Jeszenszky, Hungarian Ambassador, Cold War Chat (transcript) November 8, 1998
  75. ^ "Policy Review of Voice For Free Hungary Programming from October 23 to November 23, 1956 (December 15, 1956)" (Template:PDF). The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, A History in Documents. George Washington University: The National Security Archive. November 4, 2002. Retrieved 2006-09-02.
  76. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter VIII.D, para 336 (p. 103) Template:PDF
  77. ^ Imre Nagy’s Telegram to Diplomatic Missions in Budapest Declaring Hungary’s Neutrality (1 November 1956) by permission of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich and the National Security Archive at the George Washington University on behalf of the PHP network
  78. ^ "Andropov Report, 1 November 1956". Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Retrieved 2006-09-04.
  79. ^ "Minutes of the Nagy Government's Fourth Cabinet Meeting, 1 November 1956" (Template:PDF). The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, A History in Documents. George Washington University: The National Security Archive. November 4, 2002. Retrieved 2006-09-02.
  80. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter IV.E (Logistical deployment of new Soviet troops), para 181 (p. 56) Template:PDF
  81. ^ a b Fryer, Peter (1957). Hungarian Tragedy. London: D. Dobson. pp. Chapter 9 (The Second Soviet Intervention). ASIN B0007J7674.
  82. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter VII.D (The Political Background of the Second Soviet Intervention), para 291 (p. 89) Template:PDF
  83. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter VII.D (a silent carrier wave was detected until 9:45 am), para 292 (p. 89) Template:PDF
  84. ^ Bibó, István (1991). Democracy, Revolution, Self-Determination. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. pp. 325-327. ISBN 0-88033-214-X. {{cite book}}: |pages= has extra text (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  85. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter VIII.B (The Political Background of the Second Soviet Intervention), para 596 (p. 185) Template:PDF
  86. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter VIII.B (The Political Background of the Second Soviet Intervention), para 600 (p. 186) Template:PDF
  87. ^ Györkei, Jenõ (1999). Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 1956. New York: Central European University Press. p. 350. ISBN 963-9116-36-X. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  88. ^ Mark Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.33, No.2, Apr. 1998, p.210.
  89. ^ Péter Gosztonyi, "Az 1956-os forradalom számokban", Népszabadság (Budapest), 3 November 1990, 3
  90. ^ "Report by Soviet Deputy Interior Minister M. N. Holodkov to Interior Minister N. P. Dudorov (November 15, 1956)" (Template:PDF). The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, A History in Documents. George Washington University: The National Security Archive. November 4, 2002. Retrieved 2006-09-02.
  91. ^ a b Cseresnyés, Ferenc (Summer 1999). "The '56 Exodus to Austria". The Hungarian Quarterly. XL (154). Society of the Hungarian Quarterly: pp. 86-101. Retrieved 2006-10-09. {{cite journal}}: |pages= has extra text (help)
  92. ^ "Situation Report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party by Malenkov-Suslov-Aristov (November 22, 1956)" (Template:PDF). The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, A History in Documents. George Washington University: The National Security Archive. November 4, 2002. Retrieved 2006-09-02.
  93. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter XIV.I.A, para 642 (p. 198), János Kádár's 15 points (4 November 1956) Template:PDF
  94. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Annex A (Agreement between the Hungarian People Republic and the government of the USSR on the legal status of Soviet forces) pp. 112-113) Template:PDF
  95. ^ Fryer, Peter (1997). Hungarian Tragedy, p. 10. Index Books: London. ISBN 1-871518-14-8.
  96. ^ a b "On This Day 16 June, 1989: Hungary reburies fallen hero Imre Nagy" British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reports on Nagy reburial with full honors. (Accessed October 13, 2006)
  97. ^ Békés, Csaba, Malcolm Byrne, János M. Rainer (2002). Hungarian Tragedy, p. L. Central European University Press: Budapest. ISBN 96-392-4166-0.
  98. ^ "End of a Private Cold War". Time Magazine. 1971-10-11. Retrieved 2006-09-03. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  99. ^ "How to Help Hungary". Time Magazine. 1956-12-24. Retrieved 2006-09-03. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  100. ^ United Nations General Assembly Document A/3485: [http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/dag/docs/a3485e.pdf Report of the Secretary-General (5 January 1957) Retrieved 13 October 2006
  101. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter I.D (Organization and Function of the Committee), paragraphs 1-26 (pp. 10-13) Template:PDF
  102. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter I.E (Attempts to observe in Hungary and meet Imre Nagy), paragraphs 32-34 (p. 14) Template:PDF
  103. ^ UN General Assembly (1957) Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary Accessed October 14, 2006
  104. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Chapter II.N (Summary of conclusions), paragraph 89 (pp. 30-32) Template:PDF
  105. ^ United Nations General Assembly, Thirteenth Session: Resolution 1312 (XIII) The Situation in Hungary (Item 59, p. 69 (12 December 1958)
  106. ^ "Man Of The Year, The Land and the People". Time Magazine. 1957-01-07. Retrieved 2006-10-09. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  107. ^ International Olympic Committee: Melbourne/Stockholm 1956 Did you know? Retrieved 13 October 2006
  108. ^ Radio Free Europe: Hungary: New Film Revisits 1956 Water-Polo Showdown Retrieved 13 October 2006
  109. ^ Napolitano, Giorgio (2005). Dal Pci al socialismo europeo. Un'autobiografia politica (From the Communist Party to European Socialism. A political autobiography) (in Italian). Laterza. ISBN 88-420-7715-1.
  110. ^ "US State Department Commemorates the 1956 Hungarian Revolution" (Press release). American Hungarian Federation. 2006-02-13. Retrieved 2006-10-08. {{cite press release}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)

Further reading

  • Arendt, Hannah (1951). Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt. pp. pp. 480-510. ISBN 0-15-670153-7. {{cite book}}: |pages= has extra text (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Bekes, Csaba (Editor) (2003). The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents (National Security Archive Cold War Readers). Central European University Press. pp. 600 pages. ISBN 9639241660. {{cite book}}: |first= has generic name (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Bibó, István (1991). Democracy, Revolution, Self-Determination. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. pp. 331-354. ISBN 0-88033-214-X. {{cite book}}: |pages= has extra text (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Gati, Charles (2006). Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Cold War International History Project Series). Stanford University Press. pp. 264 pages. ISBN 0804756066.
  • Györkei, Jenõ (1999). Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 1956. New York: Central European University Press. p. 350. ISBN 963-9116-36-X. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Kertesz, Stephen D. (1953). Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana. ISBN 0837175402. {{cite book}}: External link in |title= (help)
  • Morris, William E. (Reprint edition (August 2001)). The Hungarian Revolt: October 23 - November 4, 1956. Simon Publications. ISBN 1931313792. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
  • Napolitano, Giorgio (2005). Dal Pci al socialismo europeo. Un'autobiografia politica (From the Communist Party to European Socialism. A political autobiography) (in Italian). Laterza. ISBN 8842077151.
  • Sugar, Peter F. (1994). A History of Hungary: From Liberation to Revolution (pp. 368-83). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 448 pages. ISBN 025320867X. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: publisher ___location (link)
  • United Nations: Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, General Assembly, Official Records, Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/3592), New York, 1957 (268 pages) Template:PDF
  • Zinner, Paul E. (1962). Revolution in Hungary. Books for Libraries Press. pp. 380 pages. ISBN 0836968174.
Historical collections
 
Wikimedia Commons has media related to Hungarian Revolution of 1956.
  • Institute of Revolutionary History, Hungary A Hungarian language site providing historical photos and documents, books and reviews, and links to English language sites.
  • The Hungarian Revolt, October 23 - November 4, 1956 A Scribner research anthology of written sources on the Hungarian Revolt, edited by Richard Lettis and William I. Morris. Documents include radio broadcasts, newspaper and magazine articles, and portions of books on the revolt.
  • 1956 Hungarian Revolution Collection of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project (Virtual Archive 2.0), containing documents and other source materials relating to the 1956 Revolution.
  • 1956 newspaper front pages Historic front pages from Hungarian newspapers, June to December 1956.
Published accounts
Commemorations
  • 1956 and Hungary: The Memory of Eyewitnesses - In Search of Freedom and Democracy The website of the international conference (September 28-September 29, 2006) to commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The conference will review the events of the 1950's era, based on the personal experience of those who left Hungary after the revolution, who found a new home in other countries, and have contributed to their development.
  • The 1956 Portal A resource for Hungarian-American organizations to highlight and promote their 1956 Hungarian Revolution commemoration activities, including 1956 photos, videos, resources, and events across the US.
  • Project 56 A multimedia project for the celebration of Hungarian life & culture with a focus on the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and its aftermath.
  • CHR50 Festival of Freedom The Cleveland Hungarian Revolution 50th Anniversary Committee website describing planned events on October 21 and October 22, 2006 in Cleveland, Ohio, a city with many citizens of Hungarian heritage.
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